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This dissertation investigates how presidents build successful legislative 
coalitions and enact their agenda into law in the United States Congress.  It argues that 
constituencies and electoral incentives cause members of Congress to respond to the 
president’s agenda in a systematic manner.  The president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies interacts with members’ electoral incentives to determine whether 
members will vote for or against the president.  The theoretical claims presented in this 
dissertation are supported by a combination of case studies and quantitative analysis.  The 
empirical analysis utilizes a dataset with observations for every member of Congress 
from 1957 to the present.  I find that constituency-level presidential strength causes 
systematic variance in members’ response to the president’s agenda.  Vulnerable 
members of Congress are particularly sensitive to the president’s strength in their 
constituencies, while safe members of Congress are a bit less attentive to their 
constituencies.  These findings contribute to our understanding of American politics by 
showing that the president’s ability to enact agenda items into law is affected by much 
more than mere party politics.  This conclusion is especially relevant in the modern, 
polarized era in American politics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On July 22, 2009, during a nationally televised prime-time press conference a 
reporter asked President Obama if it was the president’s job to “get a deal done” on a 
national health care reform bill.  “Absolutely, it's my job. I'm the president. And I think 
this has to get done” Obama immediately responded (CQ Transcriptions 2009).  The next 
day at a town hall meeting in Shaker Heights, Ohio the president forcefully reiterated his 
goals for Congress on health care reform.  He abandoned his previously imposed August 
deadline for the passage of health care legislation, moving the deadline to the end of 
2009.  Still, he made it clear what he expected of Congress, proclaiming to the crowd: “I 
want the bill to get out of the committees; and then I want that bill to go to the floor; and 
then I want that bill to be reconciled between the House and the Senate; and then I want 
to sign a bill” (Kaiser Health News).  On one of the potentially biggest changes to 
domestic policy in years, the president took responsibility for the bill’s passage and set 
clear goals and deadlines for Congress. 
 President Obama’s health care experience demonstrates that the president looms 
large as a legislative leader in today’s political world.  The president shares power with 
other legislative players such as party leaders and committee chairs, but he is clearly one 
of the most powerful players.  In fact, he is now perhaps the most powerful player in the 
legislative arena.  This situation is not exactly what the designers of the Constitution 
intended.  While the Constitution gave the president some power in the legislative arena, 
the Founders did not foresee a future where the president led the legislature.  To the 
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contrary, they worried often and openly that the Congress would usurp power and 
dominate the president (for example, see Federalists 51 and 73).  This fear of legislative 
dominance was unrealized.  Instead, the American system evolved in a way that 
eventually empowered the president in the legislative arena. 
 The American president looms large as a legislative leader in today’s political 
world.  The president’s participation in the legislative process is a fact of modern 
American political life.  The president sets priorities for Congress, mediates compromise 
between different factions in Congress, and lobbies members to support his political 
agenda.  The president’s central problem is discerning how to build coalitions large 
enough to win political battles and ensure that his agenda items make it through the 
process and become law.  This dissertation argues that members’ constituencies and 
electoral incentives affect how they vote on presidential agenda items.  The influence of 
constituency and electoral incentives causes systematic variation in members’ propensity 
to support the president.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, party politics is not the sole 
factor causing members to vote for, or against, the president’s agenda.  The president’s 
strength in members’ constituencies causes some members of the opposition party to vote 
for his agenda and some members of the president’s party to oppose his agenda.  
Constituency-level presidential strength is an especially important influence on the voting 
behavior of electorally vulnerable members of Congress.  If one does not understand the 
role that constituencies and electoral incentives play in member voting behavior on 
presidential agenda items, one cannot fully understand how presidents successfully enact 
their agenda into law. 
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PARTY-BASED THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL COALITION BUILDING 
The relationship between Congress and the president lies at the heart of the 
American political system.   All new laws must be passed by both chambers of Congress 
and signed by the president.  The president’s central goal in the legislative arena is to 
build coalitions large enough to win political battles and enact his agenda into law.  When 
presidents try to enact their agenda items into law, they face what Bond and Fleisher 
(1990, 7) call “the legislative imperative,” which requires presidents to build legislative 
coalitions large enough to enact their agenda into law.   
Unfortunately for the president, the design of the American system often makes it 
difficult to achieve legislative success.  The dominant theory of executive-legislative 
relations maintains that partisan support is the key to presidential success in Congress.  
Scholars, journalists, and citizens often argue that the president’s ability to pass his 
agenda into law is primarily a function of his party’s strength in Congress (Bond and 
Fleisher 1980 and 1990; Bond, Fleisher and Northup 1988; Edwards 1989 and 2009; 
Mouw and MacKuen 1992; Collier and Sullivan 1995; Litvan 2008; Clark 2010, Klein 
2012).   I use the phrase “party-based theories” or “party-based explanations” to refer to 
the conventional wisdom that presidential success in Congress is solely a function of how 
many seats the president’s party controls in Congress. 
Party-based theories of presidential coalition building lead Americans to believe 
that our politics are hopelessly divided, with members of Congress voting in lockstep 
with their parties on the most important issues of the day.  Representative Jim Cooper (D-
TN) recently summarized the prevailing view of executive-legislative relations in modern 
American politics when he stated: “We’ve effectively lost our Congress and gained a 
parliament…we have the extreme polarization of a parliament, with party-line voting, 
without the empowered Prime Minister” (Klein 2012).  With such supposedly dismal 
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prospects of receiving votes from opposition party members, citizens, and scholars 
conclude that the president has no hope of building successful bipartisan or crosspartisan 
coalitions.  Leading presidential scholar George Edwards recently summarized the 
president’s only remaining legislative strategy according to party-based theories: 
“mobilizing those predisposed to support him and driving legislation through Congress 
on a party-line vote” (Klein 2012).  
This dissertation argues that party-based theories, i.e. those theories that focus on 
party alone as the key to presidential success in Congress, must be revised for one very 
important reason – they are empirically incorrect.  Presidents can almost never enact their 
agenda into law with votes from their congressional partisans alone.  In addition to the 
support of their fellow congressional partisans, presidents almost always need votes from 
the other side of the aisle in order to pass legislation.  This opposition party support is 
sometimes necessary to overcome defections from presidential party members, and other 
times necessary because the president’s party holds an insufficient number of seats in 
Congress.  In order to fully understand how presidents build legislative coalitions, we 
must understand why some members of Congress cross party lines on presidential agenda 
votes.  When the president looks at Congress and considers how to build a successful 
enacting coalition, party-based theories contend that the president sees just blue 
Democrats and red Republicans.  My argument maintains that the president sees red, 
blue, and shades of grey. 
The disconnect between party-based theories and the more nuanced realities of 
presidential coalition building in Congress raises four important normative and 
theoretical questions.  They also give rise to three puzzling empirical facts.  In the 
following section, I discuss these four important questions and three puzzling facts. 
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FOUR MOTIVATING QUESTIONS 
Normatively speaking, party-based theories of presidential coalition building 
present a rather dim picture of modern American politics.  The first question that 
motivates my inquiry is whether members of Congress listen to their constituencies on 
the major issues of the day.  In other words, do members of Congress care about what 
their constituents think?  In any given Congress, there are dozens of what I refer to as 
“cross-pressured” members of Congress, which means that they are either members of 
the president’s party who represent constituencies where the president is weak, or 
members of the opposition who represent constituencies where the president is strong.1  If 
these members behave as strict partisans, with opposition party members voting against 
the president’s agenda even though their constituents support the president and 
presidential party members voting for the president’s agenda even though their 
constituents oppose the president, they would seem to be ignoring the political opinions 
of their constituents.  In short, they would not be representing their constituents in 
Congress.  Thus, party-based theories suggest that dozens of members of Congress do not 
live up to the normative ideal of representation in the American system. 
 The second question that motivates this study is whether the American people 
have any power in the policymaking process, above and beyond voting in elections.  This 
question is closely related to the first.  Party-based theories imply that if a constituency 
supports the president and wants his agenda enacted into law, it is necessary for them to 
also elect a presidential party member as their congressional representative.  If they do 
otherwise and elect an opposition party member, party-based theories suggest that the 
                                                 
1 While my measures change a bit throughout the study, the simplest way to define “weak” is as those 
constituencies where the president received less than 50 percent of the vote in the previous election.  The 
simplest way to define “strong” is as those constitutes where the president received more than 50 percent of 
the vote in the previous election. 
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opposition party member will oppose the president’s agenda.  Thus, the people have no 
control in the policymaking process beyond electing members who either share the 
president’s party label (if the constituency supports the president) or do not (if the 
constituency opposes the president).  Furthermore, inquiry into what I call “the 
presidential popularity hypothesis” often finds that the president’s approval plays little or 
no role in members’ decision-making process on presidential agenda items.  Some 
scholars go so far as to conclude that “presidential approval plays little role in 
presidential influence,” (Collier and Sullivan 1995, 207) and “popular approval is 
irrelevant for presidential influence in Congress” (Mouw and MacKuen 1992, 596).  If 
such studies are correct, they suggest that there is little representation or democratic 
accountability in the American system because members of Congress simply behave as 
partisan robots in regard to the president’s agenda and pay no mind to the president’s 
standing with the American people. 
The third and fourth motivation questions that I seek to answer are more practical.  
The third question is how presidents enact their agenda.  In short, how do presidents win 
legislative battles?  Party-based theories would say that presidents win legislative battles 
when their party is in the majority and lose them otherwise.  One problem with this 
prediction is that the president’s party almost never enjoys large enough majorities to win 
legislative battles without opposition party votes.  To do so, a party would need a 
majority in the House and a supermajority in the Senate in addition to controlling the 
presidency.  Since the end of World War II, such an arrangement has occurred for only 
seven of the last sixty-seven years.2  Presidents almost never enjoy large enough 
                                                 
2 Democrats enjoyed a House majority, Senate supermajority, and control of the presidency in the 88
th
 
Congress (1963 – 1965), the 89
th
 Congress (1965 – 1967), the 95
th
 Congress (1977 – 1979), and part of the 
111
th
 Congress after Arlen Specter changed his party affiliation and before Scott Brown’s election to fill 
Teddy Kennedy’s seat (2010 – 2011).  In practice, the divide between Northern and Southern Democrats 




 Congresses.  
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congressional majorities to enact their agendas into law without votes from opposition 
party members.  As we will see below, even when presidents do enjoy such large 
congressional majorities, they almost always end up needing opposition party votes 
anyways because some presidential party members’ decide to vote against the president’s 
agenda. 
The fourth and final question is what type of members make up successful 
enacting coalitions on presidential agenda items.  Again, many party-based theories have 
a simple answer: presidential party members, and presidential party members alone, help 
the president build successful enacting coalitions.  Of course, party-based theories often 
do acknowledge that constituency influence causes some members to defect from their 
party caucus’s position on presidential agenda votes.  Unfortunately, the default 
explanation for such defection from the party caucus is “ideology” (see Bond and 
Fleisher 1990).  Ideology cannot meaningfully explain presidential coalition building 
because the way political scientists currently understand ideology is endogenously linked 
to the formation of legislative coalitions. 
The main problem with using “ideology” to explain congressional voting behavior 
is that our best measures of “ideology” are based on congressional voting behavior!  
Summarized voting scores such as NOMINATE cannot meaningfully measure members’ 
ideology for two reasons.  First, many votes in Congress are not ideological.  Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) find that about 38 percent of the important laws enacted 
between 1946 and 1991 cannot be classified using a simple liberal/conservative 
dichotomy.  Using votes on issues without ideological content to measure ideology is a 
stretch, at best.  
Second and most important, the use of NOMINATE scores conflates members’ 
operative preferences, those that guide their voting behavior, with members’ personal 
 8 
preferences.  Members’ operative preferences are the result of not only their personal 
preferences, but also the influence of constituencies, presidents, party leaders, interest 
groups, and other political forces.  Using summarized voting scores to measure personal 
ideology conflates members’ ideology with all of these outside forces on their vote.  Lee 
(2009) demonstrates that party politics structures most of the conflict in Congress.  The 
behavior of members who switch their party affiliation during their time in Congress 
presents a compelling example of why summarized voting scores cannot capture the 
distinction between personal preferences and operative preferences.  A number of studies 
find that members who switch parties vote very differently after the switch (Nokken 
2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2001).  Furthermore, a vast and rich literature 
exists on constituency influence on members’ votes.  Simply put, it is impossible to 
untangle members’ personal preferences from their operative preferences.  As a result, 
ideology-based explanations of presidential coalition building do not tell us much other 
than some members of Congress vote against their party caucus’s position on presidential 
agenda items.  This study asks why these members choose to vote against their party on 
presidential agenda votes. 
 
THREE PUZZLING EMPIRICAL FACTS 
The answers that party-based theories provide to the first two motivating 
questions are troubling because they suggest a lack of representation, democratic 
accountability, and citizen control at some levels in the American system.  At the same 
time, we cannot reject theories just because they do not paint a rosy picture of reality.  If 
the empirical answers to the third and fourth questions are correct, i.e. if presidents can 
enact bills on the strength of votes from members of their party alone and if presidential 
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party members are the sole members of enacting coalitions, we must accept the answers 
provided by party-based theories no matter how troubling they may be.   
An investigation into the passage of some of the most important bills in modern 
American politics presents a puzzling empirical fact if we rely on party-based theories of 
presidential coalition building.  The president almost always needs votes from opposition 
party members in order to enact major agenda items into law.  Contrary to the 
expectations of party-based theories of presidential coalition building, presidents can 
almost never enact major agenda items on the strength of votes from their party members 
alone.  Table 1.1 displays the 28 pieces of “landmark legislation” enacted by Congress 
from 1957 to 2007, as defined by Mayhew in Divided We Govern (Mayhew 2005).  With 
the exception of the War Powers Resolution, every piece of landmark legislation is a 
presidential agenda item.  Twenty-six of these twenty-seven landmark presidential 
agenda bills could not have become law without opposition party votes.  In each of these 
twenty-six cases, a number of presidential party members voted against the president’s 
proposal.  As a result, the president did not have enough votes from his party members to 
enact historically important legislation into law.  In order to pass these twenty-six 
historically important pieces of landmark legislation, the president needed support from 
opposition party members to offset “nay” votes from presidential party members.   
The president was involved in the passage of every major law in modern 
American politics, and only once could he enact his preferred policy into law without 
votes from opposition party members.  In every other instance, votes from presidential 
party members alone were not enough to enact the president’s agenda into law.  The 
combination of constituency influence and electoral incentives explains both why 
members of the president’s party voted against his position on these historically 
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important votes, and why members of the opposition party voted with the president and 
enabled him to pass landmark legislation into law. 
The second empirical puzzle presented by party-based theories is why presidential 
success rates vary within congresses.  In any given Congress, the partisan composition of 
both chambers remains relatively stable, but the president’s legislative success rate may 




 sessions of that particular Congress.  For 
example, consider President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s experience during the 89
th
 
Congress.  According to Congressional Quarterly, LBJ enjoyed tremendous legislative 
success in 1965 as he made 469 legislative requests and Congress granted 323 of them 
(68.9 percent).  In the following year, President Johnson made 371 requests and Congress 
granted 207 of these requests (55.8 percent).  In the same Congress, with the same 
amount of partisan strength in both chambers, Johnson’s success rate dropped by 13 
percent and Congress enacted 116 fewer of his legislative requests.  This variance in 
legislative success within a particular congress is not unusual, it is the norm.  Party-based 
theories cannot account for such variation in the president’s relationship with Congress, 
an empirical fact of legislative life. 
The similar legislative success rates of presidents in both unified and divided 
government, as well as the empirical fact that some divided government presidents had 
greater legislative success than unified government presidents, is the third empirical 
puzzle posed if we use party-based theories to explain presidential coalition building.  
Consider Richard Nixon in the 91
st
 Congress (1969 – 1970) and Jimmy Carter in the 96
th
 
Congress (1978 – 1979).  In both congresses, Democrats held 58 seats in the Senate.  In 
the House, Carter had large Democratic advantage in the 96
th
 Congress (277 to 158), 
while Nixon faced a large Democratic majority in the 91
st
 Congress (243 to 192).  Yet in 
both the 91
st
 and the 96
th
 Congress, the president had a legislative success rate of around 
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77 percent!  Such a similar legislative success rate in Carter’s unified government and 
Nixon’s divided government presents a third empirical puzzle. 
 
INVESTIGATING HOW CONSTITUENCIES AND ELECTORAL INCENTIVES AFFECT 
PRESIDENTIAL COALITION BUILDING 
The evidence from Table 1.1 suggests that party-based theories, alone, do not 
accurately explain the enacting coalitions that formed to pass over 96 percent of the most 
important pieces of legislation in modern American history.  Party-based theories of 
executive-legislative relations are prominent in political science for a good reason: 
presidential party members usually make up the majority of members in the president’s 
legislative coalition.  The problem is that a focus on party alone causes observers to miss 
three important facts about presidential coalition building.  First, some members do 
defect from their party caucus on presidential agenda votes.  Second, these defections are 
not random.  Third, these defections are substantively meaningful because most major 
pieces of legislation proposed by the president require some support from opposition 
party members to become law.   
Members of Congress regularly cross party lines on presidential agenda items.  
Understanding why members defect from their party caucus is vitally important to 
understanding the relationship between Congress, the president, and the American 
people.  This dissertation argues that in order to fully understand how presidents build 
legislative coalitions, it is necessary to understand how constituency influence and 
electoral incentives affect members’ voting behavior.  Edwards is right that the president 
needs to focus on those “predisposed to support him,” but it is not only party politics that 
make members predisposed to support the president.  In fact, some members of the 
president’s party are predisposed to oppose his policies, while some members of the 
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opposite party are predisposed to support them.  I argue that constituency influence and 
electoral incentives make some members of the president’s party predisposed to vote 
against his agenda, and some members of the opposition party predisposed to support the 
president’s agenda.  The president’s strength in members’ constituencies causes 
systematic variation in members’ voting behavior on presidential agenda items.  
Electorally vulnerable members of Congress are particularly sensitive to the president’s 
standing in their constituencies and vote accordingly, while electorally safe members of 
Congress have greater freedom in their voting behavior. 
In the following chapters, I outline how the president came to play such a large 
legislative role, develop three hypotheses about how constituencies and electoral 
incentives systematically affect member voting behavior on the president’s agenda, and 
test these hypotheses through both large-N quantitative analysis and case studies.  
Chapter 2 argues that the Constitution, formal changes to both the law and the 
presidential selection process, and informal presidential precedents all combined to cause 
the president to become a legislative leader.  Chapter 3 presents an argument about 
presidential decision-making, congressional decision-making, and citizen decision-
making.  This argument is based a micro-level conceptual framework that explains how 
members of Congress decide how to vote on presidential agenda items.  This micro-level 
argument explaining the votes of individual members of Congress has macro-level 
consequences because it explains the types of coalitions that will form to enact the 
president’s agenda.  I use this argument to develop three hypotheses: the Constituency 
Hypothesis, the Vulnerability Hypothesis, and the Safety Hypothesis.  
Chapter 4 begins to test the hypotheses using presidential support scores from 
1957 to 2007.  This analysis finds that members’ constituencies and electoral incentives 
cause some members to vote against their party caucus on presidential agenda votes.  
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Specifically, the president’s relative strength in members’ constituencies affects 
members’ relative levels of presidential support.  This effect is especially strong for 
vulnerable members of Congress. 
Chapter 5 responds to arguments about presidential coalition building that focus 
on members’ ideology as an explanation for their voting behavior on presidential agenda 
items.  I examine member behavior on “challenged vetoes,” those vetoes which Congress 
attempts to override.  This analysis holds bill content constant and finds that constituency 
influence and electoral incentives are strongly related to members’ decisions to switch 
their votes between final passage and the veto override attempt.  These effects are often 
stronger than ideology’s effect on members’ voting behavior. 
Chapter 6 consists of a case study of the presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson.  
LBJ’s legislative experience encapsulates the highest of highs and rather low lows in just 
a five year period.  This case study presents three more empirical puzzles posed by party-




 Congress, LBJ’s legislative success rates 
fluctuated drastically from one year to the next, decreasing by over 10 percent from 1965 
to 1966 and increasing almost 10 percent from 1967 to 1968.  Furthermore, President 
Johnson enjoyed equal or greater legislative success in 1968 than he did in 1966, despite 
Democrats controlling 47 fewer House seats and four fewer Senate seats.  I find that the 
changing voting behavior of “cross-pressured” House Democrats and Republicans, as 
well as the voting behavior of electorally safe Senate Republicans help explain these 
three empirical puzzles.  Thus, adding constituency influence and electoral incentives to 
our theories of presidential coalition building solves the three puzzles of LBJ’s legislative 
experience that cannot be solved by party-based theories. 
Chapter 7 examines the major legislative battles of the Obama presidency during 
the 111
th
 Congress.  If ever any president at any point in history would be able to enact 
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his agenda on the strength of votes from presidential party members alone, the 111
th
 
Congress was that time and Barack Obama was that president.  Despite an overwhelming 
electoral victory and large Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress, around 
two-thirds of the Obama agenda items enacted into law during the 111
th
 Congress could 
not have passed with Democratic votes alone.  Instead, the president had to rely on 
Republican votes to enact the majority of the agenda items he was able to get through the 
111
th
 Congress.  My analysis finds that large numbers of House Democrats voted against 
the president because they represented constituencies where the president was weak.  The 
Republicans who provided President Obama with the votes he needed to enact his agenda 
into law almost always represented constituencies where the president was strong.   
The concluding chapter comments on the ways in which the constitutional design 
influences congressional behavior in the modern day.  I summarize my findings and 
clarify the study’s theoretical contributions and conclude by discussing the normative 
implications of the current institutional relationship between Congress and the president. 
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Votes to Pass 
in Senate?
Civil Rights Act of 1957 Eisenhow er 286-126 168 Yes
Trade Expansion Act Kennedy 256-91 178 Yes 78-8 56 Yes
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Kennedy No 80-19 55 Yes
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Johnson 289-126 153 Yes 76-18 46 Yes
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 Johnson 226-185 204 Yes 61-34 51 Yes
Tax cut Johnson 326-85 218 No 77-21 56 Yes
Medical Care for the Aged Johnson 307-116 237 No 70-24 57 Yes
Voting Rights Act of 1965 Johnson 328-74 217 No 79-18 49 Yes
Elementary & Secondary Education Act Johnson 263-153 228 No 73-18 55 Yes
Open Housing Act Johnson 250-172 150 Yes 71-20 42 Yes
War Pow ers Act Nixon N/A N/A
Economic Recovery Tax Act Reagan 282-95 169 Yes 67-8 41 Yes
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act Reagan 232-193 185 Yes 80-14 49 Yes
Tax Reform Act of 1986 Reagan 292-136 116 Yes 74-23 41 Yes
Deficit Reduction Package George HW Bush 228-200 47 Yes 54-45 19 Yes
Persian Gulf Resolution George HW Bush 250-183 164 Yes 52-47 42 Yes
Omnibus Deficit Reduction Act Clinton 218-216 218 No 51-50 50
NAFTA Clinton 234-200 102 Yes 61-38 27 Yes
Welfare Reform Clinton 328-101 98 Yes 78-21 25 Yes
Balance Budget by 2002 Clinton 327-97 129 Yes 76-22 36 Yes
Bush Tax Cut George W Bush 240-154 211 Yes 58-33 46 Yes
Use of Force - Afghanistan George W Bush 420-1 214 No 98-0 47 Yes
USA Patriot Act George W Bush 357-66 212 No 98-1 49 Yes
Iraq Resolution George W Bush 296-133 215 No 77-23 48 Yes
New  Homeland Security Department George W Bush 299-121 212 No 90-9 48 Yes
Medicare Reform George W Bush 220-215 204 Yes 54-44
Housing Reform Plan George W Bush 272-152 45 Yes 72-13 27 Yes
TARP George W Bush 263-171 91 Yes 74-25 34 Yes
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Chapter 2:  How the President Became the Legislator-in-Chief 
Modern American politics take place in a system that is a mixture of the original 
constitutional design and the Constitution’s evolution over time.  The Constitution’s 
guidelines establish the basic rules of the game.  Over time these rules evolved and 
created new powers, responsibilities, and expectations for American politicians.  The 
current American system thus operates under “two constitutions” (Tulis 1987).  The first 
constitution is the actual document itself.  The second constitution is our evolved 
understanding of each institution’s place in the political system.  Both formal and 
informal changes caused our expectations of Congress and the presidency to evolve over 
time.  Formally, changes in the modes of election for each branch played a major role in 
democratizing both the presidency and the Senate.  Informally, a number of presidents set 
significant precedents for their successors to follow.  These formal and informal changes 
led to the president’s current role as both a legislative leader and as an information 
shortcut that the American people use to make sense of the political arena. 
There is no question that the modern presidents play a large role in the legislative 
process.  In this chapter I trace how the president became a central participant in the 
process.  First, I outline the constitutional backdrop underlying the modern political 
world by summarizing the legislative powers and responsibilities the Framers gave to 
Congress and the president, as well as the constitutional checks on both branches power.  
Second, I discuss how these legislative powers and responsibilities evolved over time as 
the result of formal reforms, informal precedents established by innovative presidential 
actions, changes in the electorate and technological advances.  Third, I discuss the 
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behavior of presidents, members of Congress, and the voting public in the modern 
context.  Fourth, I develop three hypotheses about which members of Congress are most 
likely to be a part of the president’s legislative coalitions.  Finally, I discuss which 
members are most likely to be the targets of the president’s persuasive efforts. 
Separation of Powers 
The Founders faced quite a conundrum at the Constitutional Convention.  Their 
central problem was figuring out how to grant the government enough power to operate 
effectively while at the same time protecting the rights of the people.  The Articles of 
Confederation were failing because they did not provide a strong enough government for 
the growing United States (Prince 1867).  The Founders thought it clear that a stronger, 
more energetic government was needed.  At the same time, the Founders had four fears 
about such a system of government.   They were afraid of tyranny, legislative dominance, 
the potential harms from bad legislation, and the potential for demagoguery to arise in the 
executive branch.  In order to control both each branch of the federal government as well 
as the government as a whole, the Founders created a system where each branch would 
“be the means of keeping each other in their proper places” (Federalist 51).  The first 
three fears led the Founders to separate legislative powers between the executive and 
legislative branches, and give each branch a check on the other’s legislative powers.  The 
fear of bad legislation and the potential for demagoguery led the Founders to devise an 
electoral system with a number of checks on the popular will.  With these safeguards in 
place, the executive and legislative branches were given the power and responsibility to 
jointly make laws.   
The designers of the Constitution feared the development of tyranny in their new 
nation.  By tyranny, they meant the consolidation of power into one branch of 
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government (Federalist 47).  To guard against the growth of tyranny, the Founders 
separated power among the branches and gave each branch checks on the others power 
(Federalist 48).  “Legislative dominance” was thought to be the primary tyrannical threat 
because the legislature was closest to the people and thus most able to win their favor 
(Federalist 51).  Legislative dominance would occur if Congress usurped all power for 
itself and rendered the president impotent.   
Bicameralism was one way the Founders guarded against this threat.  The intent 
of bicameralism is to provide the two chambers of Congress with “different modes of 
election and different principles of action” in order to make them “as little connected with 
each other” as possible (Federalist 51).  Each chamber of Congress thus had its own 
separate constituencies, modes of election, and concerns.  The House’s constituency was 
the people themselves, members of the House were directly elected, and their concern 
was the national interest (Federalist 39).  On the other hand, the Senate’s constituents 
were their state legislatures, they were selected as these legislatures saw fit, and their 
concern was representing their state’s interests (Federalist 39).  As a result of these 
differences, each chamber brought a separate perspective to bear in the legislative arena.  
These different perspectives ensured that Congress would be unlikely to conspire against 
the president and steal power away from the executive branch (Federalist 51).  In modern 
terms, the Founders guarded against legislative dominance by intentionally designing 
Congress with a collective action problem. 
In addition to bicameralism, the veto power guarded against the prospect of 
legislative dominance and tyranny.  Federalist 73 explains that the veto power will give 
the president protection against the legislature by providing the presidency with the 
“competent powers” necessary for “energy” in the executive.  It goes on to argue that 
each branch should possess a “constitutional and effectual power of self-defense.”  The 
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veto provides this protection for the president, while impeachment provides such 
protection for the Congress. 
In addition to concerns about legislative dominance, the Founders also feared the 
potential harms arising from bad legislation.  The Federalist repeatedly mentions 
concerns about improper legislation.  Both bicameralism and the veto power were 
intended to guard against the passage of such legislation.  These mechanisms reflect the 
Founders’ belief that “the oftener the measure is brought under examination” and “the 
greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it” the better a law it 
will be (Federalist 73).  Bicameralism ensures that legislation cannot pass without the 
support of first “a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the states” (Federalist 
62).    The veto makes it even more difficult for bills to become laws.  The Founders 
acknowledge that occasionally such a system will stall the passage of beneficial laws, but 
conclude that “the injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will 
be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones” (Federalist 
73).  In other words, the institutional design of the system favors the status quo and 
creates a high barrier to the passage of new legislation in order to guard against negative 
consequences by ensuring that new legislation is well thought out.   
 
Electoral Safeguards 
 The Constitution created the American republic with an understanding that the 
government derived all of its power from the people (Federalist 37).  The government’s 
legitimacy depended upon the people’s consent.  In addition, the people’s participation in 
the electoral system provided the primary precaution against an oppressive government 
(Mansfield 1989).  While the Founders considered the people’s consent integral to the 
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integrity and legitimacy of the government, they also wished to protect minority rights, 
prevent the passage of harmful legislation, and give representatives some protection from 
the passions and whims of public opinion (Federalists 10, 68 and 73).    To balance the 
tension between grounding the government in the public’s authority and protecting the 
people from themselves the Constitution provided presidents, senators, and 
representatives with different modes of election and thus different constituencies  
(Federalist 39).  Members of the House were directly elected by the people, senators 
were selected by state legislatures, and the president was picked by the states through the 
device of the Electoral College, which ensured that the president possessed the moral and 
intellectual abilities needed to be president and to guard against presidential candidates 
gaining office through “talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity” 
(Federalist 68).  The Framers attempted to achieve these goals by adding a layer of 
insulation between the people and presidential selection.  Similarly, the selection of 
senators by state legislatures insulated the Senate from being directly accountable to the 
voting public.  Despite this electoral insulation, Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution 
requires each chamber of Congress to keep a journal of its proceedings in order to allow 
the people to monitor the official conduct of their representatives.  While the Framers 
added a layer of protection between presidents, senators, and the popular will, they also 
made certain that the people could monitor their representatives and make sure they were 
acting in the constituency’s interests.     
 
Congressional Powers and Responsibilities under the Constitution 
 Article I is the first, longest and most detailed part of the Constitution.  It creates 
the bicameral Congress and vests “all legislative powers” in the body.   Article I, Section 
VIII outlines Congress’s legislative powers, both enumerating congressional powers and 
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granting Congress the authority to “make all laws which are necessary and proper” to 
carry out its enumerated powers.  This section of the Constitution is referred to as “the 
most important section” of the document since it encapsulate the scope of the federal 
government’s power, thus setting the playing field for the political game between 
presidents, Congress and the courts (Corwin 1937).  The bulk of this section enumerates 
Congress’s power in economic and military affairs, as well as the power to create inferior 
courts and punish federal crimes.  In the economic arena, Congress is given the power of 
the purse through clauses allowing it to both tax and spend, and thus the power to 
regulate or promote economic activities as it sees fit.  Militarily, the Constitution grants 
Congress the power to declare war, raise and support an army and a navy, and to organize 
state militias and call them into service of the federal government when it sees fit.  By 
themselves, the economic and military powers enumerated in Article I, Section VIII 
created a powerful Congress, but the Founders added two clauses that led the scope of 
congressional power to enlarge over the course of American history.  The “interstate 
commerce clause” and the “necessary and proper clause” would eventually lead to a 
federal Congress that exercised vast legislative powers. 
 With great legislative power comes great legislative responsibility.  First and 
foremost, Federalist 70 charges Congress with the responsibility to provide “deliberation 
and wisdom.”  Second, the Congress is responsible for winning “the confidence of the 
people” and “securing their privileges and interests.”  In particular, the House of 
Representatives is intended to “have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate 
sympathy with, the people” (Federalist 52).  Members of the House are held accountable 
through frequent elections in order to make sure that they properly represent the people’s 
will.  On the other hand, senators are responsible for working in the interest of their 
respective states.  They were thus held responsible through selection and potential 
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removal by their state legislatures.  Senators are given a longer term in office in order to 
provide stability in the government, promote a sense of national character in Congress, 
and defend the people from making rash, unwise decisions (Federalists 62 and 63).  They 
are thus to be responsible for balance the interests of their respective states with the 
national interest (Federalist 64).  The Founders designed what they considered to be the 
most important branch of government as a bicameral legislature with a Senate intended to 
represent states’ interests and prove stability and prudence in the Congress, and a House 
intended to represent the people and win their support.  Frequent popular elections 
ensured that the House would be responsible to their constituent’s, while less frequent 
election by state legislatures made certain that senators would be insulated from popular 
pressure and help allow the Congress to act in the nation’s best interests.    
 
Presidential Powers and Responsibilities under the Constitution 
 Article II is neither as long nor as detailed as Article I (and of course, it is also not 
the first article in the Constitution).  The Founders designed the office with a unitary 
structure intended to instill energy in the executive branch (Federalist 70).  By “unitary 
structure,” I mean that the presidency is vested in a single person who can act on his or 
her own without consultation or permission from others.  The unitary structure of the 
office, in combination with the president’s four year term of office, was also intended to 
allow the president to act vigorously in the national interest as he saw it (Federalist 71).  
Article II gives the president three primary legislative powers; the veto, the ability to call 
Congress into special session, and the duty to periodically give Congress information on 
the State of the Union and recommend measures that he deems “necessary and 
expedient.”  These limited legislative powers are the extent of the president’s 
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constitutional powers in the legislature.  Looking at these powers alone would not suggest 
that president would come to play a major role in the legislative arena.  The president 
came to play that role nonetheless.  In fact, some scholars argue that the Constitution 
intentionally left the president’s powers relatively vague in order to later empower the 
president when circumstances warranted increases presidential power (Mansfield 1989). 
 The president’s primary responsibility is to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution” (Article II, Section I).  He is to do so by acting in the national interest as he 
understands it.  Both the Electoral College and the president’s four year term in office 
were intended to insulate the president from popular pressure in order to encourage him 
to make politically unpopular decisions when he thought it appropriate.  These structural 
mechanisms would allow the president to withstand pressure and act in opposition to the 
“temporary delusions” of the mass public (Federalist 71).  The president would still be 
held accountable by the Electoral College every four years, but this body was also 
designed to be detached from the “heats and ferments” of public opinion (Federalist 68).  
While the Electoral College gave the president some tie to the people and thus some 
republican legitimacy, it also allowed him to put his own considerable skills to work in 
order to meet his great responsibility to the nation and the Constitution.   
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
 The president did not always play a large role in the legislative arena.  The limited 
legislative powers outlined for the president in Constitution constrained his legislative 
activity in the early part of American history.  The president’s modern role as a 
legislative leader is the result of a number of formal rule changes, informal presidential 
innovations and technological advances.  The most important formal rule changes involve 
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the democratization of the Electoral College, the Senate and the nation as a whole.  
Another important change is the democratization of the presidential nominating system.  
These changes directly tied both the president and the Senate to the public and made their 
job security dependent upon the people’s approval.  Informally, the president’s legislative 
role expanded due to precedents set over time in response to major issues of the day.  In 
particular, Presidents Jefferson, Jackson and Wilson all enhanced the president’s 
legislative powers.  Technologically, the growth of the mass media through radio, 
television and the Internet contributed to the president’s current role as a center of the 
legislative universe. 
 
Formal Changes – Democratization 
 The Electoral College placed a barrier between the people and the presidency in 
order to allow the president to act against the popular will when necessary (Federalist 
68).  This separation quickly dissolved as more and more states decided to use popular 
election to choose electors to the college.  By 1836 every state in the Union used popular 
election to choose electors, electors made their presidential preferences known in 
advance, and the political parties offered full slates of pledged electors (Gregg 2001).  
This development at the state level democratized the Electoral College by making a vote 
for an elector equivalent to a vote for the presidential candidate the elector pledged to 
support, thus removing what the Founders intended to be a degree of separation between 
voters and candidates.  In addition to the democratization of the Electoral College, the 
major parties’ presidential nominating process became more democratic as well.  The 
turbulent presidential contest of 1824 and its eventual resolution through a “corrupt 
bargain” between John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay led to the demise of the “King 
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Caucus” nominating system.  By 1828, the King Caucus system was replaced with 
national party conventions.  Over a century later, the McGovern-Fraser Commission 
reforms further democratized the presidential nominating process by taking control of 
party conventions away from party leaders and giving control to delegates selected by 
popular vote.  As a result of these developments, today’s presidents are both nominated 
and selected by direct election.  This democratization of the presidential selection process 
ties the president and the people together in what is now a two-year long process. 
 The presidency is not the only institution with legislative powers that underwent a 
democratic transformation.  The Senate did as well.  Article 1, Section 3 of the 
Constitution mandated that Senators be chosen by their state legislatures.  In the early 
20
th
 century, Progressives railed against this provision as both undemocratic and 
inefficient because in a number of cases state legislatures under divided party control did 
not select Senators for months or years at a time.  The 17
th
 Amendment replaced this 
system with direct election of Senators.  As a result, today both the president and all 
members of Congress are held accountable to the popular will through the electoral 
process.  This fact helps the president build legislative coalitions by using his status as a 
popularly elected national leader as leverage with senators. 
 
Informal Presidential Power Precedents 
 The formal changes to the electoral process for both presidents and senators laid 
part of the groundwork for the president’s evolution into a major legislative player.  
Informal presidential precedents augmented this electoral foundation.  As these informal 
precedents accumulated, the president eventually became the leader of both his party-in-
government and his party-in-the-electorate.  Moreover, the president also became a major 
policy advocate in both private and public.  Thomas Jefferson set the first of these 
 26 
precedents, leading the way for the president to become the leader of his party-in-
government.  Jefferson’s election in 1800 occurred in tandem with a major change 
democratizing the Electoral College; the formation of party organizations that offered 
slates of electors who pledged to vote for a particular presidential candidate (Gregg 
2001).  Jefferson led congressional candidates from his Democratic-Republican Party 
into power in both the House and the Senate.  During his first Inaugural Address 
Jefferson in effect claimed the first electoral mandate, arguing that his party’s policies 
should be enacted into law due to the party’s electoral success.  With a centralized and 
disciplined party organization in place in both the House and the Senate, Jefferson set the 
precedent for the president to exercise legislative power by acting as his party’s leader in 
the Congress (Milkis and Nelson 1990).  This informal use of presidential power relied 
on the people’s support of both the president and members of Congress who championed 
the president’s program.  Working together to pass the president’s preferred policies, 
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republican members of Congress who supported him took 
the first step on the president’s journey to becoming a major legislative player. 
 The second step on the president’s road to his current role as a central legislative 
actor took place under Andrew Jackson.  Once again it occurred alongside a formal 
reform that democratized the presidential selection process; the demise of the “King 
Caucus” nominating system whereby the party’s congressional caucuses selected their 
presidential candidates.  In a 1823 resolution assailing King Caucus, the Tennessee 
General Assembly railed against the injustice of the system, claiming that it violated “the 
spirit of the Constitution”  (Nelson 2004).  After the “corrupt bargain” of 1825 that 
elevated John Quincy Adams to the presidency in return for his naming Henry Clay the 
Secretary of State, the caucus system fell apart and was replaced by party nominating 
conventions.  The same popular fervor that led to the death of “King Caucus” also helped 
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Jackson set an informal precedent that enhanced the president’s legislative role.  Jackson 
established the president as the leader of his party in the electorate.  Through his 
resounding victories in both the 1828 and 1832 presidential elections and his veto 
message in response to Congress rechartering the Bank of the United States in 1831, 
Jackson further established the president as a legislative player with power partially 
grounded in the public’s approval.  Furthermore, Jackson showed that the president could 
use public approval to strength his legislative role.  In his bank policy veto message, 
Jackson claimed coordinate legislative powers and claimed that the president had the 
ability to independently interpret the Constitution.  He grounded these claims in public 
approval, maintaining that the people could approve or reject his claim of coordinate 
powers in the 1832 election and ending his message proclaiming “I have now done my 
duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and happy”  
(Nelson 2004).  By the end of his presidency Jackson set informal precedents establishing 
the president’s potential to become the leader of his party in the electorate, and the 
president’s ability to use this popular leadership as leverage in the legislative arena. 
 Jefferson and Jackson also set another informal precedent that strengthened the 
president’s legislative role.  Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase and Jackson’s bank policy 
veto introduced the idea of using the presidential election as a referendum on particular 
policies.  Both men explicitly stated that the public could judge their innovative claims to 
presidential power.  Woodrow Wilson expanded on this informal precedent and set 
another precedent in the process.  Wilson packaged his preferred policies together as the 
“New Freedom” agenda and used his election as a referendum on his legislative program.  
Building on Teddy Roosevelt’s use of the presidency as a “bully pulpit,” Wilson went 
over Congress’s collective head and took his policy agenda directly to the people.  For 
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the first time in presidential history, the president used rhetorical appeals to the people to 
pressure members of Congress to vote in favor of the presidential agenda (Tulis 1987).     
 By the end of Wilson’s presidency, a powerful foundation existed for the 
president to exert power in the legislative agenda.  The democratization of the presidency 
is the rock upon which the president’s legislative power is built.  Jefferson, Jackson and 
Wilson all exploited the president’s link to the people to enable themselves to set 
informal precedents expanding the president’s legislative role.  Jefferson established the 
president as the leader of his party in the government, Jackson showed the president’s 
potential to lead his party in the electorate, and Wilson demonstrated how presidents 
could use the people’s support as leverage in the legislative arena.  All three men also 
revealed the potential to use elections as policy referendums.  With these informal 
precedents in place, technological developments enabling the rise of mass media was all 
that was necessary to elevate the president to his current role. 
 
Technology, Media and the Presidency 
 Presidents used the media to disseminate their message and garner support for 
their legislative programs even before Wilson’s time.  For example, Teddy Roosevelt 
used McClure’s magazine to publicize his campaign in support of the Hepburn Act 
(Buchanan 1987).  Advances in the media’s geographical range and turnaround time, as 
well as increases in media readership and viewership all enhanced the media’s potential 
as a presidential tool in the legislative arena.  By the 1930s the media had the potential to 
reach almost all Americans through the radio and almost instantaneously update them on 
the latest presidential actions.  Radio allowed FDR to reach into millions of homes with 
his fireside chats.  Wilson began the practice of regular presidential press conferences and 
JFK augmented this tool by bringing the presidential press conference to television.  
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Reagan carefully scripted television appearances and photo opportunities in order to 
make the most of his media appearances.  He also instituted the practice of a weekly 
presidential radio address.  Today, President Obama uses the Internet to supplement the 
traditional weekly presidential radio addresses, releasing a video message on YouTube 
and the White House website.  The technological advances of the 20
th
 century allow 
modern presidents to reach all Americans through the media and have made the 
American president a familiar face to almost all of the nation’s citizens. 
 
THE LEGISLATOR-IN-CHIEF 
The American president’s current role in the legislative process is aptly 
summarized as “the Legislator-in-Chief.”  Over time presidents have augmented their 
traditional powers of the veto and executive orders with informal powers that solidified 
the president’s place at the forefront of American politics.  These informal powers 
include acting as a party leader in both the electorate and the government, marshalling the 
power of the people to claim mandates and hold referendum elections on both particular 
issues and entire legislative programs, and using the media to publicize the president’s 
positions, actions and activities.  As a result, the president is at the forefront of the 
legislative process.  Greenstein (1988) cites increased formal and informal and powers, 
and a greater legislative focus as two distinguishing characteristics of the modern 
presidency.  The modern president sets the agenda on major issues of the day, uses the 
veto to bargain with members, and uses his visibility to reward and punish members both 
politically and financially.  In the following sections I outline the current powers and 
responsibilities of both Congress and the president, introduce an argument about how 
presidents, members of Congress and the voting public make political decisions, and 
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develop three hypotheses about which members of Congress are most likely to become a 
part of legislative coalitions on presidential agenda items. 
 
Current Presidential Powers and Responsibilities 
The president’s constitutional powers form the foundation of his legislative 
leadership.  The veto is the president’s primary constitutional power in the legislative 
arena.  Andrew Jackson demonstrated the veto’s power as a policy-making tool in 1832 
and every president thereafter has followed suit by using the veto to affect policy.  
Presidents use the veto and veto threats to influence the outcome of legislation, both by 
changing its content or killing it altogether.  Krehbiel (1998) demonstrates how the 
location of the 67
th
 senator in support of a piece of legislation (aka “the veto pivot”) can 
allow the president to either kill bills or at least force Congress to modify a bill’s content 
and make it more moderate.  In addition to maintaining the status quo or moderating bills 
through vetoes, the president can also strategically employ a veto threat to alter a bill’s 
content (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988, Cameron 2000).  The veto may be the president’s 
only constitutional power in the legislative arena, but it alone makes the president quite a 
formidable foe.   
The Constitution influences the president’s legislative power in a second way as 
well.  Article II, Section III compels the president to provide Congress with information 
about the state of the Union and “recommend to their consideration such measures as he 
shall deem necessary and expedient.”  This section works in tandem with the institutional 
structure of the executive branch to make the president a primary agenda-setter in the 
legislative arena.  While not an actual power, the structural design of the executive 
branch gives it an important advantage over the legislature in terms of agenda-setting.  
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Because the president is a unitary actor while Congress is a collective body with diverse 
interests, the president is able to set a clear legislative agenda for Congress to pursue.  
This structural advantage allows the president great influence in agenda-setting 
(Schattschneider 1960, Kingdon 1984, Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Cohen 1995).  
Modern presidents exploit this advantage, along with their informal power as the head of 
their party in the government, to push their legislative agenda.   
The constitutional core of the modern president’s legislative leadership is 
enhanced by formal powers not enumerated in the Constitution.  These powers include 
submitting an annual budget proposal to Congress, issuing executive orders and attaching 
signing statements to bills.  The creation of the Budget Bureau (now the Office of 
Management and Budget) in 1921 empowered the president and turned his obligation to 
submit an annual budget into a formidable political and legislative tool.  The use of both 
executive orders and signing statements are increasingly important to the modern 
presidency.  Executive orders allow the president to unilaterally change the legislative 
status quo (Mayer 1999 and 2001, Howell 2003), while signing statements give the 
president leeway in a law’s interpretation.  Taken together, the president’s formal powers 
are powerful legislative tools.   
Many of the president’s informal legislative powers are used behind the scenes.  
The one exception, going public, is an increasingly common part of the legislative 
process.  The president’s power to go public is enhanced by both the unitary structure of 
his office and advances in media technology.  Behind the scenes, the president informally 
encourages members of Congress to support his agenda through bargaining, arm-twisting, 
vote trading, and providing personal favors.  Presidential persuasion usually consists of 
the constitutional power of the veto as well as the president’s tool chest of informal 
powers.  
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Today, the president’s legislative responsibilities involve serving what he sees as 
the nation’s best interests by presenting and working to pass a comprehensive legislative 
agenda.  The president still represents the nation, but instead of recommending 
“necessary and expedient” measures “from time to time,” he presents them constantly.  
He then uses his constitutional, formal and informal legislative powers to achieve one 
overarching goal: building a legislative coalition large enough to pass his agenda into 
law.  In order to do so, the president must inevitably persuade some members of 
Congress to join the coalition.   
Persuasive presidents use the veto and informal powers to maximize their 
leverage on members of Congress.  Maximizing leverage is no easy task in the American 
system.  The government does not start from scratch after each presidential election.  
Jones (1994) notes that the American federal government is a continuous government 
with an ongoing agenda that exists before the president takes office and will continue 
after he leaves office.  Similarly, many members of Congress are elected before the 
president’s arrival and will continue to serve after the president departs.  The president is 
only one player in a complex web of power (Smith 1988).  As a result of the American 
constitutional design, the interests of presidents often conflict with the interests of 
members of Congress.  In order to pass his agenda, deal with national problems, and 
convince members to make crucial compromises the president must persuade members of 
Congress (and other political actors) that their interests coincide with his.  The power to 
persuade is thus perhaps the president’s most important power (Neustadt 1960).  The 
president uses his entire legislative toolbox, including the veto, behind-the-scenes 
bargaining and public pressure, to successfully persuade members to support his agenda. 
In addition to the evolution of how the president performs his responsibility to the 
nation in the legislative arena, the political actors who hold him accountable for 
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performing his responsibilities have changed as well.  As I cover in Section III, the 
president is no longer accountable to a set of electors detached from the “heats and 
ferments” of the people.  Instead, the president is now held directly accountable to the 
people.  This change in the president’s constituency increases the president’s legislative 
power.  With the president at the top of the ticket, the electoral fates of members of 
Congress are related to his own political fortunes (Brady, Cogan, Gaines, and Rivers 
1996; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003).  This fact 
of political life allows presidents leverage over members’ voting decisions.  Today 
presidents attempt to harness the power of the people in order to pass their legislative 
agenda.   
 
Current Congressional Powers and Responsibilities 
Unlike the president, the Congress has seen less evolution of its instruments of 
power over time.  While the balance of power between Congress and the president ebbs 
and flows over time, Congress’s legislative toolbox has remained relatively static over 
time.  Yet the fact that Congress has not added new arrows to its quiver does not mean 
that it has not expanded its power.  The scope of congressional power grew exponentially 
through a series of Supreme Court rulings broadly interpreting the “interstate commerce 
clause” and the “necessary and proper clause” (O’Brien 2005).  Moreover, congressional 
organization has evolved in a number important ways over the course of American 
history (Shepsle 1989, Sinclair 2000).   
The major change is thus not in what Congress does, but in how Congress 
performs its legislative function and which issues it legislates.  Internally, the current 
Congress is distinguished by high levels of partisanship in the legislative process.  
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Paradoxically, it is also distinguished by a high level of individualism.  Parties organize 
the legislative process, but they do so in a manner that serves the needs of their members 
(Rohde 1991, Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 2005).  In addition to the evolution in 
Congress’s internal organization, the objects of legislation have evolved as well.   
Congress’s responsibilities have undergone some change over the years.  The 
most important change is that senators are no longer held accountable to their state 
legislatures.  Instead, the 17
th
 Amendment made senators directly responsible to their 
state’s electorate.  Like the president, senators are now held directly accountable by their 
constituents.  In today’s Congress, senators are responsible for looking after the interests 
of their state’s constituents, while members of the House are responsible for looking after 
their districts.  This change in the constituencies to whom members of Congress are 
responsible to has effects on their behavior, making them more likely to follow their 
constituency’s lead on certain issues in order to avoid a defeat at the polls.  In the 
following chapter, I consider how this change in the institutional structure of Congress 
affects individual voting behavior within the institution.  
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Chapter 3: Constituencies, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential 
Coalition Building 
The design and evolution of the American system create a situation where the 
president acts as one of the main legislative agenda-setters.  This large legislative role 
results from the Constitution’s command that the president recommend measures to 
Congress, the institutional incentives that stem from the presidency’s structure as a 
unitary actor and Congress’s structure as a collective body, and the informal precedents 
set by presidents acting as agenda-setters and pressing legislative programs.  Today the 
president is expected to set a major part of the legislative agenda and use his formal and 
informal powers to pass this agenda into law.  In order to see his agenda into law, the 
president must build majority coalitions in both the House and the Senate.  At times in 
the Senate the bar is even higher, as senators who support the president’s position need 
sixty votes to invoke cloture and overcome the filibuster. 
The previous chapter outlined how the constitutional design and evolution created 
the institutional environment that members of Congress and the president operate in 
today.  This institutional environment creates goals, responsibilities, resources, and 
constraints that shape the behavior of presidents and members of Congress.  The 
institutional environment affects how members and presidents make decisions because it 
influences both their preferred ends and their available means.  I argue that the Framers’ 
decision to make members of the House subject to frequent elections, in tandem with 
reforms that democratized both the presidency and the Senate, creates institutional 
incentives that shape members’ decisions and thus affect the president’s ability to build 
legislative coalitions. 
 My argument addresses how electoral incentives, member vulnerability, and the 
president’s strength in members’ constituencies combine to make some members 
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systematically more likely to vote in support of the president’s agenda and others 
systematically more likely to oppose it.  In particular, vulnerable members from 
constituencies where the president enjoys relatively high popularity will tend to support 
the president more than other members.  Constituency-level presidential causes some 
members to support the president more than others whether the member is electorally 
vulnerable or not.  Aspects of the American constitutional design, working in tandem 
with the evolution of the American political system, systematically induce such members 
to support the president.  The president’s status as the sole representative of the entire 
nation and the electoral mechanisms designed to ensure representation and democratic 
accountability combine to make some members more likely to support the president. 
I organize my argument by considering the factors that influence the decision-
making of presidents, members of Congress, and the general public.  The decisions of 
individual members, presidents, and the public are all interrelated.  Individual members 
decide whether or not to support the president based in part on calculations about how 
their constituents will respond to the member’s vote.  The president decides which 
members will support him based in part on his strength in members’ constituencies, and 
the public decides who to vote for based in part on the relationship between the president 
and their representatives. 
 
MOTIVATING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PRESIDENTS, CITIZENS, AND REPRESENTATIVES 
I build my argument about presidential, congressional, and mass decision-making 
on a few simple assumptions.  First, I assume that presidents behave presidentially (Moe 
and Wilson 1994).  In other words, the institution of the presidency creates a similar set 
of goals, incentives, powers, and responsibilities for all individuals who occupy the office 
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independent of the partisan or the personal differences among them.  My second simple 
assumption about presidents is that all presidents wish to win legislative battles for 
reasons of politics, policy, and personal legacy.  Third, I assume that presidents are 
rational actors with limited time and resources who will target their coalition building 
efforts towards those members of Congress whom are most likely to vote in support of 
the president’s position. 
I build my argument about congressional decision-making on two simple 
assumptions.  First, members of Congress are single-minded seekers of reelection 
(Mayhew 1974).  Second, in order to serve their electoral goals members of Congress 
attempt to please their constituencies at all time.   
I use four assumptions to motivate my argument about mass decision-making and 
mass voting behavior.  First, American citizens have limited time to devote to politics.  
Second, as a consequence of these time limits American citizens know little about 
American politics.  Third, citizens know more about the president than they know about 
their members of Congress.  Fourth, because they know more about the president than 
they know about their members of Congress, citizens will use the president as an 
information shortcut and reward or punish their members of Congress based on the 
members’ level of support for the president’s agenda. 
 
Presidential decision-making 
Presidents are rational actors with limited time and resources.  They work within a 
complex environment that exists before their entry into the system and continues past 
their exit (Jones 1994).  Regardless of partisan and ideological preferences, all presidents 
share a set of public expectations and institutional capacities.  The public expects 
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presidents to maintain national security, economic prosperity and domestic tranquility 
(Ostrom and Simon 1985).  Presidents all share a set of institutional capacities, and work 
within the same larger institutional arrangement that is the American political system.  
Therefore, we can expect that presidents will behave presidentially and in a relatively 
similar fashion on the whole (Moe and Wilson 1994). 
Presidential behavior is motivated by the president’s conception of what will 
work best with the least political cost.  In other words, the president wants to get the most 
bang for his political buck.  This motivation holds in both the legislative and electoral 
arenas.  Electorally, presidents are judged on whether they make national conditions 
better or worse.  Public support for the president is based in large part on news about 
political outcomes (Brody 1991).  In the legislative arena, passing the best policy possible 
contributes to the president’s two main goals: reelection during the first term and 
presidential legacy during the second term.  In order to decide where his time is best 
spent, the president must consider how member of Congress make voting decisions and 
tailor his legislative strategy accordingly. 
 
Congressional decision-making 
Three factors motivate the behavior of members of Congress (Fenno 1978).  First 
and foremost, members of Congress are interested in reelection.  Second, members of 
Congress care about upward mobility.  House members often want to become senators or 
governors, and nearly all senators dream of one day becoming president.  The desire for 
upward mobility usually causes members to respond to their party leaders, but can 
sometimes cause members to defect from the party.  Members will defect from the party 
on big issues where they want to make what they see as the “right” decision, pass good 
policy, and earn the admiration and respect of the voting public.  John McCain’s dogged 
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pursuit of campaign finance reform is a good example.  Third and finally, personal policy 
preferences also drive member behavior, but these preferences are not generally as 
important as electoral incentives.   
The proximate goal of almost every member of Congress is to win their next 
election (Mayhew 1974).  Constituencies exert influence on members’ response to 
presidential agenda items because constituents hold the final say over members’ primary 
interest; reelection.  Members see themselves as “unsafe at any margin” (Mann 1978) and 
political scientists find that this perception is often true (Jacobson 1987; Ansolobehere, 
Brady and Fiorina 1992).  As a result, members pay attention to their “reelection 
constituency” at almost all times (Fenno 1978) and even the safest members of Congress 
are quite responsive to constituent opinion (Bartels 1991).  When an issue is salient in the 
public’s eyes, constituent preferences tend to take precedence over member preferences 
in members’ decision-making process (Kingdon 1973).  Even potential constituent 
preferences at a later date can guide member behavior on issues that have little salience 
and do not capture the public’s attention during the legislative process (Arnold 1990).  
Most presidential agenda items are either highly salient issues, or have the potential to 
become salient issues.  In order to serve their electoral interests, members must anticipate 
how their constituents will react to the member’s votes on the president’s agenda. 
 The decision-making process of members of Congress provides an opening for 
presidents to build successful coalitions.  Because members, above all, desire reelection,  
presidents can employ members’ constituents as leverage in the legislative arena.  In 
order for the president to successfully utilize a member’s constituency to the president’s 
legislative advantage, both members and presidents need to know something about how 





Most American citizens have little time to devote to politics.  Americans are now 
the hardest-working people in the world in terms of hours worked per week (International 
Labour Organization 2007).  Still, many citizens feel a sense of duty that drives them to 
vote despite the infinitesimally small chance that any one individual’s vote will change 
the outcome of an election (Downs 1957).  To compensate for their limitations, voters 
tend to use low-information shortcuts to process political events (Popkin 1991).  Party ID 
is the easiest and most available shortcut (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960).  Party’s usefulness as an information 
shortcut for voters, and thus its usefulness to members’ electoral goals, helps explain its 
influence on member voting behavior.  While party surely serves as both an information 
shortcut for citizen and an influence on member voting behavior, I argue that the 
president can also serve as an information shortcut for voters.  Thus, in addition to party 
politics, constituency-level presidential support influences member voting behavior as 
well.   
Despite party’s exceptionally strong influence on member behavior, members of 
Congress can and do defect from their party’s position on roll-call votes.  Defection is 
especially likely on salient, high-profile votes.  I argue that this defection often occurs on 
presidential agenda votes because the president himself serves as an information shortcut 
for voters.  The president can serve as an information shortcut in two ways.  First, the 
president’s involvement in high-profile issues such as health care reform can help voters 
make sense of political debates and decide where they stand on certain issues.  Second, 
while many voters pay little attention to politics and use only party itself as an 
information shortcut, more sophisticated voters pay closer attention to politics and may 
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use their opinion of the president as an additional information shortcut above and beyond 
party politics. 
Both empirical and anecdotal evidence shows that voters use the president as an 
information shortcut.  First, Americans do form coherent opinions about presidential job 
performance (Brody 1991).  Second, these opinions about the president can affect 
electoral outcomes.   Numerous studies find that voters who disapprove of the president’s 
job performance tend to take out their anger on members of his party (see Campbell 1993 
and Jacobson 1997 for two good examples).  Third, voters are able to distinguish between 
members of Congress based on members’ level of presidential support.  Members of 
Congress tend to suffer more electorally as their support of unpopular presidents 
increases (Brady, Cogan, Gaines and Rivers 1996; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 
2002).  When citizens use presidents as cues, they are able to differentiate between 
members with high and low levels of presidential support (Gronke, Koch and Wilson 
2003).  A substantial body of empirical evidence demonstrates that voters form opinions 
about the president, and use these opinions to evaluate members of Congress. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the cognitive process at work when voters use the 
president as an information shortcut.  I argue that citizens use the president as a type of 
“likability heuristic” when evaluating their members of Congress (Brady and Sniderman 
1985; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).  Gronke, Koch and Wilson (2003, 798) find 
empirical evidence that “citizens who like the president reward members who support 
him and punish members who oppose him, while citizens who dislike the president do 
exactly the opposite.”   A voter in Arkansas provided anecdotal evidence about how this 
decision-making process works, succinctly summarizing it to a reporter who asked his 
thoughts about Blanche Lincoln’s support of President Obama’s health care reform bill.  
“I don’t give two cents for his health care plan,” Mr. Mansfield said, “and if she supports 
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it, I don’t give two cents for her opinion” (Dewan 2010).  Mr. Mansfield’s remarks 
suggest that in order to evaluate their members of Congress on presidential agenda votes, 
citizens only need to make two simple calculations.  First, do they like or dislike the 
president’s proposals?  Second, does their member of Congress agree or disagree with the 
president’s proposals?  This straightforward calculation allows citizens to assess their 
representatives in Congress using little time and effort. 
Consider the cognitive and time demands that a more thorough decisionmaking 
process would put on American voters.  Using the president as an information shortcut to 
evaluate a members’ vote is a simple, connect-the-dots process.  A more sophisticated 
analysis of members’ votes on the president’s agenda is akin to climbing Mount Everest.  
In order to perform such a sophisticated decision, a citizen would be required to read and 
analyze each bill the president supports, develop a deep understanding of the policy 
implications of these bills, and collect information about how their representative and 
senator vote on each bill.  While a few incredibly engaged citizens may perform such a 
sophisticated analysis of the policy implications of their representatives’ votes on the 
president’s agenda, all existing evidence suggests that the great majority of voters use the 
president as a low-information shortcut to evaluate their members of Congress. 
 
HOW PARTY, CONSTITUENCY AND VULNERABILITY AFFECT PRESIDENT SUPPORT  
I use the above argument about presidential, congressional and mass public 
decision-making to derive three hypotheses about which members of Congress will be 
most likely to support the president’s preferred policies: the Constituency Hypothesis, the 
Vulnerability Hypothesis, and the Safety Hypothesis. 
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The Constituency Hypothesis 
In order to achieve their proximate goal, reelection, members of Congress 
must remain popular with their constituents.  Because constituents use presidential 
support, among other things, to evaluate their members of Congress, members 
adjust their levels of presidential support accordingly.  The Constituency 
Hypothesis holds that members will vary their support of the president in 
accordance with their constituency’s preferences.  
  
The Constituency Hypothesis:  The likelihood that a member will 
support the president’s policies increases as the president’s strength in the 
member’s constituency increases. 
 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis 
 All members of Congress are not equally secure.  Many members hail from safe 
districts and have great leeway in their voting behavior.  Others come from marginal 
districts and live in constant fear of losing their slim electoral edge.  Marginal members 
are particularly sensitive to their constituents’ preferences.  When a marginal member’s 
constituents are favorably predisposed towards the president, that member opposes the 
president at her own peril.  Conversely, if a marginal member’s constituents are 
unfavorably predisposed towards the president, that member will be hesitant to stick her 
neck out and support the president.  The Vulnerability Hypothesis holds that marginal 
members will be especially likely to follow their constituency’s lead on presidential 
agenda items.    
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The Vulnerability Hypothesis:  Vulnerable members from constituencies 
with high levels of presidential strength will be more likely to support the 
president than other members.  Vulnerable members from constituencies 
with low levels of presidential strength will be less likely to support the 
president.   
 
 
The Safety Hypothesis 
All members of Congress pay attention to their constituents and attempt to keep 
them happy, but safe members have a bit more freedom than vulnerable members.  This 
freedom could cause safe members to change their votes more often at various stages of 
the legislative process.  This expectation seems logical for two reasons.  First, both 
presidents and congressional party leaders might be more likely to lean on safe members 
and ask for their support on critical presidential agenda votes.  Presidents and party 
leaders are pragmatic politicians who understand that safe members of their party are 
more likely than vulnerable members to take potentially risky positions.  Second, safe 
members may be more likely than vulnerable members to vote according to their personal 
ideological preferences on some issues.  Vulnerable members have a greater risk of 
failing to achieve their proximate goal, reelection, and thus give great weight to 
constituent preferences when deciding how to vote.  Safe members may take advantage 
of their electoral situation and vote against constituent preferences on issues that have 
relatively low salience and are personally important to them. 
To test the Safety Hypothesis, I analyze vote switching on veto override attempts.  
The Safety Hypothesis holds that electoral safe members of Congress will be the most 
likely to switch their votes between final passage and the veto override attempt for the 
two reasons discussed above.  First, presidents and party leaders may be more likely to 
press safe members for their support on the veto override attempt.  Second, safe members 
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might be more likely to vote as they see fit on the final passage vote when the public’s 
attention to the issue is low, while vulnerable members pay closer attention to the 
public’s “potential preferences” (Arnold 1990).  As a result, the operative preferences of 
safe members would be the most likely to change after the president issues a veto and the 
public’s attention to the debate increases.  
 
The Safety Hypothesis:  As a member’s electoral vulnerability decreases, 
the member’s likelihood of switching votes during the override attempt 
increases. 
 
HOW REPRESENTATION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY INFLUENCE ELITE 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 If the above hypotheses hold true, they suggest that representation and democratic 
accountability are alive and well in the American political system.  The president 
represents the nation by proposing policies that he thinks will best serve the national 
interest.  The Constituency Hypothesis suggests that members of Congress will represent 
their constituents when they respond to the president’s agenda by adjusting their levels of 
presidential support to fit their constituency’s view of the president.  If a member’s 
constituents like the president and support his policy proposals, that member will 
represent her constituents by voting in favor of the president’s agenda.  Conversely, 
members from constituencies that do not have a high opinion of the president or his 
policies will represent their constituents by voting “nay” on presidential policy items.  In 
this manner, the constituency’s views are acted upon by their elected representatives. 
 The Vulnerability Hypothesis suggests that members’ fear of being held 
accountable at the next election provides citizens with a way to ensure that their 
representatives behave in accordance with their constituents’ wishes.  Vulnerable 
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members of Congress have the most to fear in their coming election, and thus will be the 
most sensitive to their constituency’s opinion of the president.  When the Vulnerability 
Hypothesis holds true, it serves as evidence that members fall in line with their 
constituency on presidential agenda items in order to avoid losing their seats in Congress.  
The electoral mechanism thus works as intended, forcing members to give voice to their 
constituents or risk being held accountable for failing to represent what the constituency 
views as the best course of action.   
 The Constituency and Vulnerability Hypotheses do not merely tell us about 
congressional accountability.  They also demonstrate how the public holds the president 
accountable for his actions.  When the voting public has a high opinion of the president 
and his policies, members of Congress are more likely to vote in favor of his agenda in 
order to represent their constituencies and avoid being held accountable in the next 
election cycle.  High popularity thus makes it easier for the president to accomplish his 
legislative agenda.  On the other hand, when the president becomes unpopular, members 
of Congress will be less likely to support his preferred policies.  This situation often leads 
to a stalemate between Congress and the president, keeping the president from passing 
his agenda into law.  Voters thus hold the president accountable by holding the power to 
encourage their representatives to either provide or withhold support for the president.  
When the president takes actions and proposes policies that voters disagree with, they 
hold him accountable by stalling his legislation agenda.  The public, working through 






Chapter 4:  Constituencies, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential 
Support 
The dominant theory of executive-legislative relations maintains that presidential 
success in Congress is primarily a function of partisan politics.  The idea is that 
presidents will be successful when their party controls Congress, and unsuccessful 
otherwise.  This chapter argues that partisan politics are only part of the story.  To enact 
legislation into law, presidents almost always need opposition party support.  In order to 
understand both presidential success in Congress and the passage of some of the most 
important bills in the modern era, we must understand why some members of Congress 
cross party lines on presidential agenda votes.  This chapter investigates presidential 
support from 1957 to 2007 and finds that the president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies systematically influences member voting behavior.  This influence is 
particularly strong for electorally vulnerable members of Congress.  Even in today’s 
highly partisan Congress, the president’s strength in members’ constituencies has a strong 
effect on members’ voting behavior. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL STRENGTH AND PRESIDENTIAL COALITION BUILDING 
This chapter’s analysis of the relationship between constituency-level presidential 
strength, electoral incentives, and presidential support helps explain a puzzling empirical 
fact that arises from party-based theories of presidential coalition building.  All but one of 
the twenty-eight pieces of “landmark legislation” enacted into law from 1945 to 2008 
were presidential agenda items.  Contrary to the predictions of party-based theories, all 
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but of the twenty-seven landmark president agenda items enacted into law between 1945 
and 2008 would not have become law without votes from opposition party members.  
This puzzling empirical fact means that party-based theories do not accurately explain the 
enacting coalitions that formed to pass over 96 percent of the most important pieces of 
legislation in modern American history.  To understand more comprehensively how 
presidents build legislative coalitions, I investigate members’ presidential support scores 
from 1957 to 2007.  I find that members’ constituencies and electoral incentives make 
some members systematically more likely to vote against their party caucus on 
presidential agenda votes.  Specifically, the president’s relative strength in members’ 
constituencies affects members’ relative levels of presidential support.  This effect is 
especially strong for vulnerable members of Congress.  The effects of constituencies and 
electoral incentives explain why some members of the president’s party voted against his 
position on landmark legislation, as well as why some opposition party members ended 
up providing the president with the votes he needed to enact landmark legislation into 
law.  
This chapter introduces the concept of “presidential strength” in order to test and 
measure constituency influence on presidential agenda items.  Presidential strength 
measures the constituency’s predisposition towards the president for each member of 
Congress.  Using this measure, I find that the combination of constituency and member 
vulnerability explains why some members defect from their party caucus on presidential 
agenda votes.  Constituency and member vulnerability are particularly strong influences 
in the House during the later period of the study (1985 – 2007).  It is striking that even in 
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today’s highly partisan era, the combination of constituency and member vulnerability 
can substantially influence members’ votes on the president’s agenda. 
This investigation into how members’ constituencies and electoral incentives 
systematically influence their response to the president’s agenda is important for 
theoretical, policy, and normative reasons.  Theoretically, understanding these systematic 
forces in American politics allows for a complete, accurate explanation of how enacting 
coalitions form.  This inquiry also clarifies two contested topics in political science – the 
presidential popularity hypothesis and the marginality hypothesis.  In terms of policy, 
understanding the effects of constituency and electoral incentives informs observers that 
presidents are rarely able to pass policy with votes from their congressional partisans 
alone.  Instead, they almost always need votes from the opposition party.  As a result, 
policy outputs in Congress will tend to be moderate and full of compromise instead of 
ideologically extreme policies passed by polarized partisans.  Normatively, the continued 
strength of constituency and electoral incentives suggest that norms of representation and 
democratic accountability are alive and well in the American system. 
 To investigate how constituency and vulnerability influence members’ votes on 
the presidential agenda, this chapter tests the Constituency and Vulnerability Hypothesis 
using presidential support scores from 1957 to 2007.  I begin by briefly reviewing the 
scholarly literature concerning both constituency influence in Congress, and the 
relationship between members’ electoral vulnerability and their voting behavior.  Then, I 
discuss how members of Congress consider their constituents’ preferences when deciding 
how to vote on the president’s agenda and formulate two hypotheses about presidential 
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support in Congress.  Next, I test these hypotheses using a dataset that includes every 
member of Congress from 1957 – 2007.  Finally, I conclude by arguing that 
comprehending the systematic relationship between presidential support, presidential 
strength, and member vulnerability adds a great deal to our understanding of the 
relationship between the president, Congress, and the American people. 
  
WHY CONSTITUENCIES AND MEMBER VULNERABILITY MATTER 
 Party-based theories of executive-legislative relations are prominent in political 
science for a good reason: presidential party members usually make up the majority of 
members in the president’s legislative coalition.  The problem is that a focus on party 
alone causes observers to miss three important facts about presidential coalitions.  First, 
some members do defect from their party caucus on presidential agenda votes.  Second, 
these defections are not random.  Third, these defections are substantively meaningful 
because most major pieces of legislation proposed by the president cannot become law 
without support from opposition party members.   
As a result of these three facts of legislative life, party-based theories cannot fully 
explain how presidents form winning coalitions in Congress.  The main reason why 
party-based theories hold such sway in the current literature is that most empirical tests of 
presidential success in Congress examine presidential success rates across congressional 
sessions and find that presidents tend to enact more of their agenda into law when their 
party controls more seats in Congress.  The research question of those studies is “when 
do presidents win most often?”  The main difference with this study is that I investigate 
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the behavior of individual members of Congress during individual congressional 
sessions.   As a result, my research question is “how do presidents win in Congress?” or 
“what type of members join the president’s legislative coalitions?”  To answer this 
question, we must understand how constituency influence and electoral incentives affect 
members’ voting behavior.   
Constituency influence on member voting behavior is a well-studied political 
phenomenon.  This influence stems from the Constitution, which created the American 
republic with an understanding that the government derived all of its power from the 
people (Federalist 37 and 52).  Political scientists have found that, for the most part, 
members of Congress do in fact represent the people’s will.  Miller and Stokes (1963, 56) 
concluded that “the conditions of constituency influence…are met well enough to give 
the local constituency a measure of control over the actions of its Representatives.”  
Subsequent studies consistently confirm this conclusion, finding a strong relationship 
between constituency opinion and member behavior (Kingdon 1973; Erikson 1978; 
Bartels 1991; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1994; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 
2001; Theriault 2005 and 2008; Jessee 2009). 
 Despite this long-standing link between constituency opinion and member 
behavior, political scientists still debate whether the American people affect member 
voting behavior on presidential agenda items.   In particular, the “presidential popularity 
hypothesis” is a point of great contention.  One side of the debate finds that presidential 
popularity causes members to respond more favorably to the president (Edwards 1976, 
1978, 1980, and 1997; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Rohde and 
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Simon 1985; Brace and Hinckley 1992).  The other side argues that the relationship 
between presidential popularity is sometimes statistically significant, but always 
substantively meaningless (Bond and Fleisher 1984; Bond, Fleisher and Northup 1988; 
Edwards 1989; Mouw and MacKuen 1992; Collier and Sullivan 1995) and that 
controlling for party and ideology makes the relationship disappear entirely (Bond and 
Fleisher 1980, 1990).  If constituencies clearly influence the voting decisions of members 
of Congress, why is the role of presidential popularity so unclear? 
 One problem in testing the presidential popularity hypothesis is the fact that 
members of Congress likely care about the president’s popularity in their constituency, 
not his popularity in the nation at large.3 Yet even scholars who recognize this problem 
sometimes fail to find a clear relationship between constituency-level presidential 
approval and member voting behavior (Cohen, Bond, Fleisher and Hamman 2000).4  This 
chapter focuses on how “presidential strength,” a measure of the president’s relative 
strength in members’ constituencies, affects members’ relative levels of presidential 
support.  The relationship between constituency-level presidential strength and members’ 
presidential support helps resolve the debate over “the presidential popularity hypothesis” 
because presidential strength encompasses both constituency partisanship and the 
president’s popularity in the constituency relative to other constituencies.  If presidential 
                                                 
3 A second problem is that presidents, acting rationally, will ask Congress for more when they are popular 
and less when they are unpopular.  Thus, presidential success rates may be similar for both popular and 
unpopular presidents, but the size and scope of the presidents’ legislative agendas will likely be larger when 
they are popular.  Barret and Eshbaugh-Soha (2007) find that presidents with higher approval ratings have 
higher success affecting the substance of legislation. 
4 Other studies use less direct measures of constituency-level presidential popularity and find positive 
relationships between presidential approval and presidential support (Borrelli and Simmons 1993; Ponder 
and Moon 2005). 
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strength in members’ constituencies influences members’ votes on presidential agenda 
items, it suggests that the president’s popularity with members’ constituents can affect 
the president’s ability to successfully build legislative coalitions. 
I argue that the president’s relative strength in members’ constituencies affects 
members’ relative level of presidential support, and that this effect is especially strong for 
vulnerable members of Congress.  Political scientists often refer to vulnerable members 
as “marginal members.”  A clear consensus has yet to emerge regarding the relationship 
between member marginality and member voting behavior.  Debate exists over whether 
marginal members of Congress have “vanished” (Mayhew 1974; Jacobson 1987; 
Ansolobehere, Brady and Fiorina 1992), and whether their alleged disappearance matters 
(Fiorina 1973 and 1974; Cohen and Brunk 1983; Bartels 1991; Groseclose 2001; Gulati 
2004; Griffin 2006).  In order for the disappearance of marginal members to matter, their 
participation in Congress must make a difference in legislative outcomes.  In other words, 
we only care about the amount of marginal members in any given Congress if they 
somehow behave differently than other members.  The “marginality hypothesis” 
maintains that marginal members do behave differently than other members, holding that 
“members from marginal districts will display more moderation in their voting behavior 
than those from safe districts” (Sullivan and Uslaner 1978, 536).   
The accumulated evidence regarding the marginality hypothesis is inconclusive.  
A number of early studies supported the hypothesis that marginal members tend to be 
moderates (MacRae 1952; Froman 1963), while later studies failed to support that claim 
(Fiorina 1973 and 1974; Cohen and Brunk 1983; Groseclose 2001; Gulati 2004).   A key 
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to understanding these conflicting results is Fiorina’s (1973, 494) insight that “moderate 
relative to one’s fellow legislators does not logically imply ‘moderate relative to one’s 
constituency’.”  If marginal members do behave differently than other members, we 
should expect that they will be more responsive than other members to their constituents’ 
preferences.  My approach takes Fiorina’s insight into account by using constituency-
level measures.  I argue that the constituency’s predisposition towards the president 
offers a clear signal to marginal members.  When marginal members vote on presidential 
agenda items they follow their constituency’s lead, voting with the president if he is 
strong in their constituency and voting against the president if he is not. 
 
HOW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS RESPOND TO THE PRESIDENT’S AGENDA 
This chapter tests the Constituency Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis 
in order to demonstrate how constituency and vulnerability systematically affect 
members’ response to the president’s agenda.  In particular, this test of the Vulnerability 
Hypothesis makes an important contribution to the scholarly literature, as it has yet to be 
systematically tested by others in this context and notable scholars have called for such a 
test (Edwards 2009). 
For the empirical analysis presented in this chapter, the Constituency Hypothesis 
holds that members’ presidential support scores will vary in accordance with the 
president’s strength in their constituency.   
The Constituency Hypothesis:  A member’s presidential support score 




The Vulnerability Hypothesis holds that the relationship between constituency-
level presidential strength and members’ presidential support scores will be particularly 
strong for marginal members of Congress.    
The Vulnerability Hypothesis:  Vulnerable members from constituencies 
with high levels of presidential strength will be more likely to support the 
president than other members.  Vulnerable members from constituencies 
with low levels of presidential strength will be less likely to support the 
president.   
 
 
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The dataset used to test these hypotheses includes observations for each member 




 Congresses (1957 – 2007).  The dependent variable, 
Presidential Support, is measured using CQ’s Presidential Support scores.5  The 
statistical model includes independent variables for party, presidential strength, member 
vulnerability, and member ideology in the House.  The Senate model uses these same 
                                                 
 
5 Edwards (1989) suggests refining CQ’s Presidential Support Scores to include only “non-consensual” 
votes.  I examined the correlation between CQ’s measure and Edwards’s measure in each individual 
Congress for the years included in this study.  The correlation is almost always >0.9 and often >0.99, 
making the two measures nearly identical for the purposes of this chapter.  With the research design 
employed in this chapter, the empirical results will be similar regardless of which measure is used.  
Edwards’s measures are invaluable if we wish to compare individual presidents’ success in Congress.  My 
purpose is to look at the variance amongst members and demonstrate that the combination of presidential 
strength and member vulnerability makes certain members of Congress more likely to support the president 
than other members.  
  
Presidential support scores raise another issue.  Some scholars question the use of presidential support 
scores as evidence of presidential influence.  The basic argument is that presidential support scores only 
measure how often members vote as the president would like them to vote, not how often the president 
actually influences such decisions (Pritchard 1985).  Presidential support scores are an appropriate measure 
for this chapter because I wish to argue that party, presidential strength in members’ constituencies, and 
members’ electoral vulnerability all systematically affect members’ propensity to support the president.  I 
am not arguing that the president himself directly influences members’ votes.  Instead, I argue that 
constituency and vulnerability are systematic influences on member voting decisions, regardless of the 
president’s actions.   
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variables, plus a reelection indicator variable for senators who face an election at the 
conclusion of the Congress in question.  In addition, I include a term interacting 
presidential strength with members’ electoral vulnerability.6  The model is designed to 
provide a simple, straightforward test of the relationship between presidential support, 
presidential strength in members’ constituencies, and member vulnerability, while 
controlling for the effects of party and ideology. 
Presidential Party is an indicator variable that equals “1” if the member is from 
the president’s party and “0” otherwise.  Presidential Strength is measured using the 
president’s two-party vote share in the state’s or district’s last presidential election.  I 
discuss this variable in detail below.  Member Vulnerability is operationalized by a fluid 
measure that ranges from 0 if a member runs unopposed to 0.999 if a member wins with 
just over 50 percent of the two-party vote in their state or district.7  This fluid measure of 
member vulnerability is preferable to establishing an arbitrary cut-point of 55 percent or 
60 percent at which one declares a member “vulnerable.” When studies use such arbitrary 
                                                 
 
6 All independent variables range from 0 – 1, while the dependent variable ranges from 0 – 100.  The 
model is designed to provide a simple, straightforward test of the relationship between presidential strength 
in members’ constituencies, member vulnerability, and presidential support.  Achen (2002, 446) argues that 
“a statistical specification with more than three explanatory variables is meaningless” because there is no 
way to tell if regressions with more than a few independent variables actually fit the data.  Close 
examination of the dependent and independent variables confirm that the empirical model presented in this 
chapter fits the data quite well.  While there is no doubt that factors such as demographics and geography 
help determine a constituency’s predisposition towards the president, controlling for these variables does 
not add much to our understanding of how members’ electoral incentives interact with constituency 
influences to affect congressional voting behavior. 
 
 
7 In mathematical terms, the measure equals (1 – Win Margin); where Win Margin equals [(winner’s vote – 
loser’s vote)/(winner’s vote + loser’s vote)].  For example, if a member wins with 51% of the two-party 
vote her win margin is 0.02 and her vulnerability measure is 0.98.  Conversely, if a member wins with 
100% of the vote, her win margin is 1 and her vulnerability measure is 0.   
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criteria, their findings are dependent upon which criteria they use to define “marginality” 
(Jacobson 1987, Ansolobehere, Brady and Fiorina 1992).  Reelection is only included in 
the Senate model.  It is equal to “1” if a senator is up for reelection in the coming 
electoral cycle, and “0” otherwise.  Ideology is simply the member’s DW-NOMINATE 
score.    
Finally, interaction of Member Vulnerability and Presidential Strength is the 
product of the presidential strength and member vulnerability variables.  The logic behind 
this interaction term is that members with the highest scores will be very vulnerable 
members from constituencies where the president is strong.  A member who represents a 
constituency with high presidential strength, 60 percent for example, and barely won their 
previous election with 50.1 percent of the vote will have a score of 0.596 on the 
interaction term.  On the other hand, a member who represents a constituency with low 
presidential strength, 40 percent for example, and barely won their previous election will 
have a score of 0.399 on the interaction term.  If the Vulnerability Hypothesis is correct, 
members with higher scores on the interaction term should have higher presidential 
support scores than other members, all else equal. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL STRENGTH 
Presidential strength in a member’s state or district is the constituency’s 
predisposition toward the president, as it compares to the president’s strength in other 
constituencies throughout the nation.  I use the president’s vote share in a member’s 
constituency to measure presidential strength, which is comprised of two factors: 1) the 
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constituency’s partisan composition and 2) the president’s popularity in the constituency, 
relative to his popularity in other constituencies.  The use of presidential vote share as a 
proxy for district partisanship is a well-established convention in the political science 
literature (Schwarz and Fenmore 1977; Erikson and Wright 1980).  In addition to gauging 
a constituency’s partisanship, presidential vote share also assesses the president’s 
popularity in the constituency, relative to his popularity in other constituencies.  
Presidential popularity waxes and wanes throughout the course of a president’s term, but 
the distribution of presidential popularity across constituencies is relatively stable.  
While the mean of presidential popularity fluctuates during a president’s time in 
office, its variance across constituencies is relatively stable.  Figure 4.1 displays the 
correlation between state-level presidential vote share and state-level presidential 
approval from May 2005 through November 2006.8  The correlation is above 0.9 in all 
but one month.  Moreover, in Gallup’s “State of the States” study, the correlation 
between President Obama’s state-level vote share and his yearly state-level approval 
numbers is 0.932 in 2009 and 0.91 in 2010.  This high correlation between constituency-
level presidential vote share and constituency-level presidential approval suggests that the 
presidential strength measure explains how both 1) constituency partisanship, and 2) 
presidential popularity in the constituency, relative to other constituencies, influences the 
voting behavior of members of Congress on presidential agenda items.  
                                                 
8I use only  2005 and 2006 are the only years in which SurveyUSA conducted monthly presidential 
approval in all 50 states. 
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For a final example, consider presidential popularity in Massachusetts (one of the 
bluest blue states) and Oklahoma (one of the reddest red states) in 2009 and 2010.  
Between 2009 and 2010, President Obama’s approval fell 11.6 percent in Massachusetts 
and 11.4 percent in Oklahoma (Gallup).  While President Obama’s approval rating 
fluctuated in these two states between 2009 and 2010, it fluctuated in a nearly identical 
manner.   
 
TESTING THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY AND VULNERABILITY 
 
To test the hypotheses, I perform linear regressions with members’ presidential 
support as the dependent variable.  I performed these regressions both pooling the data 
and separating it by Congress.  Pooling data allows for the simplest and clearest analysis, 
but pooling data is not always an appropriate methodological approach.  Pooling data is 
only appropriate if the data are “exchangeable,” which means that one must be able to 
assume that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is the same 
at all points in time.  With these concerns in mind, my methodological strategy attempts 
to balance the statistical requirement of exchangeability with the clarity and simplicity 
offered by pooling data. 
Appendix 4A displays the relationship between presidential vote share, member 
vulnerability, and presidential support in the House for each Congress from 1957 to 2007.  
Appendix 4A shows that pooling the data would not be appropriate in the House because 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables are quite different at 
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different points in time.  Overall, the estimates appear to vary between two time periods.  
Within these time periods, pooling the data is justifiable because the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables is quite similar within each time period.  
Accordingly, for the House I present and discuss results from pooled regressions from the 
85
th
 to the 98
th
 Congress (1957 - 84), and the 99
th
 to the 109
th
 Congress (1985 - 2007).   
As for the Senate, pooling the entire timeframe seems more appropriate.  Appendix 4B 
displays the relationship between presidential vote share, member vulnerability, and 
presidential support in the Senate by Congress.  The results from individual Congresses 
suggest that the observations are exchangeable across all congressional sessions under 
investigation.  As a result, I present results from the pooled Senate analysis for reasons of 
simplicity and clarity. 
 
Constituency, Vulnerability, and Presidential Support in the House 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the empirical analysis for the House.9  As 
expected, party has a strong effect on presidential support scores in both time periods.  
Due to the presence of the interaction term, I calculate and present the effect of 
presidential strength for members with the mean level of vulnerability.  Similarly, I 
calculate vulnerability’s effect on members from constituencies with the mean level of 
presidential strength.  Even after controlling for party’s strong relationship with 
                                                 
9 When reporting results from models with interaction terms, it is not appropriate to interpret the 
coefficients of the lower-order variables as unconditional marginal effects (Braumoeller 2004, Brambor, 
Clark and Golder 2006).  Accordingly, I calculate the effect of presidential strength for members with the 
mean level of vulnerability.  Similarly, I calculate vulnerability’s effect on members with the mean level of 
presidential strength.  In Tables 4.1 and 4.3, I present coefficients and standard errors for these effects 
instead of presenting the coefficients and standard errors of the lower-order variables.   
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members’ presidential support scores, the empirical evidence appears to support the 
Constituency and Vulnerability Hypotheses, especially in the later time period.   
Presidential strength in a member’s constituency is sizeable influence on 
members’ presidential support scores.  As first noted by Edwards (1976, 1978), the 
president’s vote share in a member’s district is strongly associated with presidential 
support.  For members with mean levels of electoral vulnerability, presidential strength 
has a statistical and substantive relationship with presidential support scores in both time 
periods under investigation in the House of Representatives.  The effect of presidential 
strength for mean members in the first time period (1957 – 84) is around 27, which 
means that a 10 percent increase in the president’s vote share in a member’s district is 
associated with a 2.7 percent increase in the member’s presidential support score.10  In 
the second time period (1985 – 2007), this effect is even stronger.  The coefficient of 58 
means that a 10 percent increase in the president’s vote share in a member’s district is 
associated with a 5.8 percent increase in a member’s presidential support score.  Even 
after controlling for party and ideology, the president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies has a strong effect on members’ propensity to support the president. 
The evidence in support of the Vulnerability Hypothesis in the House is a bit 
more nuanced.  First, member vulnerability is statistically related to the presidential 
support scores of House members from constituencies with average levels of presidential 
strength in both time periods under investigation.  The relationship is positive in the first 
                                                 
10 A coefficient of 10 on this variable would mean that an increase of 10% in the president’s vote share in a 
member’s constituency leads to a 1% increase in that member’s presidential support score, while a 
coefficient of 100 would equal a 10% increase in presidential support for every 10% increase in the 
president’s vote share. 
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time period (1957 – 84), and negative in the second time period (1985 – 2007).  Second, 
the term interacting member vulnerability and presidential strength in the constituency is 
not statistically significant in the first time period, but it is strongly significant in the 
second time period.  To fully understand the results from the House analysis, it is helpful 
to examine the substantive effects of constituency and vulnerability.  First, I discuss the 
marginal effects of constituency and vulnerability.  Second, I present predicted 
presidential support scores for members with different levels of vulnerability, and 
differing levels of presidential strength in their constituencies. 
Table 4.2 displays the marginal effects of vulnerability and constituency for both 
the House and the Senate, while Figure 4.2 displays the marginal effect of constituency-
level presidential strength in the House, conditional on different levels of member 
vulnerability.11    If the Vulnerability Hypothesis is correct, constituencies should exert a 
greater influence on the presidential support scores of highly vulnerable members than 
they do on safe members.  This expectation holds true in both time periods under 
investigation (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3).  Vulnerable members of the House and 
Senate are more sensitive than safe members to the president’s strength in their 
constituencies. 
The strongest evidence for the Vulnerability Hypothesis exists if vulnerability has 
a negative effect on members from constituencies where the president is weak, and 
vulnerability has a positive effect on members from constituencies where the president is 
                                                 
11 I use the 5
th
 percentile of member vulnerability to calculate “low member vulnerability” and the 95
th
 
percentile to calculate “high member vulnerability.” 
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strong.  This expectation holds true for both time periods (see Figure 4.3), but only in the 
second time period are the marginal effects of vulnerability statistically significant for 
members from both types of constituencies (see Table 4.2).  In the time period from 1985 
to 2007, vulnerable members of the House from constituencies with low presidential 
strength vote with the president less often than other members.  On the other hand, 
vulnerable members from constituencies where the president is strong vote in support of 
the president’s position more often than other members.  Constituency-level presidential 
strength is a strong influence on representatives’ votes in both time periods.  Vulnerable 
representatives are particularly sensitive to constituency-level presidential strength in the 
later time period, from 1985 to 2007.  Even in today’s highly polarized era in executive-
legislative relations, vulnerable members of Congress will vote against their party 
caucus’s position on presidential agenda votes if their constituents demand it. 
Last, I perform a final test of the substantive importance of constituency and 
vulnerability in the House.  I calculate predicted presidential support scores for two types 
of members:  1) highly vulnerable members from constituencies with low presidential 
strength and 2) highly vulnerable members from constituencies with high presidential 
strength.12  I compare the predicted presidential support scores for these highly 
vulnerable members to predictions for members with mean levels of both vulnerability 
                                                 
12 I use the 95
th
 percentile of vulnerability in each Congress for the calculations regarding “vulnerable 
members.”  I use the 5
th
 percentile of presidential vote share to calculate “low presidential strength” and the 
95
th
 percentile to calculate “high presidential strength.”  Furthermore, I use the distribution for each party’s 
caucus when calculating the predicted presidential support scores.  For example, when I calculate predicted 
presidential support scores for opposition party member with “high presidential strength” I use the 95
th
 
percentile of the presidential vote share variable for opposition party members only, and not the entire 
House.  I use the same method to calculate predicted presidential support scores for presidential party 
members. 
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and presidential vote share.  If the Vulnerability Hypothesis is correct, vulnerable 
members from constituencies with low presidential strength should have the lowest 
presidential support scores, while vulnerable members from constituencies with high 
presidential strength should have the highest.  This expectation holds true for both time 
periods (see Figure 4.4).  While the expectation holds true in both time periods, the 
substantive effects of constituency and vulnerability are especially strong in the second 
time period (1985 – 2007). 
Today’s Congress is a highly partisan affair, with conditions of interparty 
homogeneity and intraparty heterogeneity leading to some of the most polarized 
congressional parties in American history (Sinclair 2006; Theriault 2008).  Despite this 
extraordinarily high level of polarized partisan behavior in Congress, the combination of 
constituency and vulnerability can have a large substantive effect on members’ 
propensity to support the president (see Figure 4.4).  First, comparing vulnerable 
opposition party members from constituencies with low presidential strength to similarly 
vulnerable opposition party members from constituencies with high presidential strength, 
the combined effect of constituency and vulnerability in the second time period (1985 – 
2007) is more than 30 percentage points!  This effect is almost as large as party’s effect 
(35.8 percentage points).  The substantive effect of constituency and vulnerability is a bit 
smaller for presidential party members at the extremes of presidential strength, but at 
more than 20 percentage points it is still quite significant.   
Second, vulnerable members of both parties from constituencies where the 
president is strong have average presidential support scores that are about 10 percentage 
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points higher than their fellow partisans with mean levels of vulnerability and presidential 
strength.  Third, comparing vulnerable members from constituencies where the president 
is weak to average members of their party, the effect is more than 20 percentage points 
for opposition party members, and about 10 percentage points for presidential party 
members.  In sum, the combination of constituency and vulnerability can affect 
presidential support scores by about 10 to 30 percentage points from 1985 to 2007.  This 
effect is about one-third to four-fifths as strong as party’s effect.  Even during one of the 
most partisan periods in congressional history, constituency and vulnerability are 
important influences on members’ votes in the House. 
 
Constituency, Vulnerability, and Presidential Support in the Senate 
 Vulnerability and presidential strength operate similarly in the Senate (see Table 
4.3).  Constituency has a rather large substantive effect on senators’ presidential support 
scores.  Presidential strength’s coefficient (49.0) for senators with mean levels of 
vulnerability indicates that every 10 percentage point increase in the president’s vote 
share in a senator’s state is associated with a 4.9 percentage point increase in the 
senator’s presidential support score.  As expected, the constituency’s influence on 
senators’ propensity to support the president grows larger as senators’ electoral 
vulnerability increases.  The marginal effects of constituency and vulnerability are quite 
substantial in the Senate (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5).  The coefficient for presidential 
strength is 20.0 for safe senators, 49.0 for average senators and 56.3 for highly vulnerable 
senators.  As the Constituency Hypothesis suggests, the president’s strength in senators’ 
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constituencies affects their propensity to support the president.  And as the Vulnerability 
Hypothesis suggests, this constituency effect grows larger as senators become more 
electorally vulnerable. 
 Vulnerability has an independent effect on senator voting behavior as well.  The 
reelection indicator variable is negative and significant, suggesting that senators up for 
reelection in the coming electoral cycle support the president a bit less often than others.  
Moreover, for senators from states with average levels of presidential strength, the 
member vulnerability coefficient is positive and significant at the p<0.1 level.  On its 
own, vulnerability’s substantive effect is not particularly impressive.  The coefficient 
(1.9) suggests that a highly vulnerable senator will have a presidential support score that 
is about 2 percentage points higher than a completely safe senator’s presidential support 
score.   
Again, the strongest evidence for the Vulnerability Hypothesis exists if 
vulnerability has a negative effect on senators from states where the president is weak, 
and a positive effect on senators from states where the president is strong.  This 
expectation holds true in the Senate (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5). 
Finally, as in the House analysis, I calculate predicted presidential support scores 
for 1) highly vulnerable senators from states where the president is weak, and 2) highly 
vulnerable senators from states where the president is strong.  I then compare these 
predictions to the predicted presidential support scores of senators with average levels of 
vulnerability representing states with average levels of presidential strength.  The 
combined effect of constituency and vulnerability in the Senate is smaller than it is in the 
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House, but it is still substantively significant (see Figure 4.6).  At the extremes, highly 
vulnerable senators from states where the president is strong have predicted presidential 
support scores that are about 15 percentage points higher than the predicted presidential 
support scores of vulnerable senators from states where the president is weak.  Further, 
comparing vulnerable senators to average senators, the effect of constituency and 
vulnerability is between 6 to 9 percentage points.   
For purposes of comparison, party’s effect in the Senate is just under 30 
percentage points.  Thus, the combination of constituency and vulnerability can have an 
effect on senators’ presidential support scores that is about one-fifth to one-half as strong 
as party’s effect.  While party is certainly a powerful influence on senators’ voting 
behavior on presidential agenda items, ignoring the effects of constituency and 
vulnerability causes one to miss a significant amount of variation amongst senators.  It is 
important to understand these senators who defect from their party caucus on presidential 
agenda items, because they are often critical to the president’s legislative success as a 
result of cloture requirements in the Senate.  Presidents often succeed when they capture 




The empirical analysis presented in this chapter finds that the president’s strength 
in members’ constituencies affects their decisions to support or oppose the president on 
the floor of Congress.  This systematic relationship between constituency-level 
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presidential strength and members’ presidential support is especially pronounced for 
electorally vulnerable members.  This analysis makes theoretical and normative 
contributions to our understanding of presidential coalition building in Congress.  
Theoretically, it is the first study to systematically investigate whether vulnerable 
members of Congress behave differently than safe members on presidential agenda votes, 
an investigation that is often called for in discussions of executive-legislative relations 
(Edwards 2009).  Second, this inquiry uses constituency-level measures to help clarify 
two contested debates in political science; the presidential popularity hypothesis and the 
marginality hypothesis.  This theoretical contribution expands our understanding of 
executive-legislative relations beyond party-based explanations, and offers a complete 
theory of how presidents win in Congress by capturing important (and too often 
overlooked) congressional behavior.  This theory thus suggests that policy outputs in 
Congress will be moderate compromises instead of ideologically extreme bills passed by 
the majority party alone.  Normatively, this study provides evidence that norms of 
representation and democratic accountability are alive and well in the American system.  
Understanding the systematic relationship between member vulnerability, 
presidential strength, and presidential support helps make sense of the ongoing debate 
over the presidential popularity hypothesis.  Political scientists debate whether the 
president’s standing with the public affects congressional behavior.  I use constituency-
level measures and find that presidential strength does affect members’ voting behavior.  
It is important to remember which type of public opinion members of Congress consider 
when making their voting decisions.  They are more concerned about the president’s 
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strength in their constituencies than they are about his standing in the nation at large.  All 
else equal, if the president is strong in a member’s constituency, that member will support 
the president more often than if the president is weak.   
Using constituency-level measures of presidential strength also adds to our 
understanding of the much maligned marginality hypothesis.  In comparison to safer 
members of Congress, marginal members are especially responsive to their constituency 
on presidential agenda items.  Marginal members wish to cast roll-call votes on the 
House and Senate floor that will win them a plurality of their electorates’ votes on the 
next Election Day.  They attempt to cast such roll-call votes by following their 

















Figure 4.1:  Correlation Between State-Level Presidential Vote 
Share and State-Level Presidential Approval 
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Table 4.1:  Testing the Constituency Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis in the House of 
Representatives  
    
 
85th - 98th Congress 99th - 109th Congress 
  
   Presidential Party 21.9*** 35.9*** 
  (0.38) (0.42) 
    
 Presidential Strength 27.3*** 57.9*** 
  (1.85) (1.73) 
    
 Member Vulnerability 4.9*** -2.04*** 
  (0.63) (0.5) 
    
 Member Vulnerability * 
Presidential Strength -1.68 29.5*** 
  (4.88) (3.74) 
    







 Constant 23.1 13.6 
  (1.55) (0.93) 
  
   R² 0.47 0.79 
 
    N 5,918 4,680 
  
 
Notes:  Table presents OLS estimates.  The dependent variable is the member’s presidential support score.  
Presidential Strength coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level of Member Vulnerability.  
Member Vulnerability coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level of Presidential Strength.   
 




Table 4.2:  The Marginal Effect of Presidential Vote Share and Member Vulnerability on  
Presidential Support Scores in the House and Senate 






85th - 98th 
Congress 
99th - 109th 
Congress 
 
85th - 109th 
Congress 
Presidential Vote Share 
    Low Member Vulnerability 22.3*** 40.6*** 
 
20.0*** 
     Mean  Member Vulnerability 49.0*** 57.9*** 
 
47.8*** 
     High  Member Vulnerability 57.2*** 68.9*** 
 
56.3*** 
     
     Member Vulnerability 
    Low Presidential Vote Share -3.31 -9.2*** 
 
-3.32* 
     Mean Presidential Vote 
Share 1.74 -2.04*** 
 
1.94* 
     High Presidential Vote 










1) The bottom line of each bar represents the marginal effect of presidential strength for 
members of Congress with low vulnerability. 
 
2) The middle line of each bar represents the marginal effect of presidential strength for 
members of Congress with mean vulnerability. 
 
3) The top line of each bar represents the marginal effect of presidential strength for 
members of Congress with high vulnerability. 
 
4) The upward arrow indicates that the marginal effect of presidential strength increases 










85th - 98th Congress 99th - 109th Congress 
Figure 4.2:  The Marginal Effect of Presidential Strength  on 




1) The bottom line of each bar represents the marginal effect of vulnerability for members 
of Congress representing constituencies with low presidential strength. 
 
2) The middle line of of each bar represents the marginal effect of vulnerability for 
members of Congress representing constituencies with mean presidential strength. 
 
3) The top line of of each bar represents the marginal effect of vulnerability for members 
of Congress representing constituencies with high presidential strength. 
 
4) The upward arrow indicates that the marginal effect of vulnerability increases as the 
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Figure 4.3:  The Marginal Effect of Vulnerability on 
Presidential Support Scores in the House of Representatives 
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1) The bottom line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for 
members with a) high vulnerability, and b) low presidential strength in their 
constituency. 
 
2) The middle line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for 
members with a) mean vulnerability, and b) mean presidential strength in their 
constituency. 
 
3) The top line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for 





















85th - 98th Congress 99th - 109th Congress 
Figure 4.4:  Predicted President Support Scores, and the 
Substantive Effect of Constituency and Vulnerability in the House 
of Representatives 
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Table 4.3:  Testing the Constituency Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis  in the Senate 
    
 
85th - 109th Congress 
   
   Presidential Party 28.2*** 
   (0.54) 
   
   Presidential Strength 49.0*** 
   (3.31) 
   
   Member Vulnerability 1.74 
   (1.3) 
   
   Member Vulnerability * Presidential Strength 
35.3*** 
   (12.4) 
   










    Constant 31.9 
   (4.24) 
   
   R² 0.51 
  
    N 2,339 
   
 
Notes:  Table presents OLS estimates.  The dependent variable is the senator’s presidential support score.  
Presidential Strength coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level of Member Vulnerability.  
Member Vulnerability coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level of Presidential Strength.   
 





1) The bottom line of the lefthand bar represents the marginal effect of presidential 
strength for senators with low vulnerability.  The bottom line of the rightthand bar 
represents the marginal effect of vulnerability for senators representing states with low 
levels of presidential strength. 
 
2) The middle line of the lefthand bar represents the marginal effect of presidential 
strength for senators with mean vulnerability.  The middle line of the rightthand bar 
represents the marginal effect of vulnerability for senators representing states with 
mean levels of presidential strength. 
 
3) The top line of the lefthand bar represents the marginal effect of presidential strength 
for senators with high vulnerability.  The top line of the rightthand bar represents the 
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Figure 4.5:  The Marginal Effects of Presidential Strength and 
Member Vulnerability on Presidential Support Scores in the 
Senate 
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1) The bottom line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for 
senators with a) high vulnerability, and b) low presidential strength in their state. 
 
2) The middle line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for 
senators with a) mean vulnerability, and b) mean presidential strength in their state. 
 
3) The top line of each bar represents the predicted presidential support score for senators 
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85th - 109th Congress 
Figure 4.6:  Predicted President Support Scores, and the 
Substantive Effect of Constituency and Vulnerability in the 
Senate 
Appendix 4A: The Effect of Presidential Strength and (Member Vulnerability * Presidential Strength) in 
the House, 85th - 109th Congresses 
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Appendix 4B: The Effect of Presidential Strength and (Member Vulnerability * Presidential Strength) in 





        
        
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
 
        
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
        
         
         
 
        
         
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
         
 
        
         
 
        
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
         
 
        
         
         





































































































































































































































































Chapter 5:  Beyond Pivotal Politics – Constituencies, Electoral 
Incentives, and Challenged Vetoes 





 Congress in order to project strength and defend “his party and his powers” 
(Mullins and Wildavsky 1992, p. 36).  This strategy served President Bush rather well 
until he suffered a serious defeat at the end of his time in office.  On September 17, 1992, 
the House of Representatives adopted the conference report on S12, the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, by a margin of 280 to 128 (CQ 
Almanac 1992).  This margin barely surpassed the two-thirds majority needed to override 
the president’s veto, setting up a highly public confrontation between Congress and the 
president when Bush vetoed the bill on October 3, 1992, in the midst of his reelection 
campaign.  The White House “stressed loyalty to the president as the main reason why 
Republicans should switch” their votes on the cable bill and vote to sustain the 
president’s veto (CQ Almanac 1992).  In the end, the White House lost this argument as 
the House overrode the president’s veto by a margin of 308-114.  On perhaps the highest 
profile veto of Bush’s presidency, zero members of the House switched their votes to 
support his position while 32 members either switched their votes to defect from the 
president’s coalition, or abstained on the final passage vote and voted against the 
president during the veto override attempt.  This crushing legislative defeat helped 
cripple Bush’s already weak campaign for reelection.  President Bush lost both the cable 
battle in October and the electoral war in November. 
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 Political science currently offers two primary explanations for member behavior 
on presidential agenda items.  The two dominant arguments assert that members respond 
to the president based on party (Edwards 1980 and 1989, Bond and Fleisher 1980, 1984 
and 1990) and ideology (Bond and Fleisher 1990, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Krehbiel 
1998).  Neither explanation fully accounts for member behavior on the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.  First, Democrats held 270 seats in 
the 102
nd
 Congress (61%), and therefore needed Republican assistance in order to 
override President Bush’s veto.  Second, ideological explanations do not accurately 
describe member behavior on S12 in 1992.  Krehbiel’s (1998) theory of “pivotal politics” 
is the dominant ideological explanation of vote switching during challenged vetoes.  
Krehbiel argues that members who switch their votes on challenged vetoes should come 
from a certain portion of the ideological spectrum as measured by DW-NOMINATE 
scores.  He refers to this region as “the veto pivot quintile.”  Of the 32 members who 
either changed their votes to defect from President Bush’s coalition or abstained on the 
final passage vote and then voted for S12 during the veto override attempt, only four 
come from “the veto pivot quintile.”  In fact, the members who changed their votes on S 
12 come from all over the ideological spectrum as captured by DW-NOMINATE scores.  
In this chapter, I argue that in order to more accurately predict and explain members’ 
response to the president’s agenda, political science must consider how constituency 
influence and member vulnerability affect members’ voting decisions on challenged 
vetoes.   
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The high stakes politics surrounding veto override attempts offer an ideal 
opportunity to study the president’s influence in Congress.  This chapter analyzes 
member voting behavior on vetoes that Congress attempts to override, which I refer to as 
“challenged vetoes.”  A bill’s content is identical on both final passage and override 
votes, yet some members of Congress vote differently on these two roll-calls.   I argue 
that constituency and electoral vulnerability cause some members to change their votes 
on challenged vetoes.  Presidential strength, which measures the constituency’s 
predisposition towards the president for each member of Congress, has an enduring effect 
on which members are most likely to join the president’s coalition during challenged 
vetoes.   Cameron (2000) examines veto power at the macro-level and finds that the 
veto’s existence as an institutional rule can cause Congress to modify legislation both in 
anticipation of a potential veto, and after the president issues a veto.  I build on these 
findings by examining the behavior of the individual members of Congress whose 
support the president needs in order to successfully veto legislation.   
Krehbiel (1998, 163) is one of few to study the veto’s effect at the individual 
level.  He finds that “postwar presidents do seem to exert a positive influence over 
individual legislators in the veto arena.”  He focuses on legislators in “the veto pivot 
quintile” and finds that, on average, presidents can gain “one vote of every eight” from 
these legislators.   My analysis goes beyond the focus on “pivotal politics” alone and 
investigates how constituency and electoral vulnerability influences legislators to switch 
their votes between final passage and the veto override attempt.  The pivotal politics 
argument suggests that about 12 percent (Krehbiel’s one out of every eight) of the 
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members within the veto pivot quintile switch their votes to join the president’s coalition 
on veto override attempts.  I build upon this finding with an argument that helps 
understand and predict which members inside the veto pivot will be among the 12 percent 
who join the president’s coalition.  Further, many legislators outside of the veto pivot 
quintile change their voting behavior as well.  What motivates these members?  It cannot 
be simply ideological considerations.  Something else must be at work.  I attempt to offer 
a more precise explanation of vote switching during challenged vetoes.   I find that the 
president’s ability to win members’ support on challenged vetoes is affected by party, 
ideology, members’ electoral vulnerability, and the president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies.   
This chapter proceeds by first explaining the need to go beyond ideology-based 
explanations of member voting behavior on challenged vetoes.  Next, I test the 
Constituency Hypothesis, the Vulnerability Hypothesis, and the Safety Hypothesis by 
analyzing vote switching on challenged vetoes.  I conclude by offering thoughts on how 
appreciating the substantive effect of constituency and vulnerability provides both 
theoretical and normative insight on the relationship between Congress, the president, 
and the American people. 
WHY GO BEYOND PIVOTAL POLITICS? 
 In Pivotal Politics, Krehbiel develops an elegant model describing how enacting 
coalitions form.  This model argues that members at and around the “veto pivot” are 
critical because legislative coalitions must include these members in order to override the 
president’s veto.  One set of tests of the model, featured in Chapters 6 and 7, divides 
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members into quintiles based on their DW-NOMINATE scores and investigates whether 
members in some quintiles behave differently than others on votes in a veto chain.  These 
analyses find that the voting behavior of members in the veto pivot quintile differs from 
the behavior of members outside this quintile in a statistically and substantively 
significant manner, with members in the veto pivot changing their votes more often 
between final passage and the veto override.  The pivotal politics model is widely 
accepted today due to its elegance, rigorous testing, and great predictive power. 
 While the pivotal politics model admirably explains a good deal of the legislative 
process using a parsimonious set of assumptions, it neglects some important aspects in 
the formation and composition of legislative coalitions.  Relying solely on the arguments 
of Pivotal Politics, one is unable to explain a considerable portion of member voting 
behavior on bills that face presidential vetoes.  At the aggregate level in both chambers of 
Congress, members outside of the veto pivot quintile comprise the majority of members 
who switch their voting behavior in general between final passage and the veto override 
attempt. 
 Figure 5.1 takes all members of the House who switch their votes between final 
passage and the veto override, and displays the percentage of members who come from 
each ideological quintile.  Members from the veto pivot quintile make up just 26.9 
percent of all House members who vote differently on final passage than they do on the 
override attempt during a challenged veto chain.  In fact, slightly more members (27.2 
percent) from what Krehbiel calls the “extreme opponents” quintile change their votes 
than do members in the veto pivot quintile.  Focusing solely on the veto pivot quintile in 
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the House would cause one to miss nearly three-quarters of the members who switch their 
vote.  This result holds true when I disaggregate the data and look separately at members 
who switch votes to either join, or defect, from the president’s coalition on the veto 
override attempt.  The percentage of members who change their votes to join the 
president’s legislative coalition on the override attempt is equal for both the veto pivot 
quintile and the extreme opponents quintile, with each quintile making up 40.8 percent of 
all presidential joiners (see Figure 5.1).  Furthermore, members from the veto pivot 
quintile make up just 22 percent of all members who defect from the president’s 
coalition.  This analysis suggests that focusing solely on the veto pivot quintile would 
cause one to miss the majority of members who change their votes during challenged 
vetoes.   
 The results from the Senate are similar.  Members from the veto pivot quintile 
comprise a slim plurality of all vote switchers in the Senate, with 28.9 percent of all 
Senate switchers coming from the veto pivot quintile and 27.8 percent from the extreme 
opponent quintile (see Figure 5.2).  The result is similar if we focus on presidential 
joiners.  About 40 percent of presidential joiners are from the veto pivot quintile, while 
about 30 percent are from the extreme opponent quintile.  Senators in the veto pivot 
quintile make up a plurality, but not a majority, of vote switchers and presidential joiners 
in the Senate.  Finally, members from the veto pivot quintile make up about 28 percent of 
those who defect from the president’s coalition.  As in the House, focusing solely on the 




 This brief investigation of vote switchers and presidential joiners reveals an 
important fact about member behavior on challenged vetoes.  In the aggregate, members 
from the veto pivot quintile do not comprise a majority of the members who switch their 
voting behavior between final passage and the veto override attempt.13  A more complete 
explanation of member behavior on challenged vetoes is needed for two reasons: 1) 
members from the veto pivot are not a majority of the members who switch their votes on 
challenged vetoes, and 2) not all members in the veto pivot change their voting behavior 
on challenged vetoes.   
In order to develop a more precise explanation of vote switching, I argue that 
political scientists must consider how the president’s use of the veto changes members’ 
“operative preferences.”  Operative preferences are “the preferences that actually govern 
the voting choice, when all the other forces pressuring the member in one direction or the 
other are taken into account” (Rohde 1991, 41).  These “other forces” may be any 
number of influences on member behavior: constituencies, presidents, parties, interest 
groups, or personal preferences are just a few potential influences on members’ votes.  
This change in operative preferences changes members’ decision-making process, and 
thus has the potential to change their votes.  Accounting for this change in operative 
preferences simultaneously solves two puzzles.  First, why do members outside the veto 
pivot change their votes between final passage and the veto override?  Second, which 
members inside the veto pivot are the most likely to switch their votes? 
                                                 
13 Of course, members in the veto pivot may make up a majority of those who switch their votes in some 





VETOES AND MEMBERS’ OPERATIVE PREFERENCES 
 Vetoes matter in the legislative process.  Both vetoes and veto threats can change 
the substance of legislation.  In fact, the mere existence of the veto power and its 
potential for use causes bill sponsors to craft legislation that can capture the support of 
“the veto pivot” and thus pass with a supermajority (Krehbiel 1998; Cameron 2000).  
Political scientists have paid a good deal of attention to this powerful presidential tool 
(Rohde and Simon 1985; Schap 1986; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Watson 1988; 
Matthews 1989; Ingberman and Yao 1991; McCarty and Poole 1995; McCarty 1997).  
Almost all of these studies look at the macro-level, studying how presidents use vetoes to 
influence Congress as a whole, and legislative outcomes in the aggregate.  My goal is to 
build on this base of macro-level knowledge by looking at the micro-level and 
investigating which individual members of Congress are affected by the veto.   
Previous research makes it clear that the veto power as an institutional feature has 
great influence over legislative outputs.  In other words, the veto need not be used in 
order to affect members’ behavior.  In this chapter, I argue that the actual use of the veto 
can influence member behavior above and beyond the veto’s influence as a feature of the 
legislative process.  This added influence can occur from either direct or indirect 
presidential influence. 
The first, and most obvious, way that vetoes allow presidents to influence member 
behavior is by increasing the president’s chances of successfully persuading members to 
join his legislative coalition.  The veto changes the rules of the legislative game, 
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transforming it from a majoritarian system to a supermajoritarian system.  This change 
makes directly persuading members of Congress easier for the president because the 
critical members of Congress who hold the key to a bill’s success or failure are closer to 
the president ideologically and more likely to be members of his party.  The president can 
directly influence these critical members in a variety of ways, including offering favors, 
promising campaign support through either appearances or money, promising support for 
members’ pet legislation, or promising to support (or block) judicial and executive 
appointees whom the critical member prefers.  By shifting the playing field and making 
the critical members of Congress closer to the president ideologically, the veto makes it 
easier for presidents to successfully influence members through direct appeals. 
The second manner in which the veto may allow presidents to influence member 
voting behavior is a bit more subtle.  This influence stems from both the people’s role in 
the American political system and the president’s role as the most visible face in 
American politics, able to capture the attention of both the media and the public.  Before 
a veto is issued, members anticipate the president’s preferences and attempt to craft 
legislation that either pleases the president or can overcome a potential veto.  For many 
bills, this process takes place out of the limelight and few citizens pay attention to the 
bill.  Presidential vetoes, however, increase both the bill’s salience and the public’s 
attention to the policy debate.  This increased public attention changes the “operative 
preferences” of legislators.  In the case of challenged vetoes, I argue that the most 
relevant “other forces” are the president and the American public.  As a result of 
presidential involvement, increased public attention, and the resultant shift in members’ 
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operative preferences, members may vote differently on veto override attempts than they 
do on final passage votes.  In the following section, I explain how constituency and 
electoral vulnerability can affect members’ operative preferences and change how some 
members vote during challenged vetoes. 
 
THE CONSTITUENCY HYPOTHESIS 
For the purposes of this chapter’s empirical analysis, the Constituency Hypothesis 
holds that the president’s strength in members’ constituencies will make some members 
systematically more likely to join the president’s legislative coalition during veto 
override attempts.  Furthermore, the Constituency Hypothesis holds that constituency-
level presidential strength will make some members of Congress systematically more 
likely to defect from the president’s legislative coalitions during veto override attempts. 
The Constituency Hypothesis:  As the president’s strength in a member’s 
constituency increases, a member’s probability of joining the president’s 
coalition increases.  Conversely, as the president’s strength in a member’s 
constituency increases, a member’s probability of defecting from the 
president’s coalition decreases.   
I again use constituency-level presidential strength to test the Constituency 
Hypothesis and measure Presidential Strength using the president’s percentage of the 




THE VULNERABILITY HYPOTHESIS 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis suggests that electorally vulnerable members of 
Congress will be especially responsive to their constituencies during challenged vetoes.  
The Safety Hypothesis suggests that safe members of Congress will have more freedom 
in their voting behavior on challenged vetoes.  In other words, voters have vulnerable 
members of Congress on a short leash, while safe members of Congress have a bit longer 
leash. 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis:  Vulnerable members of Congress 
representing constituencies with high presidential strength will be more 
likely to join (and less likely to defect from) presidential coalitions.  
Conversely, vulnerable members of Congress representing constituencies 
with low presidential strength will be less likely to join (and more likely to 
defect from) presidential coalitions. 
 
I again use the interaction of presidential strength and vulnerability to test the 
Vulnerability Hypothesis.  If the Vulnerability Hypothesis is correct, vulnerable members 
from constituencies where the president is strong will be more likely to join, and less 
likely to defect from, the president’s coalition.  On the other hand, vulnerable members 
from constituencies where the president is weak will be less likely to join, and more 
likely to defect from, the president’s coalition. 
 
THE SAFETY HYPOTHESIS 
All members of Congress pay attention to their constituents and attempt to 
keep them happy, but safe members have a bit more freedom than vulnerable 
members.  As a result of this freedom, I expect that safe members will change 
their votes more often between final passage and veto override.  This expectation 
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seems logical for two reasons.  First, presidents might be more likely to lean on 
safe members and ask for their support on the veto override vote.  Presidents are 
politicians who understand that safe members of their party are more likely than 
vulnerable members to take potentially risky positions.  Second, safe members 
might be more likely to vote as they see fit on the final passage vote when the 
public’s attention to the issue is low, while vulnerable members pay closer 
attention to the public’s “potential preferences” (Arnold 1990).  As a result, the 
operative preferences of safe members would be the most likely to change after 
the president issues a veto and the public’s attention to the debate increases.  
The Safety Hypothesis:  As a member’s electoral vulnerability decreases, 
the member’s likelihood of switching votes during the override attempt 
increases. 
 
I use the Vulnerability variable to test the Safety Hypothesis.  If the Safety 
Hypothesis is true, the Vulnerability variable should be negative, indicating that 
vulnerable members are less likely than safer members to switch their votes on 
challenged vetoes.   
 
TESTING THE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY AND VULNERABILITY 
 To test how constituency and vulnerability influence presidential joiners and 
presidential defectors, I use a dataset that consists of roll-call votes on final passage and 
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veto override attempts for all challenged vetoes from 1973 to 2011.14  My analysis 
focuses on what Krehbiel calls “showdown pairs” (1998, p. 125).  These vote pairs 
consist of 1) the post-conference final passage vote that sends the bill to the president’s 
desk, and 2) the post-veto override vote.  I focus on these vote pairs instead of all votes in 
the veto chain because in “showdown pairs” bill content is held constant.  Members vote 
on identical enrolled bills in these vote pairs.15  As a result, any changes in member 
voting behavior between final passage and the veto override attempt must be the result of 
something other than the bill’s content.   
I employ logistic regression models with bill-level random effects to test my 
hypotheses about how constituency and electoral vulnerability affects member behavior 
on veto override votes.16  The first dependent variable, Presidential Joiner, measures 
which members join the president’s legislative coalition during the veto override 
attempt.17  This variable equals 0 if a member votes for the bill (and thus against the 
                                                 
14 Tables summarizing the bill number, title, final passage vote margin, and veto override vote margin for 
these bills in the House and the Senate are available from the author upon request. 
 
15 For the purposes of this analysis, I investigate only showdown pairs where a roll-call vote was taken on 
both final passage and the veto override.   Some challenged vetoes take place after either the House or the 
Senate passed a bill via voice vote.  I do not analyze these challenges because there is no way to determine 
which members switch their voting behavior during the veto override attempt. 
 
16 Conley and Kreppel (2001) offer a typology of vetoes based on the nature of the size of the coalition that 
originally passed the bill.  “Partisan vetoes” occur on bills that pass with less than 60% support.  
“Contested vetoes” occur on bills that pass with the support of 60% to 74% of members.  “Supermajority 
vetoes” occur on bills that pass with more than 74% of members voting in favor.  Conley and Kreppel 
make a compelling argument that member behavior on challenged partisan vetoes does not provide much 
evidence about presidential influence in Congress.  Following this logic, I exclude partisan vetoes from the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
17 Those members who vote with the president on both final passage and the veto override attempt are 
excluded from this analysis.  As a consequence of their final passage vote, such members cannot join the 
president on the veto override attempt. 
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president) on both the final passage vote and the veto override vote.  The variable equals 
1 if a member votes for the bill (and against the president) on final passage, but switches 
votes against the bill (and in support of the president) on veto override attempt.  The 
second dependent variable, Presidential Defector, measures which members defect from 
the president’s legislative coalition during the veto override attempt.18  This variable 
equals 0 if a member votes against the bill on both the final passage vote and the veto 
override vote.  The variable equals 1 if a member votes against the bill on final passage, 
but switches votes and supports the bill during the veto override attempt.   
In addition to the Presidential Strength and Vulnerability variables, I include 
controls for the effects of party and ideology.  Presidential Party equals 1 if the member 
caucuses with the president’s political party and 0 otherwise.  To control for ideology, I 
include 4 dummy variables that measure a member’s relative location on the ideological 
spectrum.  Following Krehbiel, I treat the preference data as ordinal and classify each 
member into one of five quintiles: extreme supporter, supporter, moderate, veto pivot, 
and extreme opponent.19  Figure 5.3 illustrates how the ideological spectrum appears 
under both conservative and liberal presidents.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18 Those members who vote against the president on both final passage and the veto override attempt are 
excluded from this analysis.  As a consequence of their final passage vote, such members cannot defect on 
the veto override attempt. 
 
19 As a robustness check, I also ran models that excluded Krehbiel’s five ideological quintiles.  Instead of 
ideological quintiles, these models included a variable that measured the absolute value of the difference 
between the president’s NOMINATE score and each member’s NOMINATE score.  The empirical results 
are nearly identical.  I use the quintile approach for two reasons.  First, it replicates Krehbiel’s influential 
analysis.  Second, at the aggregate level the predicted probabilities make much more sense using the 




PRESIDENTIAL JOINERS IN THE HOUSE  
Table 5.1 presents the results from the analyses of presidential joiners in each 
chamber of Congress.  Constituency and electoral vulnerability are both significant 
influences on members’ decisions to join the president’s coalition on veto override 
attempts in the House of Representatives.  In the Senate, only electoral vulnerability is 
related to members’ decisions to become presidential joiners on veto override votes.  In 
the following paragraphs, I calculate predicted probabilities for different types of 
members in order to shed further light on the Constituency Hypothesis, Vulnerability 
Hypothesis, and Safety Hypothesis.20 
 Constituency is a strong influence on presidential joiners in the House, especially 
when combined with electoral incentives.  Figure 5.4 displays the predicted probability of 
members joining the president’s coalition in the House.21  Party is an important predictor 
of member behavior on challenged vetoes.  Presidential party members have a 17.7 
percent chance of joining the president’s coalition on the veto override attempt in the 
House, while opposition party members have under a 1 percent chance of becoming 
presidential joiners.  Accordingly, all calculations to the right of the “opposition party” 
                                                 
20 I use Microsoft Excel to calculate these predicted probabilities. 
 
21 In these figures, I present calculations for 1) “safe” members, 2) “vulnerable” members, 3) members 
from constituencies with “low presidential strength,” and 4) members from constituencies with “high 
presidential strength.”  “Safe” members are those who are one standard deviation below the mean of 
member vulnerability variable.  “Vulnerable” members are those who are one standard deviation above the 
mean of member vulnerability variable.  Members from constituencies with “low presidential strength” are 
those who are one standard deviation below that variable’s distribution, while members from constituencies 
with “high presidential strength” are those who are one standard deviation above the mean.  When I 
calculate predicted probabilities for presidential party members, I use the variable’s distribution in the 
presidential party’s caucus.  Similarly, when I calculate predicted probabilities for opposition party 




calculation in Figure 5.4 are for presidential party members only.  As expected, ideology 
is strongly related to members’ probability of joining the president’s coalition as well.  
Moving from the “moderate” quintile to the “extreme opponents” quintile increases a 
presidential party member’s chance of becoming a presidential joiner by about 20 
percentage points.  It should be noted, though, that only 9 percent of presidential party 
members in the dataset are in the “moderate” quintile.  Over 90 percent of presidential 
party members are in the “veto pivot” and “extreme opponents” quintiles.  Moving from 
the “veto pivot” quintile to the “extreme opponent” quintile increases a members’ chance 
of becoming a presidential joiner by about 10 percentage points. 
 While the effects of party and ideology on presidential joiners are impressive in 
the House, the effects of constituency and vulnerability are substantively significant as 
well.  Presidential party members from districts with high presidential strength (defined 
as one standard deviation above the mean) are almost 10 percentage points more likely to 
join the president’s coalition than those from districts with low presidential strength 
(defined as one standard deviation below the mean).  Including member vulnerability in 
the calculations amplifies constituency’s effect.  Vulnerable presidential party members 
from districts with low presidential strength are the least likely to join the president’s 
coalition.  Conversely, safe presidential party members from districts with high 
presidential strength are the most likely to become presidential joiners.  In sum, the 
combined effects of constituency and vulnerability, calculated one standard deviation 
above or below their means, can cause a 12 percentage point change in the probability 
that a presidential party member will become a presidential joiner during the veto 
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override attempt in the House of Representatives.  The change in probability caused by 
constituency and vulnerability among presidential party members is over two-thirds as 
large as the change in probability caused by party.  Moreover, the combined effects of 
constituency and vulnerability can be larger than the change in probability caused by 
moving from the “veto pivot” quintile to the “extreme opponents” quintile. 
PRESIDENTIAL JOINERS IN THE SENATE 
 The Senate results are similar to the House results; with the exception that 
constituency plays a smaller role in the Senate, while electoral incentives (particularly 
electoral safety) play a larger role.  Party and ideology are strongly related to senators’ 
decisions to join the president’s coalition on the veto override attempt.  Senators from the 
president’s party are more than 16 percentage points more likely to join the president’s 
coalition than opposition party members (see Figure 5.5).  Furthermore, moving from the 
“veto pivot” quintile to the “extreme opponents” quintile increases a senator’s chance of 
becoming a presidential joiner by more than 17 percentage points.  As in Figure 5.4, all 
calculations to the right of the “opposition party” calculation in Figure 5.5 are for 
presidential party members only due to party’s large effect on presidential joiners.   
Because constituency does not have a statistically significant effect on 
presidential joiners, the Constituency Hypothesis is not validated in the Senate.  On the 
other hand, member vulnerability has a strong effect on presidential joiners in the Senate.  
Safe senators from the president’s party have a 20.3 percent chance of joining the 
president’s coalition, while vulnerable senators from the president’s party have a 13.7 
percent chance.  Moving from one standard deviation below the mean of the 
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Vulnerability variable to one standard deviation above the mean thus causes about a 7 
percentage point change in the probability that a senator will become a presidential 
joiner.  This change in probability is more than one-third as large as the change in 
probability caused by either party or ideology.  While there is not sufficient evidence to 
claim that constituency affects senators’ decisions to join the president’s coalition on veto 
override attempts, there does appear to be evidence that safe members are more likely 
than vulnerable members to become presidential joiners. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL DEFECTORS IN THE HOUSE 
 Figure 5.6 presents the results from the analysis of presidential defectors in the 
House of Representatives.  As with presidential joiners in both chambers of Congress, 
party is strongly related to members’ decisions to defect from the president’s coalition on 
the veto override attempt.  Average members of the president’s party in the House have 
only a 2 percent chance of defecting, while average opposition party members have a 
17.3 percent chance of becoming presidential defectors.  Accordingly, all calculations to 
the right of the “opposition party” calculation in Figure 5.6 are for opposition party 
members only due to party’s large effect on presidential defectors.   Among opposition 
party members, ideology is related to decisions to defect from the president’s coalition.  
Average opposition party members in the “extreme supporters” quintile are the most 
likely to defect, with a 20.4 chance of defection.  Moving from the “extreme supporters” 
quintile to the “moderate quintile” causes a 7 percentage point decrease in the probability 
that an average opposition party member will defect from the president’s coalition. 
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 Constituency influences appear to affect opposition party members’ decisions to 
defect from the president’s coalition during veto override votes in the House.  
Presidential strength is both substantively and statistically significant.  Opposition party 
members from constituencies with low presidential strength have a 20.7 percent chance 
of defecting from the president’s coalition during veto override attempts, while members 
from constituencies with low presidential strength have a 14.3 percent chance of 
defecting.  Thus, moving from one standard deviation below the mean of presidential 
strength to one standard deviation above the mean causes a 6 percentage point decrease in 
an opposition party member’s chance of defecting from the president’s coalition on a 
challenged veto.  This change of 6 percentage points caused by constituency is similar to 
the 7 percentage point change caused by ideology.  Further, it is about one-third as large 
as the change caused by party.  Constituencies clearly influence the behavior of 
opposition party members in the House during challenged vetoes.  The president’s best 
bet of maintaining his coalition during veto override attempts is to focus on opposition 
party members from constituencies where the president is strong, and understand that 
opposition party members from constituencies with low presidential strength are the most 
likely to leave the president’s coalition during the override attempt. 
 Member vulnerability is not statistically related to defection from the president’s 
coalition in the House.  The Vulnerability variable has a negative sign and a p-value less 
than 0.22, but in the end I cannot reject the null hypothesis that member vulnerability has 
no effect on presidential defectors in the House.  Still, the results of the presidential 
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defection analysis in the House do provide supporting evidence for the Constituency 
Hypothesis. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL DEFECTORS IN THE SENATE 
 The results from the analysis of presidential defectors in the Senate are 
inconclusive.  Due to the low number of observations, not even party is statistically 
related to presidential defectors in the Senate.  Moreover, ideology is only weakly related 
to senators’ decisions to defect from the president’s coalition during veto override votes.  
I do not present predicted probabilities for presidential defectors in the Senate due to the 
inconclusive results.  The Senate results make it clear that ideology is an important 
determinant of senator behavior on challenged vetoes, but the number of observations is 
not large enough to allow further insight into why some senators defect from the 
president’s coalition during veto override attempts. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 The previous chapter responded to party-based theories of presidential coalition 
building by demonstrating how constituency and electoral incentives systematically 
influence members’ presidential support scores.  This chapter responds to ideology-based 
theories of presidential coalition building by demonstrating that constituency and 
electoral incentives have a systematically effect on member voting behavior during 
challenged vetoes.  Constituency and electoral incentives clearly influence member 
behavior on challenged vetoes by changing members’ operative preferences.  The effects 
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of constituency and electoral incentives are often as large, or larger, than the effect of 
ideology. 
In the House of Representatives, constituency and vulnerability can have 
substantive effects as large as the effects of party and ideology.  In the Senate, 
vulnerability’s effect on presidential joiners is about one-third as large as the effects of 
party and ideology.  The presidential joiners analysis suggests that both constituency and 
vulnerability affect whether presidential party members will decide to join the president’s 
coalition in the House, and electorally safe senators from the president’s party are the 
most likely to join the president’s coalition during override attempts in the Senate.  
Further, the presidential defectors analysis finds that constituencies affect members’ 
decisions to defect from the president’s coalition in the House, with opposition party 
members from constituencies with low presidential strength being the most likely to 
defect from the president’s coalition on the veto override attempt. 
Understanding the effects of constituency and vulnerability helps augment 
ideology-based theories of member behavior on challenged vetoes.  For example, in the 
House, the most likely presidential joiners are electorally safe presidential party members 
from constituencies with high presidential strength.  Explanations of congressional 
behavior based on party and ideology alone might say “some presidential party members 
in the veto pivot and extreme opponent quintiles are the most likely to join the president’s 
coalition.”  Adding constituency and vulnerability to our theories allows us to say 
“electorally safe presidential party members in the veto pivot and extreme opponent 
quintiles who represent constituencies where the president is strong are the most likely to 
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join the president’s coalition.”  Incorporating these two easily measurable, and easily 
understood, variables helps develop a theory of congressional behavior that is both more 
precise and more complete than using ideology and party alone.   
 In addition to this inquiry’s theoretical implications, it also has important 
normative implications for the state of American democracy.  A healthy democracy 
requires members of Congress to represent their constituents’ views when voting on the 
floor of the House and the Senate.  The evidence presented here concerning the 
Constituency Hypothesis shows that this type of representation exists, as constituencies 
influence whether members are more or less likely to join or defect from the president’s 
coalitions during challenged vetoes.  The Vulnerability Hypothesis asserts that vulnerable 
members will be more responsive to their constituencies than other members.  Such a 
relationship speaks to norms of democratic accountability by implying that vulnerable 
members follow their constituency’s lead out of fear of being held accountable in the next 
election.  Edwards (2009) suggests that if vulnerable members were found to be 
responsive to their constituency while safe members were not, we could conclude that 
members of Congress respond to the president in part based on a concern that voters will 
reward or punish their representatives as a result of their voting behavior.   
While I do not go so far as to argue that safe members of Congress are 
unresponsive to their constituents, the Safety Hypothesis holds that electorally safe 
members have greater freedom in their voting behavior and are more likely to switch 
their behavior on challenged vetoes.  The evidence from the presidential joiners analysis 
in both the House and the Senate supports this hypothesis.   In addition, the evidence 
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regarding the Vulnerability Hypothesis suggests that vulnerable members of the House 
are more responsive to their constituents than safe members.   This finding implies that 
vulnerable members attempt to represent their constituents’ concerns in order to avoid 
being held accountable on Election Day.  This type of member behavior shows that the 
threat of democratic accountability still exists in the American system.  A healthy 
democracy requires both representation and democratic accountability.  The empirical 
results of this inquiry suggests that both are present during some of the highest profile 























































Figure 5.1:  Percentage of House Vote Switchers, Presidential 
























































Figure 5.2:  Percentage of Senate Vote Switchers, Presidential Joiners, 
and Presidential Defectors  from each Ideological Quintile
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Figure 5.3:  Ideological Quintiles for Liberal and Conservative Presidents 
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Table 5.1:  The Effect of Party, Presidential Strength, Member Vulnerability, and Ideology on 
Presidential Joiners in the House and Senate 
     





































































Notes:  Table presents logistic regression coefficients.  The dependent variable is “Presidential Joiner.”   
  




Table 5.2:  The Effect of Party, Presidential Strength, Member Vulnerability, and Ideology on 
Presidential Defectors in the House and Senate 
     





































































Notes:  Table presents logistic regression coefficients.  The dependent variable is “Presidential Defector.”   
 









































































Chapter 6:  Solving the Three Puzzles of LBJ’s Legislative Experience 
The presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson encapsulated all the highs and lows of 
the legislative presidency into one presidential experience.  LBJ began his presidency in 
the wake of a national tragedy, assuming the office on November 22, 1963, when he took 
the oath of office aboard Air Force One as it traveled from Dallas, Texas to Washington, 
DC, with President Kennedy’s body aboard the plane (CQ Almanac 1963).  During his 
time as president, LBJ enjoyed tremendous success enacting major agenda items into law, 
humbling defeats, crippling compromises, and periods of gridlock.  These wide 
fluctuations in legislative success occurred during a time of unified government.  The 
extreme variance in LBJ’s legislative success during a time when his party controlled 
both chambers of Congress cannot be explained by traditional, party-based theories of 
presidential success in Congress.  These theories do a great job predicting President 
Johnson’s legislative victories, but a poor job explaining his legislative losses.  LBJ’s 
experience as president demonstrates why party-based theories are much better at 
predicting the systematic variations in presidential success across Congresses than they 
are at explaining fluctuations in presidential success within Congresses. 
 
CASE SELECTION 
I selected LBJ’s presidency as a case study for a variety of reasons.  First, 
President Johnson experienced both great success and abject failures in the legislative 
arena during his five years as president.  This wide range of outcomes in LBJ’s dealings 
with Congress creates a number of opportunities to investigate presidential success both 
across Congresses and within particular congressional sessions.  Second, President 
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Johnson’s Administration took great care to record its lobbying efforts in Congress before 
floor votes.  Such detailed record-keeping offers a rare window into which members of 
Congress presidents focus on during their efforts to win members’ votes, how presidents 
attempt to persuade these members, and why some members end up supporting the 
president while other do not.  Third, Chapter 2 finds supporting evidence for the 
Vulnerability Hypothesis in the first part of the Johnson Administration, but then all 
evidence for the Vulnerability Hypothesis in the House disappears during the later part of 
LBJ’s time in office.  After LBJ, electoral vulnerability does not appear to affect 
members’ voting behavior in the House until President Reagan’s second term.  Thus, 
LBJ’s dealings with Congress can not only illuminate how and why presidents are 
successful or unsuccessful in the legislative arena.  They can also shed light on what I 
call “The Case of the Missing Vulnerability Hypothesis.” 
 
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF LBJ’S LEGISLATIVE ROLLER COASTER RIDE 
LBJ’s fortunes in the legislative arena waxed and waned as much, or more than, 
any president in the modern era.  This chapter considers a number of potential causes that 
may explain the variance in LBJ’s legislative success over the course of his presidency.  
Some of these causes help explain the variation in presidential success between 
Congresses, others help explain the variation within Congresses sessions, and some can 
help variation both between and within Congresses.  First, I investigate how changes in 
the composition of Congress affected LBJ’s legislative agenda.  I consider changes in the 
partisan composition of Congress, the number of electorally vulnerable members in each 
chamber, the amount of Democratic members representing constituencies where 
President Johnson was weak, and the amount of Republican members representing 
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constituencies where LBJ was strong.  This investigation helps explain the fluctuation in 
LBJ’s legislative success across congressional sessions. 
Second, I examine how changes in LBJ’s presidential popularity during his term 
may have affected his legislative success.  President Johnson’s national approval ratings 
oscillated from highs of around 80 percent to lows of around 35 percent.  Presidential 
approval ratings give us a concrete measure of what Neustadt calls “presidential prestige” 
(Neustadt 1990, 78).  Neustadt suggests that presidential prestige can affect elite reaction 
to the president’s program.  This chapter investigates whether the wild fluctuations in 
presidential approval affected President Johnson’s success in the legislative arena. 
Third, I consider the possibility that a decrease in support from previously 
supportive groups such as Southern Democrats, electorally vulnerable members of 
Congress, and electorally safe members of Congress may have caused LBJ’s success rate 
to vary over the course of his presidency.  Conventional wisdom suggests that what I call 
“the Civil Rights Act effect” caused Southern Democrats to turn away from Johnson after 
supporting his agenda early on.  Chapters 2 and 3 found that vulnerable members of 
Congress are particularly sensitive to their constituents’ opinion of the president, which 
implies that during LBJ’s time in office vulnerable members of both parties held one key 
to the success or failure of his legislative agenda.  Moreover, the empirical results from 
Chapter 3 suggest that extremely safe members of Congress have greater leeway in their 
voting behavior.  Thus, the votes of these safe members may also hold a key to LBJ’s 




AN OVERVIEW OF LBJ’S LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE 
 President Lyndon Baines Johnson is known as one of the most skilled legislative 
presidents in recent American history.  A brief overview of President Johnson’s 
legislative record reveals an impressive amount of major legislation.  During LBJ’s time 
in office, he convinced Congress to pass seven pieces of “landmark legislation,” more 
than any other president from Truman through George W. Bush.22  Johnson’s legislative 
record is so substantial that a major piece of legislation such as the Public Broadcast Act 
of 1967, which created the Public Broadcast Service and National Public Radio, is 
arguably not even one of Johnson’s top ten legislative accomplishments.  Johnson is 
hailed as one of our most talented legislative presidents for good reason. 
 Despite Johnson’s extraordinary legislative accomplishments throughout his 
presidency, his relationship with Congress ebbed and flowed.  At times Congress seemed 
eager to enact LBJ’s sweeping agenda into law, while at other times Congress was 
reluctant to do the president’s bidding.  Figure 6.1 displays LBJ’s legislative success rates 
by year in order to demonstrate President Johnson’s ups and downs in the legislative 
arena.   
At the start of his presidency, Johnson worked to continue and finish JFK’s 
legislative business.  Johnson did so with “endless energy” and dedication (CQ Almanac 
1964).  This energy and dedication translated into great legislative triumphs, as LBJ 
enjoyed an 88 percent success rate on roll-call votes in both chambers of Congress as he 
labored to finish JFK’s legislative agenda and start his own “War on Poverty” using the 
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 as its legislative vehicle (see Figure 6.1).  This high 
                                                 
22 The seven pieces of “landmark legislation” are 1) The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2) The Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, 3) The Revenue Act of 1964, 4) The creation of Medicare and Medicaid through 
the Social Security Amendments of 1965, 5) The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 6) The Elementary & 




success rate on roll-calls resulted in 57.6 percent of Johnson’s 1964 legislative requests 
being enacted into law (see Figure 6.2).  As a result LBJ’s stewardship, JFK agenda items 
such as the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Revenue Act of 1964 (a major tax cut) 
passed through Congress alongside LBJ’s own anti-poverty program.  True to his 
reputation, President Johnson began his legislative presidency with resounding success. 
 After a strong start in the legislative arena in 1964, President Johnson entered 
1965 with both an overwhelming electoral victory in the 1964 elections23 and a growing 
reputation as a masterful legislative leader.  After his work enacting JFK’s legislative 
agenda into law in 1964, Johnson presented Congress with his own massive agenda in 
1965.  The Great Society legislative program was at the heart of this agenda.  Figure 6.3 
shows that Congress took almost twice as many roll-call votes on the president’s agenda 
in 1965 (when it took 274 votes) than it did in 1964 (when it took 149 votes).  
Amazingly, even with so many votes being taken on such a large agenda, President 
Johnson enjoyed an even higher legislative success rate in 1965 than he did in 1964, with 
Congress as a whole supporting the president 93 percent of the time and 68.9 percent of 
the president’s legislative requests becoming law.  It is important to note two facts about 
the president’s great success in 1965.  First, the roll-call wins were almost always on 
issues that Johnson initiated.  Second, these Johnson initiatives included major pieces of 
legislation such as the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid, the Voting Rights of 
1965, and huge amounts of federal aid for elementary and secondary schools.  The year 
of 1965 was truly a banner year for President Johnson.  CQ went so far as to call 
Johnson’s experience with Congress in 1965 “one of the most productive years in 
history” (CQ Almanac 1965). 
                                                 




 All good things must come to an end, and in 1966, Congress began to remind LBJ 
of this unfortunate fact of life.  The costs and extent of the Vietnam War started to 
become clear in 1966 and the 89
th
 Congress, which had been so supportive of LBJ’s 
Great Society agenda, was less willing to provide the massive increases in government 
spending that were necessary to support most Great Society programs.  Faced with a 
classic choice of “guns versus butter” (CQ Almanac 1966), Congress choose to buy a 
little less butter in order to afford a few more guns.  President Johnson was able to 
continue funding many of the programs he and Congress established in the first two years 
of his presidency, but continuing existing programs was as far as Congress was willing to 
go.  The president was unable to pass legislation establishing new federal commitments 
to fair housing, rural development programs and rural electricity cooperatives, and 
campaign spending limits.  In addition to these defeats, Congress also passed a number of 
programs, such as Teacher Corps funding, steps toward DC home rule, “truth-in-
packaging,” and the new Department of Transportation in “diluted form” (CQ Almanac 
1966).  While LBJ certainly enjoyed a number of significant legislative victories in 1966, 
these victories were not as numerous or as remarkable as his victories in 1964 and 1965.  
In short, 1966 appeared to be the beginning of the end for LBJ’s legislative presidency. 
 President Johnson’s relationship with Congress only got worse in 1967.  While 
Democrats still enjoyed a substantial majority in both chambers of the 90
th
 Congress, 
they did lose 47 House seats and 4 Senate seats in the 1966 midterm elections.  The 
Administration responded by proposing a legislative agenda that was “modest when 
compared with those of the (previous) three sessions” (CQ Almanac 1967).   
Of course, the term “modest” can only be used as a relative term when discussing 
LBJ’s legislative agenda.  In fact, Figure 6.3 shows that for items on which President 
Johnson took a position, Congress took more roll-call votes in 1967 (292 in total) than in 
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any other year of his presidency.  Unfortunately for the president, Congress’s response 
was more negative than it had been in the past three sessions.  The president’s House roll 
call success rate in 1967 was the lowest of his five years in office, while his Senate 
success rate was the second lowest of his time in office.  Moreover, Congress granted 
only 47.6 percent of LBJ’s legislative requests in 1967.  Figure 6.2 reveals that this 
percentage of requests enacted was LBJ’s lowest enactment rate.   
In 1964 and 1965 President Johnson seemed almost unable to lose a vote in 
Congress.  This golden touch began to disappear in 1966, while in 1967 it left LBJ 
altogether as “few Administration bills except war appropriations moved through 
Congress unscathed” (CQ Almanac 1967).  The president’s fortunes took a turn for the 
better in 1968.  With the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Congress worked with LBJ to pass a 
piece of “landmark legislation” for the first time since 1965.  This bill helped cement 
Johnson’s legacy as a champion of civil rights. 
 
EXPLAINING LBJ’S LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS 
I explore three potential explanations for the patterns that emerge from the 
overview of LBJ’s experience with Congress from 1964 to 1968.  To summarize, 
President Johnson enjoyed great success completing JFK’s legislative agenda in 1964 and 
enacting his own Great Society agenda in 1965.  This legislative hot streak cooled in 
1966, while 1967 was a year of legislative losses for the president and gridlock in 
general.  Surprisingly, LBJ’s legislative success rate increased during his final year as 
president in 1968.  These five years, under this one president, present a rather complete 
picture of the legislative relationship between Congress and the president, encapsulating 
both the highest of highs and rather low lows. 
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To explain the variance in LBJ’s legislative success, I consider three factors.  
First, I examine changes in the partisan and regional composition of Congress, as well as 
changes in the number of “cross-pressured” members and electorally vulnerable 
members.  Second, I investigate how changes in presidential popularity may have 
affected President Johnson’s legislative success.  Third, I explore whether votes from 
groups such as Southern Democrats, cross-pressured members, electorally vulnerable 
members, and electorally safe members helped LBJ win when he enjoyed success and 
caused him to lose when he experience gridlock and frustration.   
 
The Changing Partisan Composition of Congress 
This chapter seeks to explain the fluctuations in LBJ’s legislative success over the 
course of his presidency.  The first, and most obvious, explanation is changes in the 
partisan composition in Congress caused the variance in LBJ’s legislative success.  
Proponents of what I call “party-based theories of executive-legislative” relations would 
argue as the number of Democrats in Congress decreased, so did President Johnson’s 
legislative victories.  Table 6.1 displays information about the composition of Congress 
in terms of partisanship and regionalism, as well as in terms of constituency-level 
presidential strength and members’ electoral situation. 
Table 6.1 makes clear that Democratic strength in Congress can explain some, but 
not nearly all, of the variation in LBJ’s legislative success rate over time.  If one were to 




 Congresses from best to worst, the 89
th
 
would be his most successful, with the 88
th
 next, and the 90
th
 last.  This ranking does 
match up with the Democrats’ strength in Congress.  Undoubtedly, this evidence suggests 
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that the partisan composition of Congress had some effect on Johnson’s legislative 
record.   
Looking across congressional sessions, the partisan composition of Congress is 
correlated with the president’s legislative success, as party-based theories would predict.  
These theories miss a very important fact of the president’s legislative life: the 
president’s experience with Congress changes within congressional sessions in addition 
to fluctuating across congressional sessions.  If we disaggregate each Congress by year, 
the rankings change.  The order of most successful to least successful legislative years is 
as follows: 1) 1965, 2) 1964, 3) 1968, 4) 1966, and 5) 1967.   
Party-based theories fail to capture the variance in LBJ’s legislative success 
across these years. Four empirical examples help demonstrate why party-based theories 





 Congress after his party picked up 37 House seats in the 1964 elections, the 
president was also more successful in 1964 than he was in 1966 despite having 37 fewer 
Democrats in the House in 1964.  Contrary to the expectations of party-based theories, 
LBJ had a harder time with Congress in 1966 than he did in 1964 despite greater 
Democratic strength in both chambers.    
As a second empirical example, Congress enacted an equal percentage of Johnson 
requests in 1966 and 1968.  This equal rate occurred even though Democrats held 47 less 
House seats and 4 less Senate seats in 1968.  Furthermore, this equal rate is a bit 
misleading because LBJ made more legislative requests in 1968 (414) than he did in 1966 
(371).  Thus, in the final analysis, Johnson fared better in Congress in 1968 than he did in 
1966.  This result is not an artifact of Johnson requesting less, or getting less, from 
Congress in 1968.  All accounts agree that 1968 was a better legislative year for the 
president despite the large Democratic losses in the 1966 midterms (CQ Almanac 1968).  
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Changes in the partisan composition of Congress cannot account for this difference in 
LBJ’s legislative success between 1966 and 1968.  In fact, this empirical difference in 
LBJ’s legislative record is exactly the opposite of what party-based theories would 
predict. 
Third, consider the variance in President Johnson’s legislative record in 1965 and 
1966.  In other words, consider the extreme differences in President Johnson’s legislative 
record within the 89
th
 Congress.  1965 was unquestionably Johnson’s best legislative 
year.  Congress enacted both the largest percentage (68.9 percent) and the largest raw 
number (323) of LBJ’s legislative requests in 1965.  The president’s legislative agenda 
did not fare nearly as well in the 2
nd
 session of the 89
th
 Congress as it had had in the 1
st 
session.  His roll-call success rate dropped dramatically in the Senate from 93 percent in 
1965 to 69 percent in 1966.  Moreover, the overall percentage of LBJ legislative requests 
granted by Congress fell about 12 percent from 1965 to 1966, despite the president 
requesting around 100 less items in 1966 than he did in 1965.  While the numbers of 
Democrats in Congress remained nearly the same in 1966, the president’s legislative 
agenda fared much worse. 
Fourth and finally, there is a similar variance in President Johnson’s legislative 
record within the 90
th
 Congress, with one catch, which is that instead of losing legislative 
momentum as congressional elections approached as he did in 1966, Johnson gained 
legislative support in 1968 in comparison to 1967.  As mentioned early, 1968 was a better 
legislative year for the president than 1966 despite the fact that his party held 47 fewer 
seats in the House and 4 fewer seats in the Senate.  Congress did not treat the president’s 
agenda as kindly in the 1
st
 session of the 90
th
 Congress as it did during the 2
nd
 session.  In 
fact, 1967 was the worst legislative year of LBJ’s presidency.  Again, despite almost 
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identical numbers of Democrats in Congress in both 1967 and 1968, the president’s 
legislative success varied in a substantively significant manner.   
 
Changes in the Regional Composition of the Democratic Caucus 
It is clear that changes in the partisan composition of Congress cannot fully 
explain the ups and downs of President Johnson’s experience in the legislative arena.  
Another potential explanation is that changes in the regional composition of the 
Democratic Caucus, specifically the number of Southern Democrats in the caucus, help 
account for LBJ’s varied experience with Congress.  A look at Table 6.1 suggests that 
changes in the regional composition of the Democratic Caucus cannot explain much of 
the variance in Johnson’s legislative success for three reasons.  First, the percentage of 
Southern Democrats in the Senate Democratic Caucus remains nearly constant 
throughout Johnson’s time as present.  Second, Southern Democrats made up the largest 
percentage of the House Democratic Caucus in 1964, a year when LBJ was extremely 
successful in the legislative arena.  Third, as I argue above, there are large differences in 




 Congress.  These large differences 
cannot be explain by changes in the regional composition of the Democratic Caucus 
because the composition of the caucus remained relatively stable within these two 
congresses. 
 
Defining “Cross-Pressured” Members of Congress 
In the following sections, I discuss how changes in the number and behavior of 
“cross-pressured” members of Congress affected LBJ’s legislative success rates over the 
course of his presidency.  By “cross-pressured” members of Congress, I mean those 
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Republicans who represent constituencies that the president won in the 1964 election as 
well as those Democrats representing constituencies that the president lost in the 1964 
election.  Cross-pressured Republicans represented constituencies where the president 
was strong, while cross-pressured Democrats represented constituencies where the 
president was weak. 
 
Changes in the “Cross-Pressured” Composition of Congress 
Neither party nor regionalism appears to adequately explain the variance in 
President Johnson’s legislative success rates from 1964 to 1968.  Changes in the partisan 
composition of Congress can partially explain why President Johnson’s legislative 
agenda was most successful in the 89
th
 Congress and least successful in 1967.  However, 





 Congress.  Nor can they help explain why President Johnson was more 
successful legislatively in 1968 than he was in 1966.  Changes in the amount of Southern 
Democrats in the Democratic House and Senate Caucus do not appear to closely correlate 
with the changes in Johnson’s legislative success.  In order to fully understand Johnson’s 
experience with Congress, we must go beyond explanations of legislative behavior that 
focus solely on partisanship and regionalism. 
Considering the effects of constituency influence and electoral incentives 
alongside party appears to help solve the puzzle of LBJ’s varied legislative success rates 
over time.  I use the individual constituency and party characteristics of members to 
define “cross-pressured” members of Congress as 1) Democrats representing states or 
districts that Johnson lost in 1964 and 2) Republicans representing states or districts that 
Johnson won in 1964.  Taken together with changes in the partisan composition of 
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Congress, changes in the number of “cross-pressured” members of Congress appears to 
explain at least one key difference in Johnson’s legislative success over time.   
Figure 6.4 shows that the percentage of cross-pressured members of the 
Republican Caucus grew in both the 89
th
 Congress and 90
th
 Congress.  The Republican 
House Caucus grew by 38 members, from 149 members in the 89
th
 Congress to 187 
members in the 90
th
.  Thirty six of these new Republicans were from districts that 
President Johnson won in 1964, increasing the percentage of cross-pressured Republicans 
in the House Republican Caucus by about 8 percent in the 90
th
 Congress.  Moreover, the 
number of cross-pressured Democrats increased slightly in the 90th Congress as well.  
These facts suggest the possibility that Democrats helped LBJ achieve such great 
legislative success in the 89
th
 Congress, while support from cross-pressured Republicans 
helped LBJ achieving surprisingly high levels of legislative success in 1968.  In order to 
fully explore this possibility, I next investigate changes in presidential popularity over 
time and then examine how these fluctuations may have affected the voting behavior of 
cross-pressured members, especially vulnerable members of the House and senators up 
for reelection. 
 
Changes in Presidential Popularity 
President Johnson’s national presidential approval ratings may help explain part, 
but not all, of the fluctuations in LBJ’s legislative success over time.  Figure 6.5 displays 
the president’s average annual approval ratings from 1964 to 1968.24  LBJ’s approval 
ratings steadily decreased each year, from a high of 87.6 percent approval in 1964 to a 
                                                 
24 I exclude “don’t know” or “no opinion” answers and present the percent age of respondents who both 




low of 49 percent approval in 1968.  Thus, changes in presidential approval may help 
explain why the president fared worse during the 2
nd
 session of the 89
th
 Congress in 1966 
than he did in the 1
st
 session in 1964.  On the other hand, changes in the president’s 
annual approval ratings do not appear to help explain why the president’s legislative 
agenda fared better in Congress in 1968 than it did in 1967 or 1966. 
Figure 6.6 provides a closer look at the president’s approval ratings by presenting 
the results of each poll.  This figure reveals that Johnson’s approval ratings steadily 
decreased from 1964 through most of 1967, jumped a bit at the end of 1967, decreased a 
bit in mid-1968, and then jumped again at the end of 1968.  Perhaps these two jumps in 
1967 and 1968 helped the president gain momentum and achieve greater legislative 
success in 1968 than he did in 1966 or 1967, but it is difficult to make a case that they are 
the sole cause of LBJ’s surprising success in 1968.  Of course, this dissertation argues 
that members do not necessarily respond to national presidential popularity.  Instead, I 
argue that members care more about president’s strength in their own constituencies.  The 
following section considers how constituency-level presidential strength, along with 
electoral incentives, may have affected the voting behavior of members of Congress 
during the Johnson presidency. 
 
What Party, Southern Democrats, and National Presidential Approval Add to The 
Story 
The prior sections investigated four potential causes of the fluctuations in LBJ’s 
legislative fortunes over the course of his presidency.  This investigation found that 
changes in the partisan composition of Congress do a good job explaining why President 
Johnson was more successful in the 89
th
 Congress (1965-6) than he was in the 90
th
 
Congress.  On the other hand, changes in the partisan composition of Congress fail to 
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explain thee empirical facts: 1) why the president’s agenda fared better in 1965 than it did 
in 1966, 2) why the president was more successful in 1968 than he was in 1967, and 3) 
why Congress passed more of the Johnson agenda in 1968 than it did in 1966.  The third 
empirical fact is especially difficult to square with party-based explanations of 
presidential success in the legislative arena, as Democrats held 47 fewer seats in the 
House and 4 fewer seats in the Senate in 1968 than they did in 1966.  These are the three 
puzzles posed by President Johnson’s legislative experience. 
Changes in the partisan composition of Congress clearly explain some, but not 
nearly all, of the variance in LBJ’s legislative success rate over time.  Explanations 
rooted in changes in the number of Southern Democrats in Congress fare even worse.  
The percentage of Southern Democrats in the Senate Democratic Caucus remained 
relatively constant from 1964 to 1968.  In the House of Representatives, LBJ’s legislative 
record was worse in 1966 than it was in 1964 or 1968, despite the fact that there were 
more Southern Democrats in the House Democratic Caucus in both 1964 and 1968 than 
there were in 1966.  Furthermore, as with party-based explanations, Southern Democrat-





 Congresses.  
National presidential approval also does not appear to explain the ups and downs 
in President Johnson’s legislative success rates over time.  Annual averages of national 
presidential approval ratings reveal a monotonic decrease in LBJ’s approval ratings as 
they decline with each year of his presidency.  There is a small spike in Johnson’s 
national approval at the beginning of 1968 that may help explain why the president was 
more successful in the legislative arena in that year than the previous two years.  Overall, 
though, national approval ratings don’t appear to add much to our understanding of LBJ’s 
relationship with Congress. 
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In sum, changes in the partisan composition help us understand some, but not all, 
of the differences in Johnson’s legislative success across Congresses.  Further, they add 
little to our understanding of the president’s legislative success within Congresses.  
Regional explanations placing the blame for LBJ’s lower legislative success in 1966 and 
1967 at the feet of Southern Democrats do not adequately explain the president’s 
relationship with Congress.  Nor do changes in presidential approval ratings.  The best 
lead thus far is that changes in numbers and behavior of cross-pressured Democrats and 
Republicans may have caused the variation in LBJ’s legislative success rates.  The 
following section examines changes in the voting behavior of partisans, Southern 
Democrats, cross-pressured members, very safe members of the House, very vulnerable 
members of the House, senators up for reelection at the end of a Congress, and those 
senators not up for reelection.  It finds that the combination of constituency-level 
presidential strength and electoral incentives can solve the puzzles posed by party-based 
and regional explanations. 
 
Changes in Member Voting Behavior 
An examination of changes in members’ voting behavior helps solve the three 
puzzles posted by LBJ’s legislative experience from 1964 to 1968.  Table 6.2 presents the 
average presidential support scores of Democrats, Republicans, and Southern Democrats 
in both chambers of Congress.  In both chambers, Democrats strongly supported the 
Johnson agenda in 1964 and 1965 while Republicans were hesitant to vote with the 
president.  The drop in LBJ’s legislative success rate in 1966 appears to be a result of all 
members decreasing their support of the president.  This decrease was particularly sharp 
in the House Democratic Caucus.  On the other hand, President Johnson had Republicans 
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to thank for the rise in his legislative success rate in 1968.  Counter to the expectations of 
party-based explanations of presidential success in Congress, changes in the voting 
behavior of Republican members of Congress appear to explain why President Johnson’s 
legislative agenda was more successful in Congress during 1968 than it was during either 
1967 or 1966. 
The first puzzle posed by Johnson’s legislative experience is why his agenda did 
not fare as well in 1966 as it had in 1965 despite large Democratic majorities in both 
chambers of Congress.  The changing voting behavior of all members of Congress, but 
especially Democrats, helps solve this puzzle.  The average presidential support scores of 
Democrats, Republicans, and Southern Democrats all decreased from 1965 to 1966.  This 
decrease is especially pronounced in the House Democratic Caucus, with the average 
presidential support score of House Democrats decreasing 11 percentage points in 1966.  
Congress in general ran away from the Johnson agenda in 1966, but House Democrats 
appear to have led the stampede.  Democrats still supported the president a majority of 
the time in 1966, but their support was not nearly strong enough to keep Johnson’s 
agenda afloat given the fact that Republicans supported the president even less in 1966 
than they had in 1965. 
A second, similar puzzle posed by Johnson’s legislative experience is why his 
agenda fared better in 1968 than it did in 1967.  In other words, why did Johnson’s 
legislative success vary within the 90
th
 Congress?  The answer appears to lie in the 
changing voting behavior of Republican members of Congress, especially House 
Republicans.  In both chambers of Congress, the average Democrat voted with the 
president less often in 1968 than they had in 1967.  In the House, the average Republican 
voted for the president’s agenda a majority of the time (51 percent) for the first time in 
LBJ’s presidency.  While the presidential support score of the average Republican 
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senator actually decreased from 1967 to 1968, at 47 percent it was just 1 percent less than 
the presidential support score of the average Democratic senators.  Contrary to the 
expectations of party-based theories, Republican votes held the key to the increase in 
LBJ’s legislative success rate from 1967 to 1968. 
The third puzzle posed by LBJ’s legislative experience, and the hardest to answer 
if we rely on party-based explanations, is the fact that Congress enacted more of the 
president’s agenda in 1968 than it did in 1966.  Democrats held 47 less House seats and 4 
fewer Senate seats in 1968 than they did in 1966, yet Congress enacted an equal 
percentage of LBJ’s legislative requests despite the fact that the president asked for more 
in 1968 than he had in 1966.  Again, President Johnson had Republicans to thank for 
helping to enact so much of his legislative agenda in 1968.  The average Senate 
Democrat’s presidential support score was 9 percent less in 1968 than it was in 1966, 
while the average House Democrat’s presidential support score was just 1 percent higher 
in 1968 than in 1966.  On the other side of the aisle, average Republicans in both 
chambers of Congress had higher presidential support scores in 1968 than in 1966.  This 
increase in the average Republican’s presidential support score was particularly dramatic 
in the House, soaring from just 37 percent to 51 percent.  Republican votes were crucial 
to the president’s surprising legislative success in 1968. 
Republicans gained 47 House seats in the 90
th
 Congress.  According to party-
based theories, such a large pickup spells doom for the president’s agenda.  
Paradoxically, President Johnson had the opposite experience as Congress enacted a 
greater number of presidential agenda items in 1968 than it had in 1966.  Thus, party-
based explanations cannot explain important parts of LBJ’s legislative experience.  The 
following section considers whether my alternative explanation, which contends that 
constituency influence and electoral incentives combine to systematically affect 
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members’ votes on the presidential agenda, provides a better explanation of the 
fluctuations in LBJ’s legislative experience. 
 
Constituencies, Electoral Incentives, and Members’ Votes on the LBJ Agenda 
Adding constituency influence and electoral incentives to our explanation helps 
solve the three puzzles of LBJ’s legislative experience.  Table 6.3 presents the average 
presidential support scores for both cross-pressured and non cross-pressured members of 
Congress from 1965 to 1968.25  First, as my argument predicts, the average presidential 
support score of cross-pressured Democrats from districts where LBJ was weak is lower 
than the average presidential support score of non cross-pressured Democrats in both 
chambers of Congress in every year.  Second, the average presidential support score of 
cross-pressured Republicans from districts where LBJ was strong is higher than the 
average presidential support score of non cross-pressured Republican in both chambers of 
Congress in every year, with the exception of 1966 when the average presidential support 
score is equal for both types of Republican senators.   
 
Solving the First Puzzle of LBJ’s Legislative Experience 
Cross-pressured members of both parties were clearly responsive to their 
constituents’ view of LBJ from 1965 to 1968.  Can changes in these members’ voting 
behavior help explain the three puzzles of LBJ’s legislative experience?  Another look at 
Table 6.3 suggests that they can.  In 1966, the average presidential support score of a 
cross-pressured House Democrat decreased to 37.9 percent.  Cross-pressured Democrats 
                                                 
25 I exclude 1965 from the analysis because JFK, and not LBJ, was at the top of the Democratic 
presidential ticket in 1960.  Thus, the 1960 election returns are not a good measure of LBJ’s strength in 
members’ constituencies during 1964. 
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voted with LBJ just a little more than one-third of the time, less often than cross-
pressured Republicans voted for the president’s agenda.  While the average presidential 
support scores of all types of members of Congress decreased in 1966, the average scores 
of cross-pressured House Democrats were particularly low. 
The first puzzle of LBJ’s legislative experience, why the president’s agenda fared 
so much worse in 1966 than 1965, is solved by an understanding of the changes in 
members’ voting behavior.  Average Republicans and Democrats in both chambers of 
Congress decreased their support of the president.  Cross-pressured House Democrats had 
particularly low levels of presidential support in 1966.  Table 6.4 displays the average 
presidential support scores of cross-pressured Democrats and Republicans in different 
electoral situations.  Changes in the voting behavior of cross-pressured members, 
particularly very vulnerable Republicans in the House and cross-pressured Senate 
Republicans not up for reelection, help solve the second and third puzzles of LBJ’s 
legislative experience. 
 
Solving the Second Puzzle of LBJ’s Legislative Experience 
Changes in the number of cross-pressured Republicans in Congress, in 
conjunction with changes in their voting behavior, help provide an answer about why 
President Johnson enjoyed greater legislative success in 1967 than he did in 1968, the 
second puzzle of LBJ’s experience.  In the House, Table 6.3 shows that the average 
presidential support scores of very safe and very vulnerable Republicans from districts 
where Johnson was strong rose by over 5 percent from 1967 to 1968.  Moreover, the 
average presidential support score of very vulnerable cross-pressured House Republicans 
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was 52.5 percent in 1968, almost 10 percent higher than the average presidential support 
score of very vulnerable House Democrats from districts where Johnson was weak!   
The behavior of cross-pressured members of the House in 1968 contradicts the 
conventional party-based wisdom regarding how members vote on the president’s 
agenda.  In the 90
th
 Congress, 163 House Republicans represented constituencies where 
President Johnson was strong.  On average, these Republicans supported the president’s 
agenda more often than they opposed it.  This Republican support was crucial to LBJ’s 
surprising success in 1968.  Not only did these Republicans tend to support the president 
on the majority of roll-call votes, they also supported the president much more often than 
cross-pressured Democrats.  Party-based theories of executive-legislation relations fail to 
explain either of these two empirical facts of LBJ’s legislative life in 1968. 
Republican votes in the Senate also help explain the increase in Johnson’s 
legislative success from 1967 to 1968.  On average, both Democratic and Republican 
senators support the president less often in 1968 than they did in 1967.  The increase in 
LBJ’s legislative success rate is odd given the overall decrease in senators’ average 
presidential support scores.  A look at the average presidential support scores of cross-
pressured senators in different electoral situations reveals that cross-pressured Republican 
senators who were not up for reelection in 1968 were the one and only type of senator 
whose average presidential support score was above 50 percent in 1968.  As predicted by 
the Constituency Hypothesis and the Safety Hypothesis, electorally safe Republican 
senators from states where LBJ was strong supported him more often than their 
colleagues.  In fact, they supported the president more often than senators from the 
president’s own party!  The combination of constituency and electoral incentives affected 
Republicans’ voting behavior in both chambers of Congress and allowed the president to 




Solving the Third Puzzle of LBJ’s Legislative Experience 
The third puzzle presented by LBJ’s legislative experience is why the president 
did as well, or better, in the legislative arena in 1968 than he did in 1966 despite 
Democrats controlling 47 fewer House seats and four fewer seats in the Senate.  A look at 
Table 6.2 reveals that the average presidential support score of House Democrats was 
about the same in both years, while the average presidential support score of Senate 
Democrats was 9 percent lower.  According to party-based explanations, President 
Johnson’s should have done much worse in the legislative arena.  Not only did the 
president have fewer party members in Congress, over average these party members 
supported him less often.  Yet the president did well for a simple reason.  Republicans 
voted with him more often in 1968 than they did in 1966.  This increased support as 
especially strong from very vulnerable cross-pressured members of the House, as well as 
Republican senators not up for reelection at the end of the 90
th
 Congress. 
Changes in Republican voting behavior help explain why President Johnson was 
more successful in the House in 1968 than he was in 1966.  Table 6.3 shows that the 
average presidential support scores of non cross-pressured Republicans increased by 
about 15 percent from 1966 to 1968, while the average scores of cross-pressured 
Republicans increased by about 12 percent.  On average, both types of Republicans 
supported the president more often than House Democrats from districts where the 
president was weak!  As predicted by the Constituency Hypothesis, but ignored by party-
based explanations of presidential coalition building, House Democrats from districts 
where the president was weak slowed the passage of the president’s agenda in both 1966 
and 1968.   As a result, Republican votes were critical to LBJ’s success in the House.  
 
 134 
The changing voting behavior of Republican members, especially cross-pressured 
Republicans, is one key to understanding LBJ’s increased success in the House in 1968. 
On the Senate side of the Capitol Building, increased support from Republicans 
was also critical to LBJ’s increased success in 1968.  Table 6.3 again shows that the 
average support scores of all Senate Democrats actually decreased from 1966 to 1968.  
The action in the Senate demonstrates why the Safety Hypothesis contributes to our 
understanding of presidential coalition building.  Almost all Senate Republicans 
represented states where LBJ was strong.  The average presidential support score of these 
cross-pressured Republican senators increased by 5 percent from 1966 to 1968.  This 
increased Republican support was the result of increased support from electorally safe 
Republicans, i.e. those Republican senators not up for reelection at the end of the session 
in 1968 (see Table 6.4).  In the 90
th
 Congress, eleven cross-pressured Republican senators 
faced reelection in 1968, while twenty four were not up for reelection.  On average, these 
twenty four electorally safe Republican senators supported the president the majority of 
the time in 1968 (51.1 percent).  They are the only group of senators whose average 
presidential support increased substantially from 1966 to 1968.  As the Safety Hypothesis 
suggests, electorally safe Republican senators had greater freedom in their voting 
behavior in 1968.  As the Constituency Hypothesis suggests, Republican senators from 
states where President Johnson was strong followed their constituents’ lead and 
supported the president more often than other Republican senators.  In fact, they 





This chapter presents a case to highlight the deficiencies of using only party-based 
explanations to understand how presidents build winning legislative coalitions.  President 
Johnson enjoyed large Democratic majorities throughout his presidency.  While he was 
historically successful enacting his agenda in part thanks to these majorities, he also 
experienced two years of relative gridlock.  Furthermore, when we examine the variance 
in LBJ’s legislative success rates over time, three puzzles arise from party-based 
explanations.  First, why was the president so much more successful in 1965 than he was 
in 1966 despite having identical numbers of Democrats in Congress?  Second, why was 
the president more successful in 1968 than he was in 1967?  Finally, and most puzzling, 
why was the president equally or more successful in 1968 than he was in 1966 despite 
having fewer Democrats in Congress?  In short, party-based explanations fail to explain 




 Congress.  
They also fail to explain why the president was more successful in the 2
nd
 session of the 
90
th
 Congress than he was in the 2
nd
 session of the 89
th
 Congress. 
After exploring whether changes in the partisan or regional composition of 
Congress account for the variance in LBJ’s legislative success over time, I find that two 
factors provide a better explanation.  Changes in the number of cross-pressured members 
in Congress and changes in the voting behavior of members of Congress help explain 
LBJ’s legislative experience.   
The variance in LBJ’s legislative within the 89
th
 Congress (1965 – 1966) is 
explained by changes in member voting behavior.  As President Johnson’s approval fell, 
so did members’ support of his agenda.  The decrease in Johnson’s legislative success 
rates from 1965 to 1966 can be explained by the decreasing presidential support of all 
members of Congress.  In particular, support from cross-pressured Democrats fell to 
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around 38 percent.  On almost two of every three LBJ agenda votes, the president could 
not count on votes from these members of his own party. 
Fluctuations in Johnson’s legislative success within the 90
th
 Congress (1967 – 
1968) can be explained by changes in the voting behavior of Republican members of 
Congress.  On average, the 163 cross-pressured House Republicans from constituencies 
where President Johnson was strong voted for the president’s agenda 52.5 percent of the 
time.  The support of these Republican members helped LBJ overcome opposition from 
many members of his own party, especially those Democrats from constituencies where 
the president was weak.  In the Senate, Republican senators not up for reelection held the 
key to LBJ’s increased success in 1968.  On average, these safe senators supported the 
president more often than the average Democrat.  The changing voting behavior of 
Republican members also helps explain why the president’s agenda fared better in 1968 
than it did in 1966, despite smaller Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress.  
President Johnson’s legislative experience demonstrates why party-based 
explanations do not adequately explain how presidents build the enacting coalitions 
needed to be successful in the legislative arena.  President Johnson enjoyed large 
Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress throughout his presidency, but he 
experienced relative gridlock with Congress for two of his five years as president.  The 
fluctuations in LBJ’s legislative success cannot be explained by the number of Democrats 
in Congress, the number of Southern Democrats in Congress, or changes in the voting 
behavior of Democrats alone.  Contrary to the expectations of party-based explanations, 
Democrats often held up the president’s agenda items while Republicans often provided 
the president with the votes he needed to enact his agenda.  The systematic influence of 
constituencies and electoral incentives allow us to explain and understand this puzzling 
behavior by Republican and Democratic members of Congress. 
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The following chapter presents a case study that presents another strong test of 
my argument.  I investigate President Obama’s experience in the 111
th
 Congress.  If ever 
any president would be able to enact his agenda on the strength of partisan politics alone, 
either Lyndon Baines Johnson or Barack Obama would have been that president.  Both 
men enjoyed large Democratic majorities in Congress and impressive legislative success.  
This chapter makes clear that party alone is not enough to account for Johnson’s 
legislative success.  The following chapter argues that party-based theories also fail to 
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Table 6.1: The Partisan and Regional Composition of the 88th, 89th, and 90th Congress
Panel A: The Partisan Composition of the House and Senate
House Senate
Democrats Republicans Democrats Republicans
88th Congress 258 176 67 33
89th Congress 295 140 68 32
90th Congress 248 187 64 36










88th Congress 163 95 46 21
89th Congress 204 91 47 22
90th Congress 164 84 43 19














88th Congress 181 77 139 37
89th Congress 260 35 32 117














88th Congress 36 31 21 12
89th Congress 57 11 2 31
90th Congress 54 10 2 34
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1964 74% 38% 61% 45%
1965 74% 41% 64% 48%
1966 63% 37% 57% 43%
1967 69% 46% 61% 53%














Table 6.3: Average Presidential Support Scores of Cross-Pressured Members of Congress




Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured
1965 77.5% 45.5% 30.1% 43.5%
1966 66.7% 37.9% 28.4% 39.6%
1967 73.3% 45.1% 39.4% 47.0%




Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured Cross-Pressured
1965 66.6% 41.1% 38.0% 49.0%
1966 59.5% 40.0% 43.0% 43.0%
1967 61.7% 56.7% 45.0% 53.3%







Table 6.4: Average Presidential Support Scores of Cross-Pressured Members of Congress
 With Different Electoral Incentives, 1965 - 1968
Panel A: House
Democrats Republicans
Very Safe Very Vulnerable Very Safe Very Vulnerable
1964 59.2% 74.8% 44.4% 41.5%
1965 38.4% 62.1% 44.1% 40.3%
1966 33.3% 47.9% 40.1% 37.4%
1967 42.2% 49.3% 49.1% 48.8%
1968 42.6% 46.0% 54.6% 53.8%
Democrats Republicans








1964 64.2% 61.2% 51.5% 46.5%
1965 52.5% 36.5% 50.1% 47.6%
1966 42.8% 35.8% 44.1% 41.7%
1967 52.0% 61.4% 53.3% 53.4%
1968 38.2% 34.4% 51.1% 41.9%
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Chapter 7:  Between Barack and a Blue State – Constituency Influence 
and Electoral Incentives in the 111th Congress 
 This chapter analyzes President Obama’s experience with the 111
th
 Congress and 
finds that the president’s strength in members’ constituencies had a systematic effect on 
members’ voting in both chambers of Congress.  Relative to other members of their 
party, members of Congress from constituencies where the president is strong are more 
likely to support his agenda, while members from constituencies where the president is 
weak are less likely to support his agenda.  This effect exists for both presidential 
partisans and opposition party members, and is especially strong on electorally vulnerable 
members.  Furthermore, the empirical analysis finds that members’ electoral incentives 
had a systematic effect on member voting behavior in the House of Representatives as 
electorally vulnerable House Democrats from constituencies where President Obama was 
weak regularly voted against the president’s agenda.  The president’s strength in 
members’ constituencies, in conjunction with members’ electoral incentives, affected 




President Obama’s experience in the legislative arena during the 111
th
 Congress 
presents a puzzle given our current understanding of how presidents build successful 
enacting coalitions.  The dominant theory describing how presidents pass their agenda 
into law argues that presidential success in Congress is a function of partisan politics 
alone.  This theory holds that presidents will be successful when their party holds a 
majority in Congress and unsuccessful otherwise.  While this theory does a good job of 
explaining the variance in presidential success across congresses, it does not work well 
when examining the voting behavior of individual members or the passage of individual 
bills.   
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This chapter uses the 111
th
 Congress as a case study to demonstrate why political 
scientists need to look beyond party politics in order to understand how presidents enact 
their agendas into law.  President Obama enjoyed both large partisan majorities and high 
rates of success in the 111
th
 Congress, but he needed Republican votes to pass the vast 
majority of his legislative agenda.  This paper analyzes the major legislative battles in the 
111
th
 Congress and finds that the president’s strength in members’ constituencies 
explains why some members crossed party lines on presidential agenda votes.  
Vulnerable members of Congress were particularly attentive to their constituencies. 
President Obama took office with large Democratic majorities in both the House 
and the Senate.  Along with these majorities came an expectation that the president could 
use them to pass almost anything he wanted into law.  Yet Congress took over a year to 
enact health care reform, the president’s top legislative priority, into law.  His second 
legislative priority, a comprehensive energy bill intended to combat climate change, 
never became law.  Despite these difficulties enacting particular parts of his agenda into 
law, in the aggregate the president performed quite well in the legislative arena during the 
111
th
 Congress.  In 2009 President Obama enjoyed the highest presidential success rate of 
any president since Congressional Quarterly started tracking presidential success in 1953 
(Gonyea 2010).  This high success rate was in part due to large Democratic majorities in 
Congress and the president’s strategic position taking (Binder 2010), but President 
Obama is not the first president to enjoy a large congressional majority.  Nor is he the 
first president to strategically support bills that have a high probability of success. 
Party-based explanations of executive-legislative relations can explain President 
Obama’s high rate of overall success with the 111
th
 Congress, but they cannot explain the 
difficulty that President Obama faced in quickly passing his agenda into law.  Nor can 
they explain the fact that almost all of President Obama’s enacting coalitions needed 
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Republican votes in at least one chamber of Congress in order to be successful.  Table 7.1 
displays the Obama agenda items enacted during the 111
th
 Congress.  Only 11 out of 
these 33 bills (33 percent) became law without needing Republican votes.  A large 
number of Democratic votes against Obama’s agenda items in the House slowed the 
president’s ability to pass his agenda into law, while a handful of Republicans eventually 
provided the president with sometimes decisive votes in support of his agenda.  In the 
Senate, President Obama almost always needed Republican votes in order to invoke 
cloture and overcome filibusters.  This type of voting behavior, with members voting 
against their party caucus’s position on presidential agenda votes, cannot be accounted 
for by either party or ideology.  No Republican in the 111
th
 Congress has a more liberal 
DW-NOMINATE score than the most conservative Democrat (Voteview.com).  As a 
result, the 111
th
 Congress presents a puzzle given our current understanding of the 
relationship between Congress and the president.  
This chapter argues that the systematic relationship between the president’s 
strength in members’ constituencies, members’ electoral incentives, and presidential 
support helps solve the puzzle of President Obama’s experience in the 111
th
 Congress.  
The president’s standing with members’ constituents, and its effect on member voting 
behavior, helps explain both 1) the large amount of Democratic defections from President 
Obama’s legislative coalitions in the House, and 2) the decisions of Republican 
representatives and senators to provide the president with often critical votes.  The 
Democrats who defected from their party caucus on Obama agenda items usually 
represented constituencies where President Obama was weak, while the Republicans who 
supported the president on final-passage votes tended to represent blue states or districts 
where the president was strong.   
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This chapter proceeds by summarizing the patterns that arise from members’ 
votes on President Obama’s agenda during the 111
th
 Congress.  I argue that the 
Constituency Hypothesis and Vulnerability Hypothesis explain these patterns better than 
party-based theories of presidential coalition building.  To demonstrate how an 
appreciation of the systematic effects of constituency and electoral incentives allows for a 
better understanding of President Obama’s experience in the 111
th
 Congress, I test these 
two hypotheses using both overall presidential support scores and particular votes on 
specific Obama agenda items.  The chapter concludes by explaining how understanding 
the effects of constituency and vulnerability can help political scientists understand 
Obama’s experience with the 111
th
 Congress in particular, and the relationship between 
Congress and the president in general. 
 
HOW PRESIDENTS AND CONSTITUENTS INFLUENCE CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 
On July 22, 2009, during a nationally televised prime-time press conference a 
reporter asked President Obama if it was the president’s job to “get a deal done” on a 
national health-care reform bill.  The president immediately responded “Absolutely, it's 
my job. I'm the president. And I think this has to get done.” (CQ Transcriptions 2009).  
The next day at a town hall meeting in Ohio, the president forcefully reiterated his goals 
for Congress on health-care reform.  President Obama provided a brief overview of the 
legislative process when he told the audience “I want the bill to get out of the 
committees; and then I want that bill to go to the floor; and then I want that bill to be 
reconciled between the House and the Senate; and then I want to sign a bill” (Kaiser 
Health News).  On the biggest domestic policy debate in years, the president took 
responsibility for the bill’s passage and set clear goals and deadlines for Congress.   
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By the end of the 111
th
 Congress, President Obama accomplished his legislative 
goals on both health care and a number of other issues.  He did so with legislative 
coalitions that augmented a large base of presidential party members with a small bloc of 
opposition party members.  The president was able to form these coalitions because 
members’ electoral incentives made some Republican members systematically inclined to 
support the president.  He needed these Republicans’ votes because members’ electoral 
incentives made some Democrats systematically inclined to oppose the president.   
The types of enacting coalitions found in the 111
th
 Congress, with the president 
augmenting a base of presidential party members with at least a few opposition party 
members, are not uncommon.  In fact, they are the norm.  Table 1.1 revealed that over 95 
percent of all major presidential agenda items needed votes from opposition party 
members in order to become law.  As a result of this empirical fact of legislative life, 
party-based explanations fail to fully explain how presidents create the coalitions 
necessary to pass individual bills into law.  This paper uses Obama’s experience with the 
111
th
 Congress as a case study to investigate the larger questions of 1) whether 
constituencies influence the voting behavior of their representatives in Congress, 2) 
whether electorally vulnerable members are more attentive than others to their 
constituency’s preferences, and 3) which members of Congress are the most likely to vote 
against their party caucus’s position on presidential agenda items.  The 111
th
 Congress is 
a particularly good case study because President Obama enjoyed large legislative 
majorities in both chambers of Congress.  If any president at any time in history would be 
able to pass major bills into law with votes from presidential party members alone, the 
111
th
 Congress was that time and President Obama was that president.  However, with 
the exception of health care reform, President Obama always needed Republican votes in 
order to enact his agenda into law.  He needed these Republican votes due to Democratic 
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votes against the president’s legislative agenda.  The following section proposes two 
hypotheses that explain why some members of Congress are systematically more likely 
than others to vote against their party caucus on presidential agenda items. 
 
The Constituency Hypothesis 
For the purposes of this chapter, the Constituency Hypothesis holds that members 
of the 111
th
 Congress will vary their support President Obama’s agenda in accordance 
with the president’s strength in their constituency.   
 
The Constituency Hypothesis:  As the president’s strength in the 
member’s constituency increases, that member’s presidential support 
increases. 
 
I again use Presidential Strength to test the Constituency Hypothesis.  For the 
House analysis, I again use the president’s vote share in a member’s district to measure 
presidential strength.  Thanks to advances in the frequency and specificity of presidential 
approval polls, in this chapter I am able to directly measure state-level presidential 
strength using state-level presidential approval numbers.   
To test the Constituency Hypothesis in the House, this paper uses presidential 
vote share as a measure of presidential strength.  While this measure is both the best 
available measure of constituency-level presidential strength in all 435 House districts 
and quite a good measure of presidential strength as well, it does have limitations because 
it is not a direct measure of presidential strength at the time that Congress votes on the 
president’s agenda.  To increase the robustness of the analysis, I use a direct measure of 
presidential strength to test the Constituency Hypothesis in the Senate.  The Senate 
analysis uses President Obama’s annual state-level presidential approval ratings from 
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Gallup’s “State of the States” study.26  This measure clearly and directly measures 
President Obama’s strength in senators’ states. 
 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis 
In this chapter, the Vulnerability Hypothesis holds that vulnerable members of the 
111
th
 Congress will be the most likely to follow their constituency’s lead when voting on 
President Obama’s agenda.   
 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis:  Vulnerable members from constituencies 
where President Obama was strong will be more likely than other 
members to support the president.  Conversely, vulnerable members from 
constituencies where President Obama was weak will be less likely than 
other members to support the president.   
 
I again use the Vulnerability variable and the Presidential Strength * 
Vulnerability interaction term to test the Vulnerability Hypothesis.  The one difference is 
that the Senate analysis uses President Obama’s annual state-level presidential approval 
ratings from Gallup’s “State of the States” study to measure Presidential Strength. 
 




This chapter tests the Constituency and Vulnerability Hypotheses in two ways.  
First, I take a broad view and perform linear regressions with members’ CQ Presidential 
Support scores as the dependent variable.   These scores measure the percentage of time 
that a member voted in accordance with President Obama’s position on roll-call votes in 
                                                 
26 As an additional robustness check, I also performed the Senate analyses using the “presidential strength” 
variable as measure by President Obama’s state-level vote share.  The results are nearly identical to those 






 Congress.27 28  As a second test, I use logistic regressions to analyze roll-call 
votes on high-profile Obama agenda items in the Senate.  The regressions predict the 
probability that a member casts a vote in support of the president’s position.   In the 
Senate, I examine member voting behavior on 1) the “Jobs for Main Street” bill that 
President Obama advocated during his first State of the Union address and 2) the 
financial regulation reform bill championed by the president.  In the House, I investigate 
votes on 1) health care reform and 2) the “cap and trade” energy reform bill. 
I perform the above tests using a dataset that includes observations for each 
member of the 111
th
 Congress.  In addition to the constituency and vulnerability 
independent variables discussed above, I control for party.  Presidential Party equals 1 if 
the member caucuses with the president’s political party, and 0 otherwise.  I do not 
control for ideology due to the endogenous relationship between NOMINATE scores and 
presidential support scores.29  I first present the results of the test analyzing overall 
                                                 
 
27 Some scholars question the use of presidential support scores as evidence of presidential influence.  The 
basic argument is that presidential support scores only measure how often members vote as the president 
would like them to vote, not how often the president actually influences such decisions (Pritchard 1985).  
Presidential support scores are an appropriate measure for this paper because I wish to argue that party, 
presidential strength, and a member’s electoral vulnerability all systematically affect members’ propensity 
to support President Obama’s agenda.  I am not arguing that the president himself directly influences these 
members’ votes (although he may).  Instead, I argue that the president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies is a systematic influence member voting decisions. 
 
28 Edwards (1989) suggests refining CQ’s Presidential Support Scores to include only “non-consensual” 
votes.  An analysis of the correlation between CQ’s measure and Edwards’s measure for the years 1957 to 
2005 reveals that the correlation is almost always >0.9 and often >0.99, making the two measures nearly 
identical for the purposes of this paper.  Edwards’s measures are invaluable if we wish to compare 
presidential success and presidential support across congressional sessions, but with the research design 
employed in this paper, the empirical results will be similar regardless of which measure is used.  My 
purpose is to look at the variance amongst members within the 111
th
 Congress and demonstrate that 
President Obama’s strength in members’ constituencies combines with member vulnerability to make 
certain members of the 111
th
 Congress more likely to support the president than others. 
   
29 Ideology is certainly an important factor in member voting behavior, but it is quite difficult to measure.  
Accordingly, I do not include a measure of ideology in the models.  The usual measure of ideology, 
NOMINATE, is a summarized voting score.  It is not an appropriate independent variable for this study 
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presidential support, and then discuss the results from the test of members’ votes on 
individual Obama agenda items. 
 
CONSTITUENCY, VULNERABILITY, AND PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT IN THE HOUSE 
The president’s strength in members’ constituencies and member vulnerability are 
both statistically and substantively related to members’ presidential support scores in the 
111
th
 House.  The president’s strength in members’ constituencies had a strong 
independent effect on members’ presidential support scores.  Table 7.2 presents 
presidential strength’s effect on members with mean levels of vulnerability.30  For 
average members of the House, a 10% increase in President Obama’s vote share in their 
district is associated with a 5% increase in their support for the president’s agenda.31  In 
the 111
th
 Congress, members of the House from districts with high presidential strength 
supported the president’s agenda significantly more often than other members. 
                                                                                                                                                 
because my dependent variables, CQ’s presidential support scores and individual roll-call votes, are either 
summarized voting scores or votes themselves.  Therefore, the relationship between NOMINATE and these 
two variables is endogenous.  As a robustness check, I ran the models in this study and included members’ 
DW-NOMINATE scores as an independent variable.  The House results are robust to NOMINATE’s 
inclusion as an independent variable, with no difference in the statistical or substantive significance of 
constituency and member vulnerability.  The Senate results are a bit less robust when NOMINATE is 
included due to the low number of observations in the Senate and the endogenous, collinear relationship 
between NOMINATE and the dependent variables. 
 
30 When reporting results from models with interaction terms, it is not appropriate to interpret the 
coefficients of the lower-order variables as unconditional marginal effects (Braumoeller 2004, Brambor, 
Clark and Golder 2006).  Accordingly, I report the effect of presidential vote share for members at the 
mean level of vulnerability in the 111
th
 Congress.  Similarly, I calculate vulnerability’s effect on members 
at the mean level of presidential vote share.  In Tables 1 and 3, I present coefficients and standard errors for 
these effects instead of presenting the coefficients and standard errors of the lower-order variables.   
 
31 A coefficient of 10 on the presidential vote share variable would mean that an increase of 10% in the 
president’s vote share in a member’s constituency leads to a 1% increase in that member’s presidential 
support score, while a coefficient of 100 would equal a 10% increase in presidential support for every 10% 




Member vulnerability is related to representatives’ presidential support scores as 
well.  Table 7.3 shows that, in districts with mean levels of presidential strength, 
vulnerable members of the House supported President Obama’s agenda more often than 
safe members.  In addition to the independent effects of member vulnerability and 
presidential strength on presidential support, the president’s standing in members’ 
constituencies had an interactive effect with member vulnerability as well.   The term 
interacting member vulnerability and the president’s vote share in members’ 
constituencies is both statistically and substantively significant. Vulnerable members of 
the House from districts where President Obama was strong supported the president more 
often than other members of Congress.   
The interaction term allows for two additional tests of the Constituency and 
Vulnerability Hypotheses.  First, if the two hypotheses are correct, they imply that the 
marginal effect of member vulnerability should be 1) negative for members from districts 
with low presidential strength and 2) positive for members from districts with high 
presidential strength.   Table 7.3 shows that this statement, an empirical implication of 
my argument, accurately describes member behavior in the 111
th
 House.  Vulnerability 
has a negative marginal effect (-6.63) on members from districts where the president is 
weak and a positive marginal effect (13.47) on members from districts where the 
president is strong.  Second, if the two hypotheses are correct, they imply the marginal 
effect of presidential strength should be much stronger for vulnerable members than it is 
for safer members.  Again, Table 7.3 shows that this implication accurately describes 
reality.  For representatives with low vulnerability, a 10 percent increase in presidential 
strength is associated with a 3.3 percent increase in presidential support.  Presidential 
strength has a much stronger effect on members with high vulnerability.  For vulnerable 
 
 158 
members, a 10 percent increase in presidential strength is associated with a 7.3 percent 
increase in presidential support.   
To give the reader a full appreciation of the substantive effects of presidential 
strength and member vulnerability in the House, I calculate predicted presidential support 
scores for three types of members: 1) vulnerable members from constituencies with low 
presidential vote share, 2) members with mean levels of both vulnerability and 
presidential vote share, and 3) vulnerable members from constituencies with high 
presidential vote share.32  Figure 7.1 presents the results of this analysis.  Vulnerable 
Republicans from districts where President Obama was strong supported his agenda 
about 13 percent more often than vulnerable Republicans from districts where the 
president was weak.  The numbers are similar for Democrats.  Vulnerable Democrats 
from districts where President Obama was strong had presidential support scores over 15 
percent higher than vulnerable Democrats representing districts where the president was 
weak.  In the 111
th
 Congress, vulnerable members of the House from both sides of the 
aisle were clearly responsive to President Obama’s strength in their constituencies.   
 
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND ENERGY REFORM IN THE HOUSE 
The voting patterns on health care reform33 and “cap and trade” energy reform are 
representative of the voting patterns on most high-profile Obama agenda items in the 
                                                 
32 Once again, I define “low presidential strength” as one standard deviation below the mean of the 
presidential strength variable and “high presidential strength” as one standard deviation above the mean.  I 
define “low vulnerability” and “high vulnerability” in the same way.  Further, I use the distribution for each 
party’s caucus when calculating the predicted presidential support scores.  In other words, when I calculate 
predicted presidential support scores for Republicans with “high presidential strength” I use a number that 
is one standard deviation above the mean of the presidential strength variable for Republicans only, and not 
the entire House. 
 
33 I investigate the December 2009 final passage vote on President Obama’s health care reform bill.  The 





 House.  For both bills, a large number of Democrats opposed the president’s 
position and voted against the bill.  Appendix 7A displays the vote totals for both bills.  
Thirty-nine Democrats voted against health care reform in December 2009, while 44 
Democrats opposed cap and trade energy reform.  Due to these large amounts of 
Democratic votes against his agenda, President Obama often needed Republican votes in 
order for his agenda items to pass the House.  Cap and trade energy reform was one such 
case.  With only 211 Democratic votes in favor of cap and trade energy reform, President 
Obama needed Republican votes for the bill to succeed in the House. Fortunately for the 
president, eight Republicans voted for the bill, allowing it to pass in the House.  
The combination of constituency influence and electoral incentives explains why 
so many Democrats voted against the president’s position, as well as why some 
Republicans decided to vote with the president and give sometimes vital support to his 
legislative agenda.  Table 7.4 analyzes the effects of party, constituency influence, and 
member vulnerability on the final passage votes for both health care reform and energy 
reform.  The analysis finds evidence that the president’s strength in members’ 
constituencies affected members’ votes on both bills.  Moreover, on health care reform 
the combination of vulnerability and presidential strength also affected members’ voting 
decisions.  Votes from Democratic Party members alone were not enough to get an 
energy reform bill passed through the 111
th
 House, and party alone is not enough to 
explain members’ voting behavior on President Obama’s agenda during the 111
th
 House.  
Instead, we must consider the influence of constituencies and electoral incentives. 
Health care reform took the bulk of President Obama’s legislative time and 
energy in 2009 and early 2010.  Enacting comprehensive health insurance reform was at 
the very top of the president’s legislative agenda.  Three House committees and two 




Senate committees reported health care reform bills, and each chamber passed its own 
version of health care reform.  In the end, the bill became law not through a conference 
committee, but through the reconciliation process.  The opposition of dozens of 
Democratic members of the House is one major reason why health care reform took so 
long to pass.  The combination of constituency influence and electoral incentives explain 
why so many Democrats opposed President Obama’s health care bill.  During the high-
profile House vote on health care reform in December 2009, over three dozen Democrats 
voted against the bill.  Figure 7.2 displays the substantive effect of presidential strength 
and member vulnerability on members’ probability of supporting the health care reform 
bill.  The probability that a highly vulnerable Democrat representing a constituency 
where President Obama was weak would vote in favor of the bill is 36 percent less than 
the probability of an average Democrat voting for the bill’s passage.  The combination of 
constituency influence and electoral incentives clearly explains why so many Democrats 
opposed the president’s health care reform bill in December 2009.34 
After health care reform, cap and trade energy reform was arguably the second 
priority on President Obama’s legislative agenda.  While the Senate never voted on an 
energy reform bill, the House narrowly passed the type of cap and trade energy reform 
legislation that the president advocated during the campaign.  Forty four Democrats 
opposed the president’s energy bill, which meant that in order to get this agenda item 
through the House, President Obama needed Republican votes.  In the end, eight 
Republicans crossed party lines, providing the president the votes he needed.  The 
president’s strength in members’ constituencies is strongly related to members’ decisions 
to defect from their party caucus’s position on this highly salient vote.  Seven of the eight 
                                                 
34 Presidential strength and member vulnerability have similar effects on members’ voting behavior during 
the reconciliation vote on health care reform in May 2010. 
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Republican supporters represented districts that President Obama carried in 2008, and all 
eight were at least somewhat vulnerable.   Figure 7.2 shows that the probability that a 
House Republican representing a constituency with high presidential strength would vote 
in support of cap and trade energy reform was about 7 percent higher than the probability 
of an average Republican supporting the bill.  On the other side of the aisle, the 
probability a Democrat from a district with low presidential strength would support the 
bill is 33 percent lower than the probability that an average Democrat would vote in 
support of the bill.   The president’s strength in members’ constituencies explains why so 
many House Democrats opposed this major Obama agenda item, as well as why eight 
Republicans gave President Obama the votes he needed to pass cap and trade energy 
reform in the House. 
 
Constituency, Vulnerability, and Presidential Support in the Senate 
The House analysis appears to provide strong evidence for both the Constituency 
Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis, but some may question the results because 
due to the use of the president’s constituency-level vote share to measure presidential 
strength.  While this measure is a very good measure of presidential strength for reasons 
discussed above, it is nonetheless an indirect measure of presidential strength.  To 
overcome this potential obstacle and demonstrate the robustness of presidential strength’s 
effect on members’ votes, I use a direct measure of presidential strength for the Senate 
analysis: the president’s popularity in each senators’ state as measured by Gallup’s 
annual “State of the States” survey.   
Table 7.2 displays the results of the Senate analysis.  For senators with average 
levels of electoral vulnerability, a 10 percent increase in President Obama’s popularity in 
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their state is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in their 2009 presidential support 
score and a 3.5 percent increase in their 2010 presidential support score.  Including the 
interaction term allows for investigation of the marginal effects of presidential strength 
for senators at different levels of electoral vulnerability.  Table 7.3 demonstrates that a 10 
percent increase in state-level presidential popularity is associated with 3 to 4 percent 
increase in the 2009 and 2010 presidential support scores of electorally safe senators and 
senators with average levels of electoral vulnerability.  These results stand in direct 
opposition to other studies that find no relationship between presidential popularity and 
members’ votes on the president’s agenda items (for example, see Cohen, Bond, Fleisher 
and Hamman 2000). 
While the Senate results suggest that constituency-level presidential popularity 
influenced senators’ propensity to support President Obama’s agenda, they provide no 
evidence for the Vulnerability Hypothesis.  Electoral vulnerability had no statistically 
detectable effect on senators’ presidential support scores in the 111
th
 Congress.  There are 
three possible reasons for the absence of statistical evidence for the Vulnerability 
Hypothesis.  First, the low number of observations in the Senate analysis makes it 
difficult to detect empirical effects.  Second, there is less variation for the member 
vulnerability variable in the Senate than there is in the House (see Appendix 7B).  Third, 
electoral vulnerability may simply not affect senators’ voting behavior.  Whatever 
explanation holds true, the empirical results cannot reject the null hypothesis that 




JOBS FOR MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET REFORM IN THE IN THE SENATE 
 The state of the American economy was the major theme of President Obama’s 
first State of the Union address in January 2010.  President Obama urged the Senate to 
pass a jobs bill that could be merged with the “Jobs for Main Street Act” that the House 
passed in 2009.  Within a month, the Senate responded by passing a $15 billion job 
stimulus package.  In order to invoke cloture and pass this major agenda item through the 
Senate, President Obama needed Republican votes.  The relationship between 
presidential strength and member voting behavior on presidential agenda items explains 
why some Republicans decided to cross party lines and give the president this crucial 
support on both the cloture and final passage votes. 
The cloture vote in the Senate marked the first time in 2010 that Senate 
Democrats received some Republican support on a contentious bill (Bolton 2010).  Both 
President Obama and Harry Reid owe Republican senators from blue states a debt of 
gratitude for their crucial support on the Senate cloture vote.  Newly elected Republican 
Scott Brown of Massachusetts and three other Republican senators from blue states – 
Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe of Maine, and George Voinovich of Ohio – voted to 
invoke cloture and helped President Obama achieve one of the main legislative objectives 
outlined in his first State of the Union Address. 
Figure 7.3 displays presidential popularity’s substantive effect on the predicted 
probability that a senator would respond “aye” on the final passage vote for the Jobs for 
Main Street bill.  Republican senators from states where Obama was strong in 2010 were 
over 18 percent more likely to vote for the jobs bill than average Republican senators, 
while Republican senators from states where the president was weak were 15 percent less 
likely to support the bill than average Republican senators.  Presidential popularity 
played a role in voting decisions on the Democratic side of the aisle as well.  The lone 
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Democrat who voted against both cloture and final passage, Ben Nelson of Nebraska, 
represents a state where President Obama’s approval rating was just 44.7 percent when 
the votes were taken in 2010. 
 After passing the Jobs for Main Street bill into law with the help of Republican 
senators from states where he was strong, President Obama turned his attention to the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  In the end, the president 
won congressional approval of a bill that Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) described as “an out-
of-the-park home run” for the Obama Administration (Dennis 2010).  As with the Jobs 
for Main Street bill, the president could not have passed this bill through the Senate 
without the votes of Republicans where he enjoyed relatively high levels of popularity in 
2010.  Three Republican senators from states where Obama was strong (Collins, Snowe 
and Brown) provided the critical votes needed to invoke cloture on the Senate floor.  
These three senators also voted in support of the president’s financial regulation reform 
bill on the final passage vote.  President Obama needed all three votes because Senator 
Ben Nelson once again voted against the president.  Figure 7.3 shows that Republican 
senators from strong Obama states were 17 percent more likely than average Republicans 
to support the Wall Street reform bill.   Presidential strength in senators’ states 
encouraged some Republicans to vote against their party caucus and vote to pass both the 
Jobs for Main Street and Wall Street reform bills.  Without these Republican votes, 
President Obama would not have been able to pass these two major agenda items despite 







 This chapter argues that President Obama’s legislative experience in the 111th 
Congress shows that party-based theories of presidential coalition building are flawed in 
two major ways.  First, even with President Obama’s overwhelming electoral victory and 
large Democratic majorities in both chambers of the 111
th
 Congress, the majority of 
agenda items he enacted into law needed Republican votes in order to pass.  These 
Republican votes were necessary because a large number of House Democrats voted 
against the president’s agenda.  Second, the analysis presented in this chapter finds that 
President Obama’s strength in members’ constituencies was a strong influence on 
members’ voting behavior in the 111
th
 Congress.  In the House, presidential strength is an 
especially important factor in the decision-making process of electorally vulnerable 
members of Congress. 
This dissertation’s alternative hypothesis to the conventional party-based wisdom 
is that presidential strength in members’ constituencies is a strong influence on members’ 
voting behavior on presidential agenda items.  The case study presented in this paper 
poses a strong test of the alternative hypothesis.  If ever a president could build winning 
legislative coalitions with votes from presidential party members alone, it would have 
been President Obama in the 111
th
 Congress.  Instead, for the majority of Obama agenda 
items enacted into law during the 111
th
 Congress, Democratic votes were not enough.  In 
the House, large numbers of Democrats from constituencies where President Obama was 
weak voted against the president’s agenda.  In the Senate, with the exception of the nine 
months between when Arlen Specter changed his party affiliation to become a Democrat 
in late April 2009 and when the voters of Massachusetts elected Republican Scott Brown 
in early February 2010, Democrats did not have the 60 votes needed to invoke cloture 
and overcome Republican filibusters.  To accurately describe how President Obama built 
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successful legislative coalitions in the 111
th
 Congress, as well as how presidents build 
successful legislative coalitions in general, political scientists must understand and 
appreciate how constituencies and electoral incentives affect members’ voting behavior 
on presidential agenda items. 
Even with solid majorities in both chambers of Congress and an electoral mandate 
stemming from overwhelming Electoral College victory in 2008, President Obama could 
rarely enact his agenda items with Democratic votes alone.  Instead, he usually needed 
Republican votes.  Thanks to the role that constituency-level presidential strength plays 
in members’ voting decisions, President Obama was often able to gain the votes of 
Republican members from constituencies with high presidential strength and enact his 
agenda into law.  Constituency-level presidential strength had a particularly strong effect 
on the voting decisions of electorally vulnerable members of the House.  Party politics 
alone does not accurately explain members’ votes on President Obama’s agenda in the 
111
th
 Congress.  Nor does it adequately explain the passage of most of the president’s 
major agenda items.  In order to fully understand how President Obama enacted so much 
of his agenda into law in the 111
th
 Congress, we must appreciate the systematic 
relationship between constituencies, electoral incentives, and presidential support.
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Table 7.1:  Obama Agenda Items Enacted into Law in the 111th Congress



















Votes to Pass in 
Senate?
S 454 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 411-0 246 No 95-0 56 No
HR 2346 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 226-202 221 No 91-5 55 Yes*
HR 1388 Serve America Act 275-149 249 No 79-19 57 Yes*
HR 1256 Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act 307-97 237 No 79-17 56 Yes*
HR 2751 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act 298-119 239 No Voice Vote No
HR 2847 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act 217-201 211 No 68-29 57 Yes*
HR 1016
Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and 
Transparency Act of 2009 409-1 242 No Passed by Unanimous Consent
HR 2892
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 
2010 307-114 244 No 79-19 57 Yes**
HR 2996
Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 247-178 237 No 72-28 57 Yes**
HR 2997
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 2010 263-162 240 No 76-22 57 Yes**
HR 3183
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2010 308-114 238 No 80-17 56 Yes*
HR 3288 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 221-202 221 No 60-36 57 Yes***
HR 3962
Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare 
Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010 220-215 219 No Passed by Unanimous ConsentNo
HR 3961 Medicare Physician Payment Reform Act of 2009 243-183 242 No Passed by Unanimous ConsentNo
S 1793
Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 
2009 408-9 246 No Passed by Unanimous ConsentNo
HR1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 246-183 246 No 60-38 57 Yes*
HR 627
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009 361-64 248 No 90-5 55 Yes**
S 386 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 338-52 224 No 92-4 56 Yes*
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Votes to Pass in 
Senate?
HR 2965 Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 250-175 235 No 65-31 57 Yes*
S 3307 Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 264-157 247 No Passed by Unanimous Consent
HR 4994 Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010 409-2 243 No Passed by Unanimous Consent
HJR 45 Increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. 233-187 233 No 60-39 60 No
HR 2847 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act 217-201 211 No 68-29 57 Yes*
HR 4899 Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 308-114 148 Yes 67-28 55 Yes**
HR 4851 Continuing Extension Act of 2010 289-112 240 No 59-38 56 Yes*
HR 5297 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 237-187 236 No 61-38 59 Yes*
HR 4173
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 237-192 234 No 60-39 57 Yes*
HR 1586
FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety 
Improvement Act 247-161 245 No 61-39 59 Yes*
HR 4853
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, 
and Job Creation Act of 2010 277-148 139 Yes 81-19 44 Yes
Treaty 
Doc 111-5 START Treaty N/A 71-26 58 Yes****
HR 4872 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 220-207 220 No 56-43 56 No*****
HR 4213 Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 2010 272-152 241 No 59-39 57 Yes*
HR 3590 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 219-212 219 No 60-39 60 No
*Needed GOP votes to invoke cloture
**Needed GOP votes to withdraw cloture motion by unanimous consent
***Needed GOP votes both to withdraw cloture motion by unanimous consent, and to waive Senate Rule 28 on conference report vote.
**** Needed 2/3rds support (65 votes) to ratify START treaty 
***** Passed through the reconciliation process
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Table 7.2: Testing the Constituency Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis  in the 
111th Congress 
     
 
House Senate 2009 Senate 2010 
    
Presidential Party 53.4*** 40.4*** 49.5*** 
  (0.89) (2.47) (2.04) 
     
Presidential Strength 53.2*** 38.4** 35.2** 
  (3.74) (19.3) (14.0) 
     
Member Vulnerability 3.42*** -8.42 -0.79 
  (1.23) (5.6) (4.82) 
     
Member Vulnerability * 
Presidential Strength 67.9**** -9.71 3.46 
 
 
(8.51) (75.9) (55.4) 
 
    
Constant 25.6 32.1 30.6 
  (2.52) (31.7) (17.6) 
     
Adjusted R² 0.95 0.82 0.9 
 N 433 95 96 
  
Notes: Table presents OLS regression estimates.  The dependent variable is the member’s presidential 
support score.  Presidential Strength coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level of 
Member Vulnerability.  Member Vulnerability coefficients and standard errors are reported at mean level 
of Presidential Strength. 
 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7.3:  The Marginal Effect of Vulnerability and Presidential Strength on Presidential 
Support Scores in the 111th Congress 
     
 
House Senate 2009 Senate 2010 
 Member Vulnerability 
   Low Presidential Strength -6.63*** -7.75 -1.07 
 
 
(1.71) (6.1) (5.07) 
 
     Mean Presidential Strength 3.42*** -8.42 -0.79 
 
 
(1.23) (5.6) (4.82) 
 
     High Presidential Strength 13.5*** -9.1 -0.51 
 
 
(1.81) (8.96) (7.82) 
 
     Presidential Strength 
    Low Vulnerability 33.4*** 40.4** 34.2* 
 
 
(2.99) (20.2) (17.5) 
 
     Mean Vulnerability 53.2*** 38.4** 35.2** 
 
 
(3.74) (19.3) (14.0) 
 
     High Vulnerability 73.0*** 36.5 36.1 
 
 




































Table 7.4: Testing the Constituency Hypothesis and the Vulnerability Hypothesis using 
Members' Votes on High-Profile Obama Agenda Items in the 111th Congress 
 
   Panel A:  House of Representatives 
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Notes:  Table presents logistic regression estimates.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the member voted with President Obama’s position.  Presidential Strength coefficients and standard errors are 
reported at mean level of Member Vulnerability.  Member Vulnerability coefficients and standard errors are reported 
at mean level of Presidential Strength. 
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Appendix 7A:  Vote Totals on Selected Obama Agenda Items
Panel A:  House of Representatives
Health Care 12/09 Climate Bill
Yea Nay Yea Nay
All 220 215 219 212
Democrats 219 39 211 44
Republicans 1 176 8 168
Panel B:  Senate
Jobs for Main St Wall St Reform
Yea Nay Yea Nay
All 70 28 60 39
Democrats 57 1 57 1




Appendix 7B:  Distribution of Presidential Support Scores, Presidential Strength and Member 
Vulnerability in the 111th Congress
Presidential Support Scores
House Senate
All Democrats Republicans All Democrats Republicans
Minimum 8 50 8 27 77 27
25th %tile 26 90.5 17 51.5 95.5 42.5
Mean 65.3 92.4 26.8 77.9 95.7 51.3
75th %tile 96 97 35 97 97 58.5
Maximum 100 100 68 100 100 85
Presidential Strength
House Senate
All Democrats Republicans All 2009 Democrats 2009 Republicans 2009
Minimum 0.22 0.32 0.22 0.48 0.52 0.48
25th %tile 0.43 0.53 0.38 0.58 0.61 0.53
Mean 0.54 0.62 0.43 0.62 0.65 0.58
75th %tile 0.63 0.7 0.48 0.67 0.71 0.65
Maximum 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.72
All 2010 Democrats 2010 Republicans 2010
Minimum 0.3 0.36 0.3
25th %tile 0.45 0.49 0.43
Mean 0.5 0.53 0.45
75th %tile 0.56 0.59 0.5
Maximum 0.72 0.72 0.59
Member Vulnerability
House Senate
All Democrats Republicans All Democrats Republicans
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0
25th %tile 0.48 0.38 0.45 0.64 0.62 0.65
Mean 0.6 0.53 0.7 0.74 0.74 0.73
75th %tile 0.82 0.75 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.9
Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 0.99
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Chapter 8:  Constituency, Electoral Incentives, and Presidential 
Coalition Building 
The dominant theoretical explanations of presidential coalition building in the 
American system focus on party politics and ideology as the keys to presidential success 
in Congress.  Party-based theories argue that a president’s success in Congress increases 
as the numbers of congressional seats held by the president’s party increase.  Ideology-
based theories hold that ideological considerations dictate which members defect from 
their party caucus on presidential agenda votes.  The previous chapters find that party 
alone cannot explain how presidents build successful legislative coalitions.  Furthermore, 
ideology-based explanations are incomplete because it is impossible to empirically 
separate members’ personal preferences from their operative preferences, which are those 
preferences that guide members’ voting decisions after taking into account the influence 
of outside forces such as constituents, presidents, interest groups, and electoral 
incentives. 
This study began by presenting three puzzling empirical facts that arise from 
party-based theories of presidential coalition building.  First, due to the fact that members 
of the president’s party often vote against the president’s position, presidents almost 
always end up needing opposition party votes in order to pass major agenda items.  Of 
the twenty seven pieces of “landmark legislation” championed by the president and 
enacted by Congress between 1946 and 2008, twenty-six were dependent upon votes 
from opposition party members to become law.  The first puzzling empirical fact is that 
presidential party members often vote against the president’s agenda, while members of 
the opposition party often provide the president with the critical votes needed to build 
majority coalitions and pass important legislation into law. 
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Second, the president’s legislative success rates often vary widely within 
individual congresses, such as in the 89
th
 Congress when LBJ’s legislative success rate 
decreased by 11 percent from 1965 to 1966 and Congress enacted about 100 fewer of 
LBJ’s legislative requests.  Party-based theories do an adequate job explaining the 
variation in presidential success rates across congresses, but they cannot explain the 
within congress variation in presidential success rates.  In short, party-based theories 
work well at the macro level (comparing congresses), but fail at the micro level 
(understanding how individual bills become law).  The second puzzling empirical fact is 
that the success of the president’s coalition building efforts often varies substantially 
between sessions in individual Congresses, despite identical levels of partisan strength in 
both sessions. 
Third, presidents often have similar success rates in both unified and divided 
government.  For example, party-based theories cannot explain why Richard Nixon in 
divided government during the 91
st
 Congress had a similar legislative success rate as 
Jimmy Carter did in the 96
th
 Congress during unified government.  The third puzzling 
empirical fact is that presidents in unified and divided government often have similar 
success rates despite the fact that presidents in unified government enjoy partisan 
majorities in both chambers of Congress, and should be more successful according to 
party-based theories of presidential coalition building. 
This dissertation presents an argument that helps solves the puzzles presented by 
the current party-based conventional wisdom.  This argument also helps fill in the black 
box of “ideology,” which is traditionally measured using a summarized voting score that 
cannot distinguish between members’ personal preferences and their operative 
preferences.  I argue that constituency-level presidential strength combines with 
members’ electoral incentives to make some members of Congress systematically more 
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likely to vote against their party caucus’s position on presidential agenda votes.  First, 
members of the president’s party from constituencies where the president is weak will 
vote against the president more often than other presidential partisans, while opposition 
party members from constituencies where the president is strong will vote with the 
president more often than other opposition party members.  Second, vulnerable members 
of both parties with these types of “cross-pressured” constituency influences will be more 
likely to vote against their party caucus’s position.  Third, safe members of Congress 
have greater freedom in their voting behavior than others.  The voting behavior of these 
three types of members helps decide whether the president’s coalition building efforts 
will be successful or not.  Along with party, the combination of constituency-level 




I test three hypotheses that examine how constituencies and electoral incentives 
systematically affect members’ voting behavior.  The Constituency Hypothesis holds that 
as the president’s strength in a member’s constituency increases, the likelihood that the 
member will vote with the president increases as well.  The Vulnerability Hypothesis 
maintains that the votes of electorally vulnerable members of Congress will be especially 
in tune with the president’s standing in their constituencies.  The Safety Hypothesis 
suggests that as members become safer electorally, they have greater freedom in their 
voting behavior.  I test these hypotheses using members’ presidential support scores from 
1957 to 2007, members’ votes on final passage and veto override attempts during 
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challenged vetoes, an investigation of LBJ’s legislative experience from 1964 to 1968, 
and a case study of the 111
th
 Congress.   
 
The Constituency Hypothesis 
The Constituency Hypothesis investigates the relationship between constituency-
level presidential strength and members’ votes on the president’s agenda.  The analysis 
reveals a strong relationship between constituency-level presidential strength and 
members’ votes on both the president’s overall agenda and vote switching during 
challenged vetoes.  The relationship between presidential strength and member voting 
behavior is especially strong in the modern, highly polarized era in executive-legislative 
relations.  Despite the current focus on party polarization, members of Congress can and 
do vote against their party caucus’s position on presidential agenda votes.  This defection 
from the party caucus is often the result of the constituency’s influence on members’ 
voting behavior.  The empirical analysis of representatives’ presidential support scores in 
the House presented in Chapter 4 finds that a 10 percent increase in the president’s vote 
share in a member’s district is associated with a 5.8 percent increase in a member’s 
presidential support score.  The relationship operates similarly in the Senate, where a 10 
percent increase in the president’s vote share in a senator’s state is related with a 4.9 
percent in a senator’s presidential support.  These relationships hold after controlling for 
the effects of party and ideology.   
The president’s strength in members’ constituencies makes members 
systematically more or less likely to vote for the president’s program.  Constituency 
influence thus helps explain the first puzzling empirical fact that rises from party-based 
theories of presidential coalition building: the president almost always needs the votes of 
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opposition party members to pass his agenda into law, either because his party does not 
have the necessary majorities to pass bills or because members of the president’s party 
decide to vote against the president’s position.  Some members of the president’s party 
vote against his agenda items because he is weak in their constituencies, while some 
opposition party members end up providing the president with the votes he needs to enact 
his agenda because their constituents demand it. 
Constituencies also influence some members’ voting behavior on challenged 
vetoes, when the president vetoes a bill and Congress attempts to override the president’s 
veto.  Challenged vetoes offer ideal opportunities to investigate the difference between 
members’ personal preferences and their operative preferences.  Vetoes increase the 
salience of the bill and the policy debate, and thus increase constituency influence on 
members’ votes.  This increased constituency influence changes members’ operative 
preferences and causes some members to switch their votes between final passage and the 
veto override attempt. 
Empirical evidence for constituency influence on members’ votes during 
challenged vetoes exists in the House, but not the Senate.  In the House, the probability 
that a presidential party member from a district where the president is strong will switch 
their votes and join the president’s coalition on veto override attempt is 9 percentage 
points higher than if that member represented a district where the president is weak. 
Conversely, the probability that an opposition party member from a district where the 
president is weak will switch their vote and defect from the president’s coalition on veto 
override attempts is about 6 percentage points higher than the probability of defection by 
a member representing a district where the president is strong.  High constituency-level 
presidential strength helps the president win votes from his partisans in the House during 
veto override attempts.  It can also help discourage opposition party members from 
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defecting from the president’s coalition during veto override attempts.  Of course, low 
constituency-level presidential strength has the opposite effect.  Low presidential strength 
in the constituency can discourage presidential party members from joining his coalition 
during veto overrides and encourage opposition party members to defect from his veto 
coalition.  Constituency-level presidential strength clearly affects vote switching during 
challenged vetoes; whether that relationship helps or hurts the president is dependent on 
whether he is strong or weak in a member’s constituency. 
In addition to explaining aggregate trends in presidential coalition building, the 
Constituency Hypothesis also helps explain the legislative experience of President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson and President Barack Obama.  During LBJ’s time in office, 
Republicans from constituencies where he was strong tended to support the president at 
higher rates than Democrats from constituencies where he was weak.  This constituency 
effect occurs in both the House and the Senate.  Further, it helps explain why Johnson’s 
legislative agenda stalled in 1966 and 1967, and then regained momentum in 1968.  
Republicans from states and districts where President Johnson was strong provided the 
president with critical votes in 1968 during the 2
nd
 session of the 90
th
 Congress.  The 
average cross-pressured House Republican voted in support of the president’s over 50 
percent of the time in 1968 while the average cross-pressured Senate voted with the 
president about 48 percent of the time.  These Republicans, and their constituents, were 
the key to Johnson’s legislative resurgence in 1968. 
The strength of constituency influence also provides insight into Barack Obama’s 
experience with the 111
th
 Congress.  President Obama entered office with the biggest 
electoral victory by a Democrat since LBJ.  He also enjoyed large Democratic majorities 
in both chambers of Congress.  Despite these political advantages, the president had a 
surprisingly hard time enacting his top legislative priority, health care reform, into law.  
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Moreover, he failed to enact his second and third legislative priorities, cap-and-trade 
energy reform and immigration reform, into law.  In the House, large numbers of 
Democrats defected from their party caucus’s position and voted against the president’s 
agenda again and again.  Between thirty and fifty House Democrats voted against the 
president’s position on health care reform, cap-and-trade energy reform, the Jobs for 
Main Street bill, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform bill, and many other Obama agenda 
items.  These Democrats almost always represented constituencies where President 
Obama was weak.  In the face of these Democratic votes against his agenda, the president 
could not get much of his agenda through the House without Republican votes.35  House 
Republicans from constituencies where the president was strong provided these crucial 
votes on cap-and-trade, Jobs for Main Street, Dodd-Frank, and other important Obama 
agenda items.  The story of the House during the 111
th
 Congress cannot be told without 
including the influence of constituencies on members’ votes. 
The story of the Senate during the 111
th
 Congress also hinges on constituency 
influence.  Senate Democrats usually voted with their party caucus’s position on the 
president’s agenda, but Democratic votes were usually not enough because Democrats 
did not always have the sixty votes required to invoke cloture.36  Fortunately for both 
Senate Democrats and President Obama, Republican senators from states where the 
president was strong had incentives to support the president and join the Democrats on 
both cloture and final passage votes.  Republican senators from blue states thus held the 




                                                 
35 Health care reform was the exception to this trend. 
36 Senate Democrats did have more than sixty senators in their caucus during the seven months between 
Arlen Specter’s decision to caucus with the Democrats and Scott Brown’s election to fill Teddy Kennedy’s 
open seat.  The power of this “filibuster-proof’ Democratic Caucus was limited because Senators Byrd and 




The Vulnerability Hypothesis 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis, by maintaining that vulnerable members of 
Congress are more attentive to their constituencies than safer members of Congress, 
suggests that electoral vulnerability is a key to effective representation in the American 
democratic republic.  The empirical tests of the Vulnerability Hypothesis explore how 
electoral incentives affect members’ attention to their constituents on presidential agenda 
votes.  The analysis suggests that vulnerable members of Congress, especially vulnerable 
members of the House, are more sensitive to the president’s strength in their constituency 
on presidential support votes as well as challenged vetoes.  
Vulnerable members of Congress are quite responsive to their constituents’ 
opinion of the president.  This sensitivity to constituent preferences causes many 
members of the president’s party to vote against his agenda.  In the period from 1984 to 
2007, the average presidential support score of a vulnerable member of the president’s 
party from a constituency with low presidential strength was more than 20 percentage 
points lower than the average score of a presidential party member who represented a 
district where the president was strong.  Vulnerability had an even stronger effect on 
opposition party members.  The average presidential support score of an opposition party 
member from a constituency where the president was strong was more than 30 
percentage points higher than an average opposition party member from a constituency 
with low presidential strength.  In sum, the combination of electoral vulnerability and 
constituency-level presidential strength had an effect of 20 to 30 percentage points on 
members’ presidential scores.  This effect is almost as strong as party’s effect of about 36 
percentage points.  Vulnerable members of Congress are clearly responsive to 
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constituency-level presidential strength when deciding how to vote on the president’s 
agenda.  
Vulnerability also affects member behavior on challenged vetoes.  Specifically, 
the combination of vulnerability and presidential strength helps explain why some 
members of the president’s party are systematically more likely to switch votes and join 
the president’s coalition on veto override attempts in the House.  The probability that a 
vulnerable member of the president’s party who represents a constituency where the 
president is strong will become a “presidential joiner” is more than 8 percentage points 
higher than the probability of a similarly vulnerable member from a constituency where 
the president is weak will switch votes and join the president’s coalition during the veto 
override attempt.   
Understanding how electoral incentives affect the voting behavior of vulnerable 
members of Congress also sheds light on the legislative experiences of President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson and President Barack Obama.  During the Johnson and Obama 
presidencies, vulnerable Democrats from constituencies where these presidents were 
weak often voted against his positions. As a result, LBJ and Obama often needed 
Republican votes in order to enact their agenda items into law.  Vulnerable Republicans 
representing constituencies where these presidents were strong often provided LBJ and 
Obama with the votes they needed to enact their agenda items despite Democratic 
defections from their legislative coalitions.  More often than not, the combination of 
electoral vulnerability and constituency-level presidential strength causes members of the 
president’s party to vote against his agenda.  Due to these Democratic defections, the 
success or failure of President Johnson’s and President Obama’s legislative agenda laid in 
the hands of Republican members of Congress.   
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The votes of vulnerable Republicans representing constituencies with high 
presidential help account for President Johnson’s legislative success in 1964 and 1965, as 
well as his troubles in Congress during 1966 and 1967.  Moreover, supportive votes from 
vulnerable Republicans in the House and Senate helped President Johnson regain 
legislative momentum in 1968 and pass landmark legislation into law.  The voting 
behavior of certain vulnerable Democrats stalled the Johnson agenda in 1966 and 1967, 
while the voting behavior of certain vulnerable Republicans revived the Johnson agenda 
in 1968. 
The voting behavior of vulnerable members also played a role in President 
Obama’s legislative experience during the 111
th
 Congress.  Despite President Obama’s 
overwhelming electoral victory in 2008, a large number of vulnerable Democrats had 
electoral incentives to vote against the president because he was weak in their 
constituencies.  The average presidential support score of vulnerable House Democrats 
from districts where President Obama was weak was around 16 percentage points less 
than the average presidential support score of vulnerable Democrats from districts where 
President Obama was strong.  Moreover, on high-profile Obama agenda votes such as 
health care reform and cap-and-trade energy reform, the probability of a vulnerable 
Democrat representing a district where President Obama was weak voting with the 
president’s position was almost forty percentage points less than the probability of an 
average Democrat voting to support the president’s position.   
Vulnerable House Democrats from constituencies with low presidential strength 
presented a huge roadblock for the Obama agenda during the 111
th
 Congress.  These 
Democrats routinely voted against Obama’s position, especially on high-profile votrs.  
Because these Democrats often voted against the Obama agenda so often, the president 
did not have enough Democratic votes to pass much of his agenda into law without 
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attracting some Republican votes.  Vulnerable Republicans from constituencies where 
President Obama was strong provided these votes in both the House and the Senate.  
These Republican votes were especially important in the Senate because the president 
and his Democratic allies often needed to invoke cloture in order to end Republican 
filibusters.  Vulnerable Republicans from blue states with familiar names due to their 
prominence in both media reports and policy outcomes provided President Obama with 
crucial votes on the Jobs for Main Street bill, the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, and 
other important Obama agenda items.  These Republican votes usually came from 
Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine, Scott Brown of Massachusetts, or Arlen 
Specter of Pennsylvania, before his electoral incentives caused him to go so far as to 
switch parties and caucus with the Democrats in May 2009.   
Vulnerable members of Congress clearly vote differently than other members.  
This difference is especially stark in the House of Representatives.  As political scientists 
and pundits follow the legislative process and attempt to predict its outcomes, they must 
keep the behavior of vulnerable members in mind.  As increasing numbers of vulnerable 
members of the president’s party begin to vote against his agenda, it suggests that the 
president is in trouble in both Washington and the nation.  On the other hand, increased 
support from vulnerable members of the opposition party suggests that the president has a 
better chance to enact his agenda into law.  The road to successful presidential coalition 
building often runs through maintaining the support of vulnerable, cross-pressured 
members of the president’s party and attracting the votes of vulnerable, cross-pressured 




The Safety Hypothesis 
The Safety Hypothesis predicts that safe members of Congress will show the most 
variability in their votes on presidential agenda items.  In short, safe members of 
Congress are “wild cards” because their electoral safety allows them greater freedom 
from constituency influence.  I find consistent evidence that safe members of Congress 
are less tied to their constituencies than more vulnerable members on presidential agenda 
votes.  The analysis of presidential support scores finds that the relationship between 
constituency-level presidential strength and presidential support is weaker for safe 
members of Congress than it is for more vulnerable members.  In the House, a 10 
percentage point increase in presidential strength in a vulnerable member’s district 
increases that member’s presidential support score by 7 percentage points.  In contrast, a 
10 percentage point increase in presidential strength in a safe member’s district results in 
just a 4 percentage point increase in the member’s presidential support score.  The 
difference is even starker in the Senate, where a 10 percentage point increase in state-
level presidential strength is associated with a 5.5 percentage point increase in the 
presidential support scores of vulnerable senators, and just a 2 percentage point increase 
in the presidential support scores of safe senators.  Greater electoral safety results in 
greater freedom from constituency influence on members’ voting behavior.  As a result, 
the relationship between constituency-level presidential strength and presidential support 
is much weaker for safe members of Congress than it is for other members. 
Safe members of Congress also behave differently than other members on 
challenged vetoes.  In both the House and the Senate, safe members of the president’s 
party are more likely to become “presidential joiners” and switch their votes between 
final passage and veto override attempts in order to join the president’s coalition.  In the 
both chambers of Congress, one out of every five safe members of the president’s party 
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who vote against his position on the final passage vote end up switching their votes on 
veto override attempts and voting with the president.  Safe presidential party members of 
the House who represent constituencies where the president is strong have an even 
greater probability of switching their votes and joining the president’s coalition during 
veto override attempts.  The probability of a safe presidential party member from a 
constituency with high presidential strength becoming a presidential joiner is 24.7 
percent.  All else equal, safe members of Congress are more likely to switch their votes 
and become presidential joiners on challenged vetoes.  Safe members help presidents 
build the coalitions they need to sustain vetoes. 
The Safety Hypothesis also helps explain President Johnson’s coalition building 
activities in Congress.  Votes from electorally safe House Republicans, and Senate 
Republicans not up for reelection, were vital to President Johnson’s legislative resurgence 
in 1968.  These Republicans, on average, voted in support of the Johnson agenda more 
often than their Democratic counterparts who also enjoyed electoral safety.  Moreover, 
the twenty-six Senate Republicans who were not up for reelection in 1968 had a higher 
average presidential support score (about 51 percent) than the average Senate Democrat 
(about 48 percent).  President Johnson would not have regained his legislative 
momentum in 1968 and passed landmark legislation such as the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 without the support of electorally safe Republican members of Congress. 
In sum, the empirical analyses presented in this dissertation suggest that 
constituency influences and electoral incentives have systematic effects on members’ 
votes on the president’s agenda.  Constituency-level presidential strength makes some 
members of the president’s party systematically more likely to vote against his position.  
Conversely, constituency-level presidential strength makes some members of the 
opposition party more likely to vote in support of the president’s agenda.  Vulnerable 
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members of Congress are particularly sensitive to constituency influence because these 
members’ electoral incentives compel them to give great weight to constituency 
preferences when deciding how to vote.  On the other hand, electorally safe members of 
Congress have more freedom to vote against their constituents’ preferences.   
As a result of the great influence of constituency-level presidential strength and 
electoral incentives, the votes of cross-pressured members of Congress and safe members 
of Congress are key to presidential coalition building.  As more of these members vote 
with the president’s position, the president is more likely to enact his agenda into law.  As 
more of these members vote against the president, his agenda has a lower chance of 
success.  In order to understand whether presidents will succeed or fail at enacting their 
agenda, we must monitor the behavior of members with different constituency influences 
and electoral incentives. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study makes  four theoretical contributions to the political science literature.  
First and foremost, it provides a comprehensive explanation of how presidents build the 
legislative coalitions they need to enact their agenda into law.  While party-based theories 
explain the variation in presidential success compared across congresses, they cannot 
explain the passage of almost all of the “landmark legislation” enacted between 1945 and 
2008.  In short, if we wish to understand the coalitions that form to enact individual bills 
into law, we need something more nuanced and comprehensive than party-based 
explanations.  This study provides that nuanced and comprehensive explanation.  
Presidents build successful enacting coalitions upon a large base of votes from their party 
members, but usually need to augment this base with votes from opposition party 
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members.  These opposition party members will be either members from constituencies 
where the president is strong or they will be electorally safe members who have greater 
freedom in their voting behavior.  Presidential party members from constituencies where 
the president is weak will often vote against his agenda.  As a result, the president almost 
always needs votes from opposition party members in order to enact his agenda into law.  
This study explains whom those opposition party members will be, and why they might 
decide to give the president their votes. 
Second, this inquiry helps resolve the scholarly debate over “the presidential party 
hypothesis.”  This hypothesis is a point of great contention in the political science 
literature.  One side of the debate finds that presidential popularity causes members to 
respond more favorably to the president (Edwards 1976, 1978, 1980, and 1997; Ostrom 
and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985; Rohde and Simon 1985; Brace and Hinckley 
1992).  The other side argues that the relationship between presidential popularity is 
sometimes statistically significant, but always substantively meaningless (Bond and 
Fleisher 1984; Bond, Fleisher and Northup 1988; Edwards 1989; Mouw and MacKuen 
1992; Collier and Sullivan 1995) and that controlling for party and ideology makes the 
relationship disappear entirely (Bond and Fleisher 1980, 1990).   
This dissertation argues that the debate over the presidential popularity hypothesis 
is caused by a fundamental flaw – scholars are looking at the wrong type of presidential 
popularity.  Most scholarly analyses use the president’s strength in the nation as a whole 
to measure whether presidential popularity affects members’ votes on the president’s 
agenda.   I argue that it is the president’s strength in members’ constituency that truly 
affects members’ votes.  The empirical analyses presented throughout this dissertation 
consistently find that constituency-level presidential strength systematically affects 
member voting behavior on presidential agenda items.  It is the president’s popularity in 
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members’ constituencies, not the nation at large, that affects the president’s ability to 
build successful legislative coalitions. 
Third, the findings also clarify debate over “the marginality hypothesis.”  
Scholars debate whether electorally marginal members of Congress behave differently 
than other members of Congress.  Most assume that marginal members will become 
ideological moderates in order to capture the median voter and expand their base of 
electoral support.  As with the presidential popularity hypothesis, debate exists over the 
marginality hypothesis due to a fundamental flaw in scholars’ assumptions.  The 
assumption that marginal members will become moderates is fundamentally flawed for a 
simple reason: not all constituencies are moderate. 
Instead of assuming that marginal members will become ideological moderates, I 
assume that marginal members will be responsive to their constituencies.  I use 
constituency-level measures of presidential support to investigate whether vulnerable 
members of Congress behave differently than safe members on presidential agenda votes.  
This study is the first study to investigate whether marginal members vote differently 
than other members on the president’s agenda, an investigation that is often called for in 
discussions of executive-legislative relations (Edwards 2009).   Using constituency-level 
measures of presidential strength clarifies the marginality hypothesis.  In comparison to 
safer members of Congress, marginal members do vote differently.  Vulnerable members 
of Congress are especially responsive to their constituency on presidential agenda items.  
Marginal members wish to cast roll-call votes on the floor of Congress that will win them 
a plurality of their electorates’ votes on the next Election Day.  They attempt to cast such 
roll-call votes by following their constituency’s lead on presidential agenda items.   
Finally, this dissertation helps unpack the black box of “ideology.”  Lee (2009) 
began unpacking this black box.  She demonstrates that using NOMINATE scores, which 
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are simply summarized voting scores, to measure members’ personal ideologies is 
questionable at best because the majority of the issues that Congress votes on are non-
ideological items.  In my view, the main problem with using a summarized voting score 
to measure members’ ideologies is that roll-call votes measure members’ operative 
preferences, those preferences that guide members’ votes after taking into account all the 
influences on those votes.  These influences include constituencies, presidents, interest 
groups, and electoral incentives in addition to members’ personal preferences.  This 
dissertation finds that members’ votes on the president’s agenda are strongly influenced 
by constituent preferences.  This influence is especially strong on vulnerable members of 
Congress.  As a result, when political scientists and pundits discuss the votes of 
“moderate” Republicans and Democrats on presidential agenda items, what they often 
mean is “Republicans who represent constituencies where the Democratic president is 
strong” and “Democrats who represent constituencies where the Republican president is 
weak.”  For example, the House Republicans whose votes allowed President Obama’s 
cap-and-trade energy policy do not necessarily vote for the bill because it fit their 
personal preferences.  They voted for the bill because their constituents wanted them to, 
and they faced potential electoral repercussions if they did not heed their constituents’ 
preferences on such a high-profile vote.  
 
POLICYMAKING IMPLICATIONS 
The findings presented in this dissertation have three implications for the speed 
and content of policy outputs in the American political system.  First, policy outputs will 
almost always be moderate and incremental.  We need look no further than President 
Obama’s Affordable Health Care Act for an example.  Contrary to the hopes of many 
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who voted for Obama in 2008, the president did not enact universal health care or a 
similarly liberal policy as he promised on the campaign trail.  The president failed to 
produce such a liberal policy output for a simple reason.  He couldn’t.  A large number of 
Democrats had electoral incentives to vote against the major policy proposal of a 
president who was weak in their constituencies.  In order to keep the votes of enough of 
these Democrats and actually enact something into law, President Obama had to 
moderate his previous promises.  Despite the soaring rhetoric of the Obama campaign 
and the large Democratic majorities in Congress, many members of the president’s party 
were electorally vulnerable and represented districts where the president was either weak 
or only moderately strong.  In order to secure the votes of as many of these members as 
possible, President Obama had to propose a relatively moderate bill and accept changes 
that made the bill even more moderate. 
The second policymaking implication of this study deals with the speed of 
policymaking.  Simply put, policymaking will almost always take a long time.  Presidents 
almost always need to convince members of Congress that a vote for the president’s 
agenda serves their electoral interests.  Presidents cannot simply command their party 
members to vote for the presidential agenda.  Instead, they must either keep the votes of 
presidential partisans who are on the fence or secure the votes of opposition party 
members from constituencies where the president is strong.   
Finally, this study implies that once policies are enacted into law, it will be 
difficult to change them.  Even after Republicans tea partied their way into control of the 
House of Representatives after the 2010 elections, they could not reverse President 




The campaign promises of all presidents inevitably meet the empirical reality of 
Congress.  The realities of presidential coalition building dictate that policymaking will 
take a long time, policy changes will be difficult to enact, and most policy changes will 
be moderate and incremental.  These realities are especially stark in our increasingly 
polarized era.  Many presidential party members have electoral incentives that cause 
them to vote against the president, and thus presidents need to present relatively moderate 
policies in order to attract the votes needed to enact their agenda into law.  Even when 
presidents present such moderate policies, “cross-pressured” members of the opposition 
party may be slow to support them as these members carefully weigh whether voting with 
the president serves their electoral interests. 
The president must put on a balancing act and walk a moderate, incremental 
tightrope in order to keep the votes of as many of his congressional partisans as possible 
and attract the votes of enough opposition party members to offset defections by 
presidential party members.  This task is increasingly difficult in the modern, polarized 
era.  Opposition party members from constituencies where the president is strong often 
hold the key votes that determine whether presidential coalition building will succeed or 
fail.  The problem for presidents is that fewer of these “cross-pressured” opposition party 
members now exist.  In the past, presidents had a larger universe of “cross-pressured” 
opposition party members from which to work.  For example, President Johnson had 34 
Republican senators from Johnson states in the 89
th
 Congress (1965-7).  In contrast, just 
ten Republican senators represented states that Obama won in 2008.  The realities of 
presidential coalition building in the polarized era dictate that policy change will be 





The Founders created a system based upon representation, democratic 
accountability, and the idea that elections created a legitimate democratic republic.  The 
findings of the empirical analyses presented in this dissertation suggest that these 
normative ideals are alive and well more than 200 years after the ratification of the 
Constitution.  The Constituency Hypothesis suggests that members of Congress often 
represent their constituencies over their political parties.  Even in these highly polarized 
times, members’ votes on the president’s agenda are strongly related to the president’s 
strength in their constituencies.  This relationship suggests that norms of constituency 
representation are still present in the American political system. 
The Vulnerability Hypothesis and Safety Hypothesis speak to the presence of 
democratic accountability in the American system.  Elections allow constituents control 
over their members of Congress.  As members become more electorally vulnerable, they 
also become more responsive to their constituents’ opinion of the president.  The Safety 
Hypothesis suggests that as members of Congress become safer electorally, their votes on 
the president’s agenda are less in line with the president’s strength in their constituency.  
Vulnerability holds the key to democracy.  Constituencies influence the votes of 
vulnerable members of Congress more than the votes of safer members.  This relationship 
between electoral incentives and member voting behavior on presidential agenda items 
suggests that citizens should care deeply about the effects of partisan redistricting in the 
states.  The results of this study suggest that the quality of representation on presidential 
agenda items may decrease if partisan redistricting efforts result in gerrymandered 
districts and safer representatives.  Electorally vulnerable members of Congress pay 
closer attention to the constituencies on presidential agenda items.  Electoral competition 
is essential to the health of democratic representation in the United States.  
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Democratic accountability is not only present in the American Congress.  It is 
present in the American presidency as well.  As the American people become less 
satisfied with the president, their representatives in Congress will be less likely to vote 
for the president’s agenda.  Thus, the relationship between constituency, electoral 
incentives, and members’ votes on the president’s agenda keeps both members of 
Congress and the president accountable to the American people. 
The relationship between constituency, electoral incentives, and members’ votes 
on the president’s agenda also helps keep the system legitimate in the eyes of American 
citizens.  Voters see that their members of Congress behave in accordance with their 
wishes and will help or hinder the president accordingly.  This helps citizens view the 
political system as a legitimate way to settle disputes.  Furthermore, voters know that if 
their members of Congress do not heed their constituencies, they will be voted out in the 
next election.  This study presents something that Americans need – an optimistic, yet 
realistic, view of the American political system that finds that what some call gridlock is 
actually the healthy presence of representation and democratic accountability. 
  
THE COALITION-CREATING CONSTITUTION  
The Constitution compels presidents to build legislative coalitions in order to pass 
their political agendas.  The Constitution also compels members of Congress to be 
responsive to their constituencies or risk losing their seats in the next election.  This facet 
of the constitutional design helps presidents build legislative coalitions.  The president’s 
strength in members’ constituencies affects members’ decisions to vote for or against the 
president’s agenda on the floor of Congress.  This systematic relationship between 
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constituency-level presidential strength and members’ presidential support is especially 
pronounced for electorally vulnerable members. 
The relationship between Congress and the president lies at the heart of the 
American political system.  The relationship between constituency-level presidential 
strength, electoral incentives, and member voting behavior on presidential agenda items 
is a testament to the presence of representation and democratic accountability in 
American politics.  When voting on the president’s agenda, members of Congress 
represent their constituency’s preferences in an attempt to avoid being held accountable 
in the next election.  As members become more vulnerable and the threat of defeat 
increases, they are especially responsive to their constituents.  With representation and 
democratic accountability present, the people’s will flows like blood through the heart of 
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